Office of the Historian

7. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy (Eizenstat) to President Carter1

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

  • A National Integrated Telecommunications Protection Policy2

As you know, the Soviets are using their Embassy and other installations in Washington, New York and San Francisco, and Cuba to conduct an extensive and growing microwave intercept program targeted against US government agencies, government defense contractors, and US business and industry. The information collected by this intercept program is exploited by the Soviets to gain insight into critical US Government developments in military weapons, intelligence systems [Page 30] and proprietary military technology as well as to exploit the US in international trade, commodity and monetary transactions.

Some counter actions have been underway for some time. The Ford Administration took action which denied the Soviets access to the communications of some government agencies, but nothing was done about the private sector where the Soviets are increasingly focusing their intercepts.

As a result you are faced with addressing politically sensitive and potentially long-term decisions on telecommunications protection efforts. These decisions, coupled with previous actions taken and actions currently underway, have significant ramifications on the future course of (1) protecting the privacy of US citizens, business and industry; (2) denying sensitive national security information to the Soviet Union; (3) nonetheless, maintaining US intelligence gathering efforts, particularly SIGINT efforts; (4) our diplomatic relations; (5) accelerating US plans for protecting up and down link satellite transmissions as well as mobile radio-telecommunications systems and networks.

A national telecommunications protection policy is needed. Insofar as current leadership, guidance and direction are concerned, the entire program is at an impasse. Fractious, piecemeal ongoing actions continue out of their own inertia. The resolution of who’s responsible for deciding those issues is as profound as deciding the issues themselves.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve and sign the PRM at Tab A3 which directs development of an integrated National Telecommunications Protection Policy and a framework for its implementation under the SCC. (It has been reviewed at the senior working level within the Executive Office, within the Intelligence Community, including Stan Turner personally, and at the State Department.)4

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 40, [PRM–22 1 of 2] [1]. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.↩
  2. For the Ford administration’s approach to telecommunications security, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976, Documents 175–182.↩
  3. Not found attached. PRM/NSC–22, as signed, is printed as Document 8.↩
  4. Carter approved this recommendation and initialed below it.↩