Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

65. Memorandum From the Military Assistant to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Odom) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 15, 1978

SUBJECT

• SAC/NORAD Trip

My recent trip to SAC and NORAD turned up a menu of concerns too great for a single memorandum. Here is a selected number of items, that should become part of your awareness:

— The C3 problem.

— Secure Reserve Force planning.

— Thinking about LNOs.

— IVORY ITEM impact.

— NORAD reorganization.

The C3 Problem

The latest RISOP–SIOP analysis (that is, a Soviet attack on the U.S. and a U.S. response at the SIOP level) has been reported to us largely as dynamic interaction between weapons inventories on both sides. Another aspect of the analysis has not been highlighted: Soviet doctrinal concern with attacking C3 with a higher priority than attack on U.S. nuclear delivery systems. I have generally been aware that our C3 is designed to get off a retaliatory response [11 lines not declassified].

This, of course, raises doubts about our ability to ride out an attack and then retaliate. Paul Nitze’s scenario,² where we lose our ICBM force to a Soviet first strike and then would not want to retaliate because the Soviets could then attack our cities, [5 lines not declassified].

To put it in a different way, it is usually argued that “stability” exists when neither side can expect to attack and greatly limit damage to itself. [5 lines not declassified]

Secure Reserve Force Planning

The SAC staff is fairly candid about its lack of attention to and its long neglect of how to plan and use a reserve force. Attention has been so fully concentrated on the SIOP spasm response that little planning has been devoted to the next steps, i.e. what we do thereafter. For example, how do we assess the results of our attack on the USSR? We have these tidy criteria—[1 line not declassified] but no way to know if we achieved even part of that outcome. At what will we shoot reserve weapons?

[2 lines not declassified] They want an LNO capability without a war fighting doctrine. Their logical escape from this paradox is to accept an “assured destruction” doctrine, but they do not want that. Moreover, they are slowly beginning to realize that Soviet changing capabilities may be eroding a de facto “assured destruction” capability (e.g. a C3 attack combined with a political and diplomatic gambit that undercuts both our capability retaliate and our desire to retaliate.)³

Thinking About LNOs

[1 paragraph (21 lines) not declassified]

IVORY ITEM Impact

The impact of IVORY ITEM drills has been far-reaching. It has forced the CINCs at SAC and NORAD to take a very close look at the short warning situation, C3, and Soviet doctrine. General Hill at NORAD made me sit down in his chair at the NORAD command center and go through a drill to appreciate certain artificialities IVORY ITEM places on him in answering questions from the President. In working out his own role in such a personal way, he has, I believe, become aware that we are indeed on a threshold of change from the old view of the SIOP execution to⁴ a new view of a much more complicated world of command and control.

The same development has occurred at SAC in a different form. The new concerns with C3, less than SIOP exchanges, have derived in no small part from the IVORY ITEM experiences. Several of the generals at SAC simply admitted that they have not worked into these areas sufficiently. They are breaking ground, but they are nervous about how far to go because of the enormous doctrinal, forces structure, and budget implications. They know that they cannot lead in the doctrinal development. That must finally come from the NSC and the Secretary of Defense.

NORAD Re-organization

General Hill is terribly concerned that the Air Force will combine the [2 lines not declassified]. I know nothing of this proposed re-organization, but clearly it is a concept that should be considered thoroughly before taking action.⁵ Do you and the President want the SAC commander both assessing the attack and also commanding the forces for a U.S. strike? In principle that would allow him to bias the attack development either way: under-estimating the warning because he has a subjective hesitation about executing our SIOP or over-estimating the warning because he is itching for a fight. I am inclined to favor the preservation of an independent CINC with only one task: judge the seriousness of our warning data in deciding whether to sound the alarm.

An Afterthought

[1 paragraph (12 lines) not declassified]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 52, SAC and NORAD 8/20–21/78 Brzezinski Trip: 7–9/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. Outside the System. Sent for information. Brzezinski wrote at the top of the memorandum: “pp 2, 3. ZB.”
2. See Document 1.
3. Brzezinski drew two vertical lines in the left margin next to this paragraph and one in the right margin.
4. Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to the preceding sentence and this sentence up to this point and wrote: “What are they?”
5. Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to the preceding two sentences and wrote: “Why.”