Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

38. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, October 31, 1977

SUBJECT

• Speech on Defense Policy

There are many reasons why you may wish to deliver a major speech on defense policy in December or early January.

1. In such a speech you could make an authoritative statement of the defense policies and programs which have been developed during the past year, particularly in PD–18² and in the formulation of the FY 1979 defense budget during the coming weeks. It would thus be the vehicle for communicating to the public the general framework and rationale for the specific program decision which will be revealed in January and would provide guidance and direction for both Congress and the bureaucracy.

2. Assuming agreement is reached on the key elements of SALT in the coming months, this speech would explain the relationship between these agreements and our own new and on-going defense programs.

3. A defense speech would strengthen the public image of you in your role as Commander-in-Chief and would help counter the arguments of those opposed to the Panama Treaty and to SALT that you have been neglectful of our defense posture.

4. It would also answer congressional criticisms, such as those concerning the B–1 and MX in the past several weeks, that we do not have a coherent defense policy and would provide a response to arguments (such as those advanced in the attached letter from Gene Rostow) that you should provide more vigorous leadership in this area.

5. It would usefully balance your other major foreign policy speeches which have emphasized the need to control the arms race and restrict arms proliferation through United States-Soviet Union and multilateral negotiations.

6. It could also, particularly if a SALT agreement is reached, provide reassurance to our allies that we are not relaxing our determination or our ability to meet our commitments to them.

Given these reasons why such a speech might well be desirable about the first of the year, I am, unless you object, asking Sam Huntington to work with other members of the NSC Staff in developing ideas and themes for it.³

Attachment

Letter From Eugene Rostow of the Committee on the Present Danger to President Carter⁴

Washington, September 19, 1977

Dear Mr. President,

The Executive Committee of the Committee on the Present Danger appreciated our meeting last Friday, September 16, with Samuel Huntington, of your National Security Council staff. Pursuant to your request at our meeting on August 4,⁵ he came to explain the several steps which led to your assessment of Soviet policy, and your decisions in PD–18 of August 26.⁶

After a thorough and spirited discussion of the main problems, we expressed these general preliminary reactions to him:

(1) On the basis of Mr. Huntington’s exposition, the thrust and tenor of PD–18 appeared promising to us, but we believe its background and content should be explained to the American people, and to world opinion, in a major speech by you, and not through leaks to the press, or speeches by the Secretary of Defense, however constructive;

(2) We should be glad to respond to your request on August 4 for our appraisal of your assessment of Soviet intentions and capabilities, when we have studied the relevant documents, and discussed them further with your associates;

(3) We were unable to reconcile the policy of PD–18, as Mr. Huntington explained it, with other aspects of the ongoing foreign and defense policies of the Administration, including the withdrawal of conventional forces from Korea; the apparent willingness of the Administration to consider denouncing the Security Treaty with Taiwan; the positions taken in the SALT negotiations; and the contents of the defense budget, including its provisions for strategic weapons and naval strength; and

(4) We noted with interest that according to Mr. Huntington, Era II in Soviet-American relations, starting with the October, 1973, war in the Middle East, is considered to be more dangerous for us than the period which preceded it, and that the operating premise of PD–18 is that the Soviet Union will take advantage of every opportunity for the expansion of its power and influence unless deterred by unacceptable risk.

With great respect, and every good wish,

Yours sincerely,

Eugene V. Rostow
Chairman, Executive Committee

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 64, Speeches: Wake Forest University, 10/77–3/78. Confidential. A stamped notation indicates that Carter saw the memorandum. In the upper right corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: “OK to do a draft—Time and delivery will be decided later. J.”
2. See Document 31.
3. At the end of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: “Naturally, we will coordinate with Harold.”
4. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Huntington.
5. Carter and Brown met with Rostow and other members of the Committee on the Present Danger in the Cabinet Room the afternoon of August 4. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)
6. Carter signed PD–18 on August 24. See Document 31.