Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

25. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, July 7, 1977, 3–4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• PRM/NSC–10 Comprehensive Net Assessment

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Secretary Vance
  • Leslie H. Gelb

• Defense

  • Secretary Brown
  • Charles W. Duncan
  • Lynn E. Davis

• JCS

  • Gen. George S. Brown
  • Lt. General William Y. Smith

• CIA

  • Adm. Stansfield Turner
  • Robert R. Bowie

• OMB

  • Bert Lance
  • Edward R. Jayne

• ACDA

  • Paul C. Warnke
  • Spurgeon Keeny

• NSC

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David L. Aaron
  • Samuel P. Huntington
  • Catherine M. Kelleher
  • Col. William E. Odom

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The first meeting of the SCC on PRM/NSC–10 focused on the general conclusions of the Net Assessment. Three basic issues were discussed:

1. What is the present balance of power between the US and the SU?

— All present agreed with the conclusion of the Net Assessment that there is a rough overall asymmetrical equivalence in military capabilities and that the US remains significantly ahead of the SU in most non-military aspects of national power.

— With respect to strategic forces, it was agreed that the current situation is one of relatively stable essential equivalence, but that uncertainties exist with respect to increasing Soviet accuracy, Soviet civil defense, and the apparent asymmetry in the protection of command and control capabilities.

— On the Central Front, Warsaw Pact forces exceed those of NATO, but neither side can be confident that it will be able to achieve its objectives in a major conflict, with the principal Soviet uncertainty being whether NATO will use nuclear weapons.

— In terms of naval and force projection capabilities, the US is superior, but uncertainties exist in the eastern Mediterranean and the US and the SU have about equal ability to project forces into the Persian Gulf. The Soviets have also demonstrated their ability to support Angola-like proxy interventions.

— With respect to non-military capabilities, US advantages could even be somewhat greater than indicated in the assessment.

2. What is the direction of current trends and how significant are these for the balance? There was general agreement with the Net Assessment findings that:

— Soviet theater nuclear capabilities in Europe are improving significantly, and only concerted Western efforts to fulfill present improvement programs would halt (but not reverse) current trends in their favor in the military balance on the Central Front.

— The US retains a political-ideological attraction for the Third World as well as the ability to provide economic and technological benefits. Some uncertainty was expressed as to whether, as the Assessment indicates, there had been erosion in the US diplomatic standing in the past decade as a result of the increased autonomy and assertiveness of Third World countries. The point was also made that this Administration was identifying itself with a broad segment of world opinion on issues such as human rights and Africa.

The discussion also highlighted two dangerous trends which might tempt Soviet action:

— increasing political and economic uncertainties in Western and Eastern Europe which could lead Soviet leaders in the midst of a succession struggle into cautious adventurism;

— the increased dependence on the West on the Persian Gulf oil supplies.

3. How can the United States and the Soviet Union exploit their present advantages to affect the future balance? All agreed with the Assessment that the Soviets would now be more prone to use military power for political ends, although there was some disagreement as to:

— whether the Soviets had already been able to use their new military standing for political compellance;

— whether increased Western European (particularly German) attentiveness to Soviet concerns was a direct result of new Soviet influence, and thus represented a form of Finlandization.

All supported the judgment of the Assessment that:

— the primary US advantage lay in economic and technological assets;

— these could yield little direct leverage over Soviet behavior or influence over internal political development;

— these could be best used to constrain Soviet opportunities or reduce Western vulnerabilities in key regions (e.g., Middle East, PRC, Yugoslavia).

In addition, it was argued that the large American technological and industrial base allows the US to put competitive pressure on the USSR which could encourage Moscow to seek relief through arms control.

1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 27, Meetings–20: 7/7/77. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Minutes of the meeting were not found.