Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

24. Memorandum From Samuel Huntington of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, July 6, 1977

SUBJECT

• SCC Meeting on PRM–10 Net Assessment, July 7, 1977

I. Purpose of the Meeting

Our goals are to get SCC

1) approval for the submission of the Net Assessment (minus the strategies, if necessary) to the President;

2) agreement on the desirability of a follow-on SCC meeting, after the PRCs on PRM–10, for further discussion of the framework elaborating national strategies.

To achieve these two outcomes, it would be useful to guide the discussion toward:

1. Consensus on the current shape of the US–SU balance as described in the Net Assessment (static);

2. Agreement on the trends in the balance which should be of concern for the US in the overall competition with the Soviet Union (dynamic);

3. Common understanding of the opportunities and strengths on which the United States can capitalize in the competition.

The discussion at the July 7 meeting should provide an important framework for the later consideration of both national strategy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the key military and force posture issues to be presented to the PRC.

II. Issues For You to Focus On

A. The profile of the present balance. The Net Assessment concludes that at present (Era II), the US–SU competition shows a rough overall asymmetrical equivalence exists in military capabilities and significant American advantage in most non-military aspects of national power. This represents a shift, however, from the previous pattern (Era I) of US dominance in all areas. It results from the growth of Soviet military power, strategic and conventional, in the 1960s and early 1970s.

The assessment notes five key developments within the Era II balance:

1. The new incongruence in US–SU capabilities, given increased Soviet military strength.

2. The changing role of military force under rough parity, with conventional strength achieving added significance.

3. The certainty of political uncertainty, particularly in European politics (East and West), in Chinese relationships, and in the Third World.

4. The rise in the importance of the Middle East to US–SU competition.

5. The emergence of regionally influential Third World states which are also active in the global arena.

B. The direction of present trends. Current and foreseeable trends are generally less favorable to the United States. Trends in the political sphere (political institutions and leaderships, capacities for political-ideological action) and in economic productivity favor the U.S. In some other areas, such as intelligence capabilities and core alliances, the trends are mixed. And in many key areas, the dynamics either favor the SU or are against the US: strategic forces, conventional forces in Europe, mobilization and force projection capabilities, short-run economic interaction payoffs, and the diplomatic balance, especially in Africa and Latin America.

C. The significance of present trends. These adverse and mixed trends vary widely in significance. Categories for discussion are:

1. Trends which will be halted/reversed if planned US and allied improvements are carried out (e.g., in strategic forces, military balance on the Central Front).

2. Trends which do not yet pose significant challenges to the US (e.g., in force projection capabilities, Latin America).

3. Trends which could prove more troublesome in the next five years, without US action (e.g., in mobilization capabilities, erosion of US diplomatic position [especially if ties to local leviathans are eroded], a “one-way-street” in transfers of technology and capital to the East, covert action capabilities, Soviet action in Africa).

4. Trends on which US direct impact is limited (e.g., political uncertainty and weakness in Europe, China, Third World).

D. The advantages on which the United States can capitalize. There are five general areas in which the United States can exploit its opportunities to further advantage in the US–SU competition:

1. Economic strength—the general level of US productivity as well as the attraction it possesses for the East, the regional influentials, and the more developed states of the Third World.

2. Diplomatic resources—the large number of stable relationships the US has and can continue to have with the trilateral states, the local leviathans, and its regional clients.

3. Technological capacity—US technological dynamism and broad across-the-board lead in areas relevant to both the Soviet’s and Third World states.

4. Political-ideological action—the US ideological initiative and overall capacities—both public and private plus those of our allies—for influencing political attitudes and processes in other societies.

5. Force projection capabilities—the superior “global reach” of the US.

E. Outcomes and strategies of Era II. Given the existing balance, the possible outcomes of Era II US–SU competition can be analyzed in terms of two basic questions:

1. Whether US–SU relations become more competitive, more cooperative, or stay about the same.

2. Whether the global power balance shifts toward the SU or the US, or remains about as it is now.

The nine possible outcomes are presented in the following chart. Outcome A1 would be most desirable but probably impossible. Outcomes C2, C3, and B3 are clearly undesirable. Each of the remaining five outcomes could be feasible and could be reached by one of the alternative strategies outlined: condominium, cooperative, status quo, initiatives and preeminence.

Any discussion of these outcomes and strategies in detail is clearly premature. It is, however, appropriate to elicit agreement now on the desirability of attempting to develop a national strategy; presumably at a SCC meeting to follow PRC consideration of the force posture questions and packages.

III. Pitfalls to be Avoided

1. Extended discussion of DOD’s key questions or AIMSes.

2. Specific details of the Assessment (every specialist will find something wrong in his area).

3. Queries as to why report does not cover:

a. Specific policy recommendations

b. Specification of policy options

c. Other global issues beyond US–SU competition

d. Evaluation criteria

e. Overlap with DOD effort.

4. Controversy about specific break-points between Era I and Era II, and relationship of these to detente.

5. Premature discussion of, and rejection of, national strategies.

CHART 1²

POTENTIAL OUTCOMES OF ERA IIUS–SU COMPETITION AND RELATED US STRATEGIES

IV. Objections and Agreements to Expect

DOD/ISA

Harold Brown’s position is unclear but recent protest within both OSD and the JCS has apparently caused second thoughts about pressing ahead with the AIMS concept for the PRM–10 PRC meeting. Therefore, Brown and McGiffert may be more reserved or defensive than we originally anticipated in objecting to the Net Assessment.

JCS

The JCS line will be that the Assessment is too optimistic on certain military judgments, especially the Central Front and in naval issues, but these objections are less important than their fundamental approval of the Net Assessment. They will probably agree that it should go to the President.

STATE

The State objective is to reduce the Net Assessment to insignificance and perhaps to emphasize the AIMSes of the DOD side of PRM–10. Their tactic is grudging approval of the Assessment as “useful” but complete rejection of the “outcomes and strategies” (and implicitly, the study itself) as being too narrowly focused on the US–SU competition. They will again argue the need to consider 1) other issues of global concern and 2) the need for more attention to US–SU cooperation. Reference to the PRM and to the TOR should put this to rest once again. Portions of State (PM, SP) believe that the assessment is too gloomy in its judgment of Soviet military capabilities and that the study may, if widely publicized, further exacerbate present US–SU tensions.

OMB

Basically they approve the Assessment but will probably recommend that the discussion of national strategies be omitted until these are further developed.

CIA

They will probably approve the Net Assessment and call for further work on the strategies.

ACDA

Warnke’s view is unclear. He is doing his own homework and apparently is intrigued by the methodological inadequacies of the AIMSes. He should not be allowed to divert the discussion from the Net Assessment to a critique of the AIMSes. That is for the PRC on Friday!!³

V. Where You Would Like to Come Out

1. General consensus on the balance and pattern of trends described in the Net Assessment.

2. Agreement on the submission of the Net Assessment to the President once minor modifications are made.

3. Agreement on a follow-on SCC meeting, after the PRC consideration of the force posture study, to discuss national strategies.

1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 27, Meetings–20: 7/7/77. No classification marking. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Brackets are in the original. The June 29 Overview Report prepared by the Comprehensive Net Assessment Group in response to PRM/NSC–10 is ibid.
2. Secret.
3. July 8.