Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

215. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, November 24, 1980, 2:30–3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Basic Strategy Issues

PARTICIPANT

• State

  • Secretary Edmund Muskie
  • Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher

• Defense

  • Secretary Harold Brown
  • Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor
  • Under Secretary for Policy Robert W. Komer

• JCS

  • Chairman General David Jones

• OMB

  • Director James McIntyre

• CIA

  • Director Stansfield Turner

• White House

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron

• NSC

  • BGeneral William E. Odom

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Dr. Brzezinski opened by saying this is not a budget meeting but rather a review of probable geopolitical and strategic challenges which will face the U.S.; it also has relevance for our foreign policy decisions as well because they are interrelated with security. The Defense paper,² on which the meeting is based, is provocative and important. It raises critical issues and offers contingent answers. The answers we give these issues will have both budgetary implications and implications for the strategic legacy left by this Administration. They will also be important for the President to use in constructing his State of the Union Message in which he will offer warnings and conclusions about the decade ahead. (S)

Before the discussion could proceed to the list of eight issues, Secretary Muskie offered the following general objections:

— It has nothing to do with the FY 1982 budget, only implications for FY 1983–86. (McIntyre corrected this observation by noting that the Southwest Asian issue and the “readiness versus modernization” issue are relevant to the FY 1982 budget.) (C)

— He wondered about the speeches that had been made during the campaign, about the conditions of our national security in light of the assertions in this paper. If the defense is not adequate, as the paper insists, then we did not advocate a proper policy and we have misled the American people. (S)

— The paper says things about our own record for the past four years. It assumes that our Allies in Europe and East Asia must adopt drastic policy changes or the threat won’t be met. If the threat is that serious and the Allies won’t act, do we have to take up the slack? What are the consequences for Japan if the U.S. suggests that Japan take over the security of Korea? If the Japanese won’t be responsive, why raise the issue now? It would be better to do it later and in a slower manner. (S)

— The President’s concern with the State of the Union Message is understandable, and there are some valid points in the paper, but the problems relate to a period when we won’t have jurisdiction over policy. The paper needs revisions before it can be adopted by the President and the National Security Council. (S)

Harold Brown answered Muskie’s remarks about the “terrifying paper” (Muskie denied that he had used these words), a surprising paper, Brown added, in light of what was said during the election campaign. Brown recalled that our warnings during the campaign about the problems in the 1980s, about the importance of our Allies’ contributions, about our defense programs going ahead on schedule, and the importance of arms control are very consistent with the thrust of the paper. You say the Allies will not accept it. The future will be terrifying if the Allies do not and we do not carry out our defense programs. Brown added that there has not been time to staff this paper with other agencies, but its issues are primarily defense matters. In any case, we have to leave the next Administration some strategic assessment. (S)

Muskie asked why we must go public with this. Harold Brown said it will not be a public document. McIntyre added that in so far as it is included in the defense report to the Congress on the Five-Year Defense Plan, it will be public. Dr. Brzezinski added that it could be refined in our discussion here to provide points to the President for his State of the Union Address. (C)

Harold Brown and McIntyre entered a short debate on how large a deviation from previous FYDPs is appropriate. McIntyre charged that Defense is “phoneying” the books on the threat and the problems. Brown argued that “real, real growth” to meet inflation may require quite large deviations as compared to “real growth” which has not. Both agreed to defer this debate until the upcoming PRC meeting on the Defense budget. (S)

Komer offered the caveat that we separate tactical from strategic issues. We are not talking about Japan taking responsibility for the defense of Korea now but rather about this policy aim as a strategic objective for the future. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski responded to Muskie that the paper and the SCC discussion could help the President in considering most of the defense issues. Although some foreign policy issues are included, the paper admittedly does not address the full range of foreign policy problems. (C)

Turner offered the following general comment: he accepts the premises that (1) we cannot meet a Persian Gulf, European, and East Asian war simultaneously, (2) a coalition with our Allies is essential to meet our defense requirements. Because coalitions work only in wartime, U.S. strategy must not be dependent upon our allies to protect our vital interests. We need a strategy for a better defense deployment. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski and Brown challenged the soundness of Turner’s conclusion by citing the impossibility of defending Europe and Japan without their help. Dr. Brzezinski added that Turner had made one valid point: the Persian Gulf region is an exception; only the U.S. could defend it; we should face up to that now. (S)

Turner accepted Dr. Brzezinski’s argument but added that we need more flexibility because our past record of predicting locations of conflicts has been poor. (S)

Harold Brown said that if you look at the U.S./Soviet relationship you see that we play down areas far away from the Soviet Union like South Africa, the Caribbean, and the South Pacific. Geography is not against us there, but in Europe, East Asia, and Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf, the USSR is very close. Thus, we need advanced preparation for those regions. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski closed the general discussion and directed comment to the list of eight issues. (C)

Issue #-1—Do the 1980s pose a significantly greater danger of major regional or global conflict? Dr. Brzezinski asked if this is true, or if there is anyone who disagrees with it. (S)

Muskie raised a question about post-Tito Yugoslavia³ creating a greater danger of a regional conflict. Brown explained that we mean the Soviets might exploit centrifugal forces in that country. Komer added that the National Intelligence Estimate says that the first six months are not likely to be a problem; the real danger will come later; therefore, we should not be surprised that it has been quiet to date. (S)

Issue #-2—If for several years to come defending our vital interests in the widely separated NATO, Persian Gulf and Far East theaters simultaneously is beyond our capabilities, which should receive priority? and Issue #-3—How can we best fill the PG/IO power vacuum? (S)

Harold Brown said that some within Defense believe that anything less than enough to meet both the NATO and Persian Gulf theater requirements simultaneously is inadequate. He does not agree with this view, and he cited World World II in which we gave priority first to one theater and then another. Now we must ask what is the ratio of our interests to the risks in each theater. In Brown’s view the ratio is higher in Southwest Asia; therefore, it should receive priority in programs. (S)

General Jones acknowledged Brown’s point but said that when additional requirements are placed on the military services, they impact on our European and Asian capabilities whether we like it or not. (S)

Muskie said look at it the other way. If all that is necessary to seize the Persian Gulf in order to break the West’s hold in Europe, why would the Soviets attack in all three theaters at once? (S)

Brown replied that they would feint in Europe while attacking in the Persian Gulf. (S)

Jones said they would not attack in Europe but would mobilize in order to hold us in position in Europe. In all our present plans the priority commitment of forces is to Europe. (S)

Muskie expressed surprise and asked if we are not already shifting the priority to the Persian Gulf. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski explained that this is our emerging policy, not yet a fully developed one. (S)

Komer explained that the paper is not referring to operational priority but rather budget priority to the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. (C)

Muskie said okay, but the issue is the same. Europe won’t even live up to the three percent commitment. (C)

Brown then explained that we are moving from a three-and-a-half division to a six-and-a-half division plan for the Persian Gulf. The additional three divisions will have to be taken from forces which now are committed to reinforce NATO. The Europeans will have to take up the slack as we reallocate them. There was a lengthy digression on the significance of this reallocation, when it actually takes place, whether it will put pressure on the Europeans to fill the gap, or whether they will respond the same way they did to the three percent goal. (S)

Muskie argued that the Europeans might be right, that there will not be a simultaneous attack in both theaters. We might take a lesson from the Europeans. Brown argued that the U.S. must lead, not follow the European example. It is better to lead on the way “up” in force development than on the way “down.” (S)

Issue #-4—What Far East strategic posture will best relieve Soviet pressure on Europe and the PG/IO, while limiting risks of simultaneous global war? Dr. Brzezinski listed the three points of the Defense paper recommendations as:

— Getting the Japanese to rearm faster.

— Getting the Japanese to take security responsibilities for Korea.

— Sale of limited defensive arms to China. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski expressed doubt that this formula is feasible. The Japanese will not respond effectively. (S)

Muskie asked why. The problems are the same that we have with the Europeans! (S)

Brzezinski replied that indeed the argument can be made that the Europeans won’t contribute adequately to defense and, therefore, we should also contribute less. This would lead to complete Finlandization of Europe and our inability to defend adequately either in Europe or in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, the proper conclusion is that we must continue to press the Allies for more defense effort regardless of their reluctance. (S)

Turner argued that two of the points are paper tigers. First, building up China will take far too long to make any difference in the 1980s. Second, the same is true for Japan. The United States should shift its forces to the two other theaters and ignore East Asia. (S)

Brown conceded some truth to this. In a three front war, East Asia would get last priority. Turner argued that cancellation of our “swing strategy” was a mistake. The Atlantic is critical, and we must be able to draw from the Pacific to win the Atlantic battle. (S)

Brown turned to arms for China and said that we must face up to it. Is it politically feasible to provide weapons or to get the Europeans to do it? (S)

Muskie objected to any increase in military cooperation because it might cause the Soviets to take programmatic actions we do not like. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski put our policy toward China in the following way. We now have the ability to do a number of low key things. There is no need for a new policy. If the Soviets do inflammatory things, make these destabilizing moves such as intervention in Poland, we will have the option of increasing our military operations with the PRC publicly and explicitly as a U.S. reaction to Soviet behavior. (S)

Harold Brown said he liked Dr. Brzezinski’s formulation, but the new Administration will have to address some specific issues like fighter aircraft engine improvements for China. (S)

Issue #-5—How can we best get our friends and Allies to do more for the common defense? Harold Brown made the only significant comment on this point. The Allies he reports always rebuff us by putting too much pressure on them about defense contributions, but Brown went on to observe, only by chiding them do we get them to act. (S)

Issue #-6—How can we best maintain both adequate modernization and a perceived technological edge? Dr. Brzezinski and Harold Brown debated briefly about technology transfers to the USSR. Brown argued that violations to our present policy, i.e. illegal leaks, are more critical than expanding our controls. Dr. Brzezinski found this a surprise. He has seen no study or intelligence to support the conclusion. Harold Brown said that this is Bill Perry’s judgment. (S)

Issue #-7—Since quality uniformed manpower will be so tight in the 1980s, what relief must we seek? and Issue #-8—Last, how can non-Defense agencies best complement DOD efforts? were not discussioned [discussed?]. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski asked how best to present these issues to the President. He suggested that the SCC discussion might introduce them. A National Security Council meeting with the President could follow. (C)

Muskie expressed his reservations about basing the discussion on the Defense paper because he has not been able to staff it within the Department of State. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski, Harold Brown, and Komer pointed out that the issues are primarily Defense issues, not a broad review of our foreign policy review issues. Dr. Brzezinski suggested that the agencies, if they desire, put their comments on the paper in written form before an NSC meeting. This would allow State’s most thoughtful criticisms and advice to be presented. (C)

Muskie and Christopher agreed to this approach, a National Security Council meeting on the Defense paper combined with written comments from State and the DCI. (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, Special Coordinating Committee (SCC) Meeting, 11/24/80. Secret. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the summary: “Susan, file—hold C.” The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. No minutes of the meeting were found.
2. See Document 214.
3. Reference is to Yugoslavian President Josep Bronz Tito, who died on May 4.