Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

202. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, July 2, 1980

SUBJECT

• False Alerts (U)

I sent you memoranda on June 7 and 13 discussing various aspects of the false missile warning displays which resulted in alerts of Strategic Air Command bomber crews on June 3 and 6.² We have continued investigating those incidents and this memorandum summarizes our present understanding of the cause, enumerates the corrective actions underway, and assesses the public and congressional reactions. (U)

The Cause (U)

NORAD attributes the source of the spurious data to the intermittent failure of a 46¢ micro-electronic integrated circuit (often referred to as a “chip”) in a data communications interface device at the NORAD Combat Operations Center in Colorado. Although NORAD has been unable to get the suspected circuit to fail again under test,³ the NORAD evaluation has been confirmed by an independent task force of highly competent and respected computer experts enlisted from the private sector. (U)

Corrective Actions (U)

This particular electronic fault will be corrected by replacing the suspected integrated circuit; however, to prevent a similar, future hardware failure from causing such an undetected error, we also are proceeding to improve the automatic error-detection and correction capabilities of the NORAD data communications system. Specifically, NORAD will:

— put monitor devices on output lines set to alarm whenever a warning message (whether valid or not) is being sent so as to speed confidence checking

— improve the error-detection routines throughout its computer and data communications system

— make continuous and comprehensive records of system performance to be used to improve its troubleshooting capability

— analyze its computers and communications equipment to find (and fix) other places where a single failure could produce a false missile attack indication.

Until these corrective actions are implemented (about 60 days) NORAD will operate primarily on the [less than 1 line not declassified] completely bypassing the equipment that caused the recent incidents. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have assessed that this temporary mode of operations can be tolerated, although it does have certain operational limitations, notably [1 line not declassified] The JCS-directed procedural changes to [3 lines not declassified] (S)

Congressional Reaction (U)

The Chairmen of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of both Houses of Congress were notified of the false alerts less than 24 hours after they occurred. Congressional interest has remained high ever since. We have briefed the House Armed Services Committee and several Senators individually, and we continue to respond to many letters on the subject from members of Congress. Congress seems to have been mostly reassured by our explanations, but continues to express concern about [9 lines not declassified]

Press Reaction (U)

Our approach to the news media has followed that which I outlined to you in my June 13 memorandum on false missile alerts. Most of the newspaper stories which appeared immediately after a June 18 press briefing by my Assistant Secretary for Communications, Command, Control, and Intelligence, Gerry Dinneen, correctly reflected the points in that memorandum. However, television network follow-up stories appearing June 24–26 have attempted to sensationalize (mushroom cloud) the incidents or to link them to unrelated matters. We continue to receive many press inquiries and requests for interviews on the subject. We will have to continue to emphasize that there is no chance that any irretrievable actions would be taken based on ambiguous computer information, nor do the precautionary survivability measures in any way reduce the absolute human control over nuclear weapons. Conclusion: A misleading picture is worth, in show business (TV news) much more than ten thousand accurate words.

The Future (U)

In summary, we are diligently pursuing corrective actions for the specific cause of the June 3 and 6 false alerts, just as we addressed the specific cause of the November 9, 1979, event.⁴ Those causes were different, however, and as I reported to you in my June 13 memorandum, I believe we must be prepared for the possibility that another, unrelated malfunction may someday generate another false alert. Although we will make appropriate electronic improvements to minimize the probability of such a false alert, we must continue to place our confidence in the human element of our missile attack warning system. (U)

Harold Brown

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 42, Missile Warning Incidents: 11/79–8/80. Top Secret. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the memorandum: “cc Harold, ok J.” Brzezinski forwarded the memorandum to Carter under cover of a July 11 memorandum in which he noted that Brown was “managing a difficult situation as well as can be expected. It is important for you, in my view, to let Harold hold the lead on this problem and keep it at Defense and NORAD, not letting the focus shift to the White House. No investigation will satisfy everyone, and the more information made public about the investigation, the easier it will be for the critics to exploit it imprudently beyond what is sound for national security.” Carter underlined the phrase “Harold hold the lead” and wrote at the top of Brzezinski’s memorandum: “Zbig, I agree. J.” Brzezinski returned Brown’s memorandum under cover of a July 17 memorandum in which he noted Carter’s comments and added: “The President has affirmed his decision for you to hold the lead on any future investigations and corrective actions.” (Ibid.)
2. See Documents 190 and 193.
3. Carter underlined the portion of this sentence that reads “has been unable to get the suspected circuit to fail again under test” and drew an exclamation point in the right margin next to it.
4. See Document 167.