183. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- FB–111B/C Proposal (U)
(S) General Ellis, Commander of the Strategic Air Command, has proposed that we modify 150 F–111As and FB–111s into a new, longer range strategic bomber called the FB–111B/C. He argues that this would strengthen our strategic forces during the “vulnerability window” i.e., during the period after Minuteman becomes vulnerable (1982) and before M–X becomes operational (1986). Key to this proposal is the belief that the FB–111B/Cs is relatively cheap, could be available quickly, and would be an effective penetrator of Soviet Air Defense.
(S) Unfortunately, none of these beliefs is correct. The Air Force Systems Command has made a careful analysis of General Dynamics’ proposal and concluded that the program to modify 150 aircraft would cost $8B (FY 80$), reach an IOC in 1985 and an FOC in 1987. Even more importantly, the FB–111B/C does not solve the B–52’s penetration problem. The B–52 actually will continue to be a capable penetrating bomber until the SU deploys in quantity an effective low altitude [Page 781] defense consisting of several hundred SA–10s and a new “lookdown shoot-down” interceptor (a modified MIG–25 with AA–X–9 missile). These Soviet systems will begin deployment in the early 80’s, will erode the B–52s penetrating capability by the mid-80’s and make it untenable by the late 80s. The solution to this problem is the cruise missile which becomes operational in 1982, and reaches a deployment of 1800 missiles by the mid-80s. The cruise missile by virtue of its low detectability and large numbers will be able to penetrate the new Soviet air defense system. On the other hand, the FB–111B/C, which is well behind the cruise missile’s schedule, is almost as vulnerable as the B–52s to the new air defense system. Its radar cross-section, only slightly lower than the B–52s, is 100 times as great as the cruise missile.
(S) The FB–111B/C cannot fly supersonic during low altitude penetration, when its speed is only Mach .8 to Mach .85. While this is faster than the B–52 (which penetrates to about Mach .6), it is not fast enough to degrade the effectiveness of the new Soviet air defense systems. Because of these limitations the only chance of either the FB–111B/C or the B–52 successfully penetrating these new defenses is for them to have an effective ECM system. Neither the B–52 or FB–111B/C has a modern ECM system in which we could have much confidence. An improved system (designed for the B–1) could be installed on the B–52s for several billion dollars. A similar additional expense would be needed for the FB–111B/C, but because of space limitation, it is doubtful if the full ECM capability could be installed on that plane. At best, a new ECM set would give us only a fair confidence of penetrating the new Soviet air defense system because of that system’s extreme use of monopulse radars which are highly ECM resistant—this was a principal reason for deciding not to produce the B–1 aircraft.
(S) There are other, less important, problems with the FB–111B/C. It is short-legged, requiring two tankers to give it full target coverage. If we dedicate these aircraft for the strategic forces, we deflect them from the valuable function they perform for our conventional forces. In fact, during the several years of airframe modification (during the peak of the so-called “window of vulnerability”) they will not be available for either tactical or strategic forces.
(S) We already have underway significant programs to strengthen our strategic forces before M–X is deployed. We will be deploying about 300 TRIDENT I missiles and 1800 cruise missiles during that period. If it is necessary to augment further our strategic forces prior to M–X deployment, we have two alternatives available to us much more attractive than the FB–111B/C proposal. First, we could increase the production and deployment rate of our cruise missiles (60 per month instead of 40 per month) giving us 1000 more cruise missiles deployed by 1986, at a cost of about $2B. Second, we could deploy sea launched [Page 782] cruise missiles on the retired POLARIS submarines, giving us initial deployment by mid-1983 and 600 cruise missiles deployed at sea by 1985 at a cost of about $2B. Either of these forces has greater military effectiveness than the FB–111B/C program at substantial less cost.2
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 20, Alpha Channel (Miscellaneous)—[4/80–6/80]. Secret; Sensitive. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the memorandum: “CC: Harold—Gen Ellis should quit lobbying for this unacceptable proposal or resign if not able to work it out with you—JC.” In a May 1 memorandum, Brzezinski wrote Brown: “Attached is a copy of your memorandum to the President on the FB–111. We might have been able to support you on this issue had the paper come through normal staffing channels.” (Ibid.)↩
- At the bottom of the memorandum Brown wrote: “P.S. You are also aware of another factor that I mentioned to you on the phone. So is Jim Wright. But Bob Carr is not. HB.” No other record of Brown’s telephone conversation with Carter was found.↩