181. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- The U.S.-Soviet Military Balance
I have reviewed my recent public characterizations of the U.S.–Soviet military balance, as well as my testimony before Congressional committees and responses to questions from Members on this subject. In the course of this review I have also examined media reporting to see how accurately my assessments have been quoted and in what context; I recognize that we have to take some responsibility for what we are perceived as saying, as well as full responsibility for what we actually say.
The products of this review are attached. On reflection, I think my characterization has been accurate—neither alarmist nor inappropriately comforting.
The basic elements of my explanation of the balance are:
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- In 1960–63, the U.S. spent 30% more on defense than did the Soviet Union; in 1980 we will spend 30% less. The turnaround is the result of a doubling of Soviet defense spending, while U.S. defense spending remained level.
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- The Soviet Union has, for over two decades, spent vast sums of money in a determined effort first to equal, and then to surpass, the United States in military strength. That they have not yet succeeded in surpassing us is not a reflection on their determination or, indeed, on their achievements. It is partly because we were well ahead when they began their build-up, partly because our allies and their adversaries must also be weighed in the balance, and also because we remain ahead in a number of important technological areas.
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- In strategic nuclear forces, the Soviets have come from a position of substantial numerical inferiority 15 years ago to one of parity today. Their forces have improved in quality as well as numbers. The Soviets have a potential for strategic advantage if we fail to respond with [Page 777] adequate programs of our own. But we are responding, by modernizing each leg of our Triad, to prevent that from happening.
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- In Central Europe, NATO will be much more nearly in balance with the Warsaw Pact within the next few years, provided that the Allies proceed with the modernization of their forces and other increased defense efforts, and provided that our programs for rapid deployment of reinforcements are brought to fruition. Even with these improvements, however, we will not have as high a level of confidence as I would like of containing a large attack against NATO launched by the Pact with little preparation and warning.
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- The disparity between U.S. annual defense expenditures and the dollar cost estimates of annual Soviet expenditures has continued for so long and grown so great that it has begun to bring the credibility of our defense posture into question. A prolongation of the past 15 year trend for another 10 or even 5 years would clearly consign us to inferiority.
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- To prevent us from falling behind, or from appearing to, our efforts devoted to defense must increase in real terms. If we do not respond now to the sustained expansion of Soviet military power by increasing our own, we will condemn the United States to an inferior military position. We need a steady, sustained, and significant increase in effort. This Administration has set that in train.
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- What needs to be done is to set a pattern of growth and then sustain it over a period of years—rather than have a large growth in one year and then assume that the problem has been solved. The program that the Administration has proposed will arrest and then turn around the relative disparity in momentum between the Soviet and U.S. programs. This will require not only the projected growth in our defense efforts, but greater efforts by our allies, more effective coordination of U.S. and allied defense programs, higher efficiency in our own defense program, and correct choices on our own part to take advantage of our technological lead.
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- The Administration has responded to the adverse trends in the military balance and to increased dangers to U.S. interests through steady increases in defense budgets, culminating in substantial growth in the FY 81 defense budget. The FY 81–85 Five Year Defense Program projects continued real growth in defense spending through FY 1985.
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- In the first year of this Administration, we placed the major weight of our efforts behind improving NATO’s early conventional combat capability, primarily through the LTDP and the three percent real growth commitment. We next turned to the problem of modernizing our strategic TRIAD. Most recently, we have taken steps to modernize our theater nuclear forces in Europe. Thus, programs in each of these areas are underway and have momentum. We can now concentrate special attention and resources on improving our capabilities to [Page 778] deal with threats and crises around the world and, in particular, we are acting to expand the improvement (begun two years ago) in our ability to get men and equipment quickly to potential areas of conflict and to retain our preeminence at sea in an era of new technologies.
These comments represent the situation as I judge it. Most others with comparable experience take a more pessimistic view. I believe that much of the difference comes from their failure to distinguish between the present balance and the balance to be expected if past trends continue, that is if the Soviets continue their build-up and we do not implement the defense programs that this Administration has adopted and those we have urged on our Allies. For that reason, I have tried to make the distinction in my own statements between the present balance, about which we can do little, and the future balance, which we will affect by our decisions. I also think that getting the American people to understand this distinction is the most responsible and practical strategy for sustaining confidence in American strength while assuring an adequate military balance in the future through the necessary growth in our capabilities.
In general, I am satisfied that the media have reported my assessment accurately. I’ve said pretty much the same things on scores of occasions—and you have heard me say them a number of times at Congressional briefings at the White House. If after your review of the attached quotations, you believe that my assessment of the balance (present and future) raises problems, please let me know.2 Otherwise, I will continue to sing from essentially the same sheet music.
- Source: Library of Congress, Harold Brown Papers, Box 106, Secretary Brown Eyes Only, Jan–June 1980. Confidential; Eyes Only. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the memorandum: “I have read this carefully. It is a good analysis—and your presentations seem balanced. It is difficult to include NATO v. W. Pact, PRC border, air defense etc in every statement. My concerns are not fully alleviated because in general, the impression is that we & our allies are inferior—now—seriously we still need to work on this problem—with $ and with words—Thanks, J.C.” A stamped notation on the first page of the memorandum indicates Brown saw Carter’s note.↩
- Attached but not printed is a collection of public statements and press coverage.↩