Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

178. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, March 7, 1980

SUBJECT

• Contingency Plans for Increased Strategic Capability (U)

(S) Last year’s NIE raised the prospect that the Soviets could pull ahead of us in warheads in the early 1980’s.² That conclusion was partly because of inconsistent rules for counting U.S. and Soviet SSBNs on sea trials. Furthermore, in the event Soviet deployments of highly fractionated SLBMs and ICBMs have progressed more slowly than the NIE predicted, [1 line not declassified] It now appears unlikely that we will lose our lead in warheads in the early 1980’s. Nonetheless, I share your belief that we must be prepared to take further actions. If SALT II collapses, our planned forces may be inadequate, particularly in the mid-1980’s before MX can be deployed in numbers.

(S) My staff has examined a number of options, as illustrated by the attached table. The shortest and cheapest path to a real increase in our strategic and theater nuclear capabilities would be to accelerate deployment of cruise missiles—ALCM, GLCM, and perhaps SLCM. [2 lines not declassified] We have also examined the option of converting POLARIS submarines to SLCM launchers with 80 or more per boat. It is not necessary to choose among ALCM, GLCM, or SLCM now, however, in part because these missiles share so many components. My staff is examining actions we can take to cut the lead time for increasing production; I will let you know our plans in the near future.

(SRD) One other problem that could limit our response to a breakdown in SALT is the supply of special nuclear material. According to the “Moderate No-SALT” estimate in Draft NIE 11–3/8–79 the Soviets could deploy an additional 8000 warheads by 1989.³ [6 lines not declassified] Therefore, if we want to prepare for this contingency, we should soon increase production of special nuclear material.

Harold Brown

Attachment

Table Prepared in the Department of Defense⁴

Washington, undated

Table 1. Summary of Quick Fix Options

			WHDS		Cost (FY 81 $M)
Option	IOC	FOC	1984	FOC	Acquisition	Annual O&S	Comments
100 MN III missiles in silos	80	81	2005	2006	167	-	Little increase in survivable capability.
Full bomber weapon load-out	80	81	140	140	-	100	Poses operational problems
All MN III to MK–12A	82	84	-	-	261	-	Little increase in survivable capability
200 mobile MM III	83	85	3007	3008	3000	135	Needs strategic warning to survive
Trident I on Polaris	83	85	2569	128010	6000	185	Lifespan of Polaris is uncertain
SLCM on Polaris	83	85	400	800	2500	185	No firm option exists
Increase ALCM production (B–52 G&H)	83	90	59011	72012	4000	100
FB–111 B/C (140 UE)	84	86	550	1160	7200	500	SAC’s recommendation
CMCA (B–1 variant 100 UE)	85	88	-	300013	11000	400	Requires a second ALCM production line
B–1 (210 UE)	85	90	-	3360	26700	1000	Subsonic variant possible for ¾ the cost
FB–111H (210 UE)	85	91	-	2100	13400	1000

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 89, Doctrine/C3I: 1979–1980. Secret; Restricted Data.
2. See Document 111.
3. For the final version, see the attachment to Document 184.
4. Secret.
5. Adherence to SALT I or SALT II would require retirement of other systems, resulting in smaller increases in warheads. [Footnote is in the original.]
6. Adherence to SALT I or SALT II would require retirement of other systems, resulting in smaller increases in warheads. [Footnote is in the original.]
7. Adherence to SALT I or SALT II would require retirement of other systems, resulting in smaller increases in warheads. [Footnote is in the original.]
8. Adherence to SALT I or SALT II would require retirement of other systems, resulting in smaller increases in warheads. [Footnote is in the original.]
9. Adherence to SALT I or SALT II would require retirement of other systems, resulting in smaller increases in warheads. [Footnote is in the original.]
10. Adherence to SALT I or SALT II would require retirement of other systems, resulting in smaller increases in warheads. [Footnote is in the original.]
11. Adherence to SALT I or SALT II would require retirement of other systems, resulting in smaller increases in warheads. [Footnote is in the original.]
12. Adherence to SALT I or SALT II would require retirement of other systems, resulting in smaller increases in warheads. [Footnote is in the original.]
13. Adherence to SALT I or SALT II would require retirement of other systems, resulting in smaller increases in warheads. [Footnote is in the original.]