Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

177. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, February 29, 1980

SUBJECT

• Mobilization Planning (U)

I have indicated to you several times over the past year that US mobilization planning has been in a state of considerable disarray for many years, due primarily to a lack of authoritative planning guidance and to poor interagency communication. (S)

Last summer, I commissioned an interagency mobilization planning study under NSC sponsorship and assigned it three ambitious objectives: (1) develop draft Presidential guidance that will ensure consistency and coordination in all US civil and military mobilization planning; (2) establish a process for assessing our mobilization potential and for rectifying any deficiencies in it; and (3) achieve mobilization planning commonality with our allies. (C)

The first objective and part of the second have now been completed:

— The interagency mobilization planning structure that lay dormant for thirty-five years has now been substantially revitalized. (In the process, several very sticky, long-standing interagency jurisdictional disputes that, for example, plagued the DOD/FEMA NIFTY NUGGET large-scale mobilization exercise last year, were settled.) (S)

— Fifty-six major Presidentially-directed emergency actions that will determine the extent of US mobilization in a crisis have been identified (e.g., evacuate citizens abroad, surge defense production, assume control of civil telecommunications, etc.), as have the agencies responsible for planning the execution of each of the 56 actions and the Presidential authorities required to actually carry them out (e.g., Presidential Proclamation, declaration of National Emergency, etc.). (C)

— Additionally, 29 major peacetime preparedness activities that contribute directly to our ability to take the 56 major emergency actions have been identified (e.g., prepare military contigency plans, pre-identify wartime civilian and military personnel requirements, stockpile critical materials, etc.), along with the agencies responsible for the activities. (C)

— And five politically bland but broad, representative crisis scenarios have been developed to serve as the basis for the creation of plans by the responsible agencies for the 56 emergency and 29 preparedness actions. (C)

We are now ready to begin the next phase of the NSC Study effort: the actual development of plans for the emergency and preparedness actions, plus a comprehensive assessment of our mobilization potential. For at least two reasons, I feel it is important that you endorse the interagency effort at this time: (1) the mobilization community has been essentially ignored for three decades and badly needs a shot-in-the-arm to boost its morale and productivity; and (2) the planning resources that the departments and agencies will have to commit to the next phase of the effort are quite substantial. (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve my signing the Presidential Directive at Tab A, which would:

— Recognize the fundamental importance of mobilization planning and your support for it;

— Endorse the NSC Mobilization Study effort to date and direct that it be used as the principal basis for future US mobilization planning, subject to whatever changes are necessary to ensure its continued relevance;

— Direct FEMA to oversee the drafting of plans for the 56 emergency and 29 preparedness actions against the five scenarios, but with enough flexibility built into the plans to permit their use over a wider range of scenarios where possible. (The plans would be based on funds, personnel and other physical resources expected to be available in FY 1980);

— Direct NSC to oversee the assessment of the US mobilization potential. This will involve: (1) conducting a net assessment of US/Soviet and, eventually, NATO/Warsaw Pact mobilization capabilities; and (2) assessing the “goodness” of FEMA’s planning effort, including tailoring future DOD and FEMA mobilization exercises (e.g., NIFTY NUGGET II) to test various aspects of FEMA’s plans. (S)

State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, HEW, HUD, Transportation, Energy, OMB, JCS, CIA, OSTP, GSA, Post Office, FCC, Selective Service and FEMA concur. This is a significant initiative: your Administration will be the first since World War II to conduct a comprehensive mobilization planning effort at the highest level of government.² (U)

Tab A

Presidential Directive/NSC–57³

Washington, March 3, 1980

TO

• The Vice President
• The Secretary of State
• The Secretary of Treasury
• The Secretary of Defense
• The Attorney General
• The Secretary of Interior
• The Secretary of Agriculture
• The Secretary of Commerce
• The Secretary of Labor
• The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
• The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
• The Secretary of Transportation
• The Secretary of Energy
• The Director, Office of Management and Budget
• The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
• The Director of Central Intelligence
• The Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy
• The Administrator of General Services
• The Postmaster General
• The Chairman, Federal Communications Commission
• The Director, Selective Service System
• The Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency

SUBJECT

• Mobilization Planning (U)

I. Policy. It is of fundamental importance to the national security that the United States maintain the capability to mobilize its national resources in a timely and efficient manner in order to respond effectively to crises that might arise. (U)

Such maintenance requires consistency and coordination within the United States government in all civil and military mobilization planning activities. Accordingly, the President directs: (1) that the broadly-defined crisis scenarios, emergency actions and preparedness activities developed in the NSC Mobilization Study are to serve as the principal basis for future US civil and military mobilization planning;⁴ and (2) that all such future planning is to be fully coordinated among all interested Federal agencies. (U)

II. Implementation. The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will ensure that all existing and pending Executive Orders pertaining to mobilization are made consistent with this directive. (U)

Implementation plans for each emergency action identified in the NSC Mobilization Study will be developed by the designated responsible and coordinating agencies based on the funds, personnel and other physical resources expected to be available in FY 1980. The implementation plans should be based on the NSC Mobilization Study crisis scenarios, but should also be sufficiently flexible to facilitate their use over a wider range of scenarios where possible. The Director of FEMA will arbitrate among the responsible and coordinating agencies wherever necessary to eliminate overlap among individual implementation plans, to conserve resources, and to resolve any jurisdictional conflicts. The implementation plans pertaining to Continuity of Government, the Selective Service System, and US Telecommunications Facilities are to reflect the policies and guidance resulting from the ongoing Presidentially-directed studies in these areas. (C)

The Director of FEMA will combine the completed individual implementation plans into a Federal Master Mobilization Plan and ensure that necessary standby legislation is drafted and execution procedures are promulgated to facilitate use of the plan during crises. The initial Master Plan should be provided to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for NSC review by June 1, 1980. (U)

The following tasks are to be added to the NSC Mobilization Study charter:

— with the Intelligence Community, provide the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by April 1, 1980 terms of reference for a comprehensive comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact mobilization capabilities and historical levels of effort. (C)

— provide the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by June 1, 1980 a detailed plan for assessing the adequacy of the newly developed Federal Master Mobilization Plan. To assist in the assessment and to help refine the Master Plan, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of FEMA are to ensure that, to the maximum extent practical, mobilization-type exercises over the next few years (e.g., NIFTY NUGGET/REX) are designed, conducted, and evaluated in a manner that supports the NSC Study. (C)

— adjust the crisis scenarios, emergency actions, and preparedness activities as necessary during development of the Master Plan to ensure their continued relevance and appropriateness; and seek ways to improve the mobilization planning and implementation processes. (U)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 104, Military Posture 1–3/80. Secret. Sent for action. At the top of the memorandum Carter wrote: “Zbig. C.”
2. Carter approved the recommendation and initialed the bottom of the memorandum.
3. Confidential. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the directive: “ok, JC.”
4. Not found.