Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

175. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, February 26, 1980

SUBJECT

• The Nuclear Weapons Stockpile (U) (Annual Update)

DOD and DOE have submitted their recommended FY 1980–82 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan (Tab B)² for your approval. The Plan consists of suggested ceiling levels for each of the sixty-one types of nuclear warheads held in the stockpile, and, for information only, projected levels for each of the warheads for the extended period FY 1983–87. (C)

For the period FY 1980–82, there are no changes of any consequence from last year’s projections:

— The continuing success of the TRIDENT warhead production line, coupled with DOD’s decision to keep a seventeenth POSEIDON boat on-line during the 1980s, will permit earlier retirement of POLARIS warheads than was anticipated last year. (S/RD)

— Production, technical or fiscal problems have caused some delays in modernizing the MINUTEMAN III warheads, as well as certain strategic and tactical bombs, tactical missile warheads, and artillery shells, but the delays do not appear excessive and the “get well” schedules seem adequate. (S/RD)

— [3 lines not declassified]

— [1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]

For the extended period FY 1983–87, however, there are some fairly substantial changes over last year’s projection. [4 lines not declassified]

— DOD and DOE display a sizeable number of older strategic and tactical bombs in the Stockpile after their modernized replacements appear. (C)

— New, approved warheads begin to appear in the inventory, including MX, ALCM, GLCM, and PERSHING II. (S/RD)

— New systems that have not been approved also appear, including SLCM, HARPOON, the new 155mm artillery projectile, and the Navy’s Standard Missile II. (S/RD)

Ordinarily, we would pay scant attention to the out-year projections for FY 1983–87 since: (1) they are provided for information only; and (2) they are unconstrained, and, therefore, probably inflated. However, this year for the first time the out-year projections have had near-term impacts: DOE sought FY 1981 funding to begin reactivating the N-reactor/PUREX plutonium production facility because they felt they would not have enough special nuclear materials (SNM) to build all the weapons in the out-year projections. OMB turned down DOE’s initial funding request, and, although DOD lent its support to the request, DOE did not appeal the OMB decision. However, since the issue was raised, it will undoubtedly be a subject of debate during the forthcoming authorization hearings. (The agreed interagency position on this matter is that we have sufficient SNM for the next five years, that projections beyond five years are difficult to make, but the Administration has long-term SNM requirements under review and will act if and when necessary.) (S/RD)

The lack of coordination between DOD and DOE on the SNM issue and the fact that the White House was not drawn into the matter until after the FY 1981 Budget was finalized, are the latest manifestations of the rather serious communications problem that exists between DOD and DOE on nuclear-related programs. We have held informal discussions with DOD, DOE, JCS, OSTP and OMB in an effort to find ways to get decision makers to focus on problems like SNM availability rationally and sufficiently early to impact the budget process. Two remedial steps have been taken: (1) DOD and DOE have begun an extensive joint examination of the warhead acquisition process and of warhead requirements through FY 2000; and (2) DOD and DOE have agreed informally to submit next year’s Stockpile Memorandum to you for approval by September 1, 1980. NSC and OMB will closely monitor the former and ensure compliance with the latter. We are pursuing further remedial steps, with OMB’s collaboration, to ensure better procedures in formulating the FY 1982 budget. (S/RD)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve my signing the Presidential Directive at Tab A³ that: (1) approves the proposed FY 1980–82 Stockpile Plan subject to future policy and programming decisions; (2) notes but does not approve⁴ the FY 1983–87 Stockpile Projection; (3) authorizes continuation of standard production, retirement, custodial and, transfer procedures for nuclear weapons and parts; and (4) directs DOD and DOE to submit the FY 1981–83 Stockpile Plan for your approval not later than September 1, 1980. OMB and OSTP concur.⁵ (S/RD)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 23, PD/NSC–56. Top Secret; Formerly Restricted Data. Sent for action. The date is handwritten.
2. Not found attached.
3. Not found attached. See Document 176.
4. Carter underlined “does not approve,” drew a line to the bottom of the memorandum, and wrote “J.”
5. Carter approved the recommendation.