Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

174. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, February 16, 1980

SUBJECT

• Defense Production Priorities (U)

Deputy Secretary Claytor has requested (Tab B) that you designate the XM–1 tank and the MX and PERSHING II missiles as “Programs of Highest National Priority” to ensure that they are given priority over other DOD and all commercial programs in the competition for components, materials and other resources.² (U)

I support Claytor’s request:

— Essentially all DOD programs already enjoy priority over all commercial programs by virtue of the Defense Production Act of 1950; the action Claytor recommends simply realigns priorities among the various defense programs. (U)

— DOD, DOE, Commerce and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have surveyed each of the affected prime and sub-contractors and suppliers and found that the action will not adversely affect any member of the production community, and that it will, indeed, help prevent production slippages. (U)

— DOD, DOE, Commerce and FEMA also assure me that the action will have no adverse impact on the economy. (U)

— And I feel that the signals you would send to the Congress, the public and our NATO allies by the action would have a positive political impact. (C)

There are currently ten other DOD programs on the “Highest National Priority” list: three sensitive programs concerning space reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare and airframe design; the Cruise Missile; TRIDENT; the Fleet Ballistic Missile program; two anti-ballistic missile programs; MINUTEMAN III; and the M–60 tank.³ DOD is reviewing the list (especially the last five programs, above) and will come to you later this year with recommended adjustments as appropriate. (S)

Lastly, your reply to Claytor’s request provides an opportunity for you to lend emphasis to the development of our rapid deployment capabilities. I suggest that you task DOD to consider ways to minimize delays in production of the new CX cargo aircraft—to include assignment of the “Highest Priority” and, perhaps, streamlined management procedures. Since no aircraft production program has yet been assigned the “Highest Priority,” DOD, Commerce and FEMA will have to do some thinking to find ways to smooth the production process.⁴ (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo at Tab A that grants Claytor’s request and directs consideration of ways to minimize CX production delays.⁵ (U)

Tab B

Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Claytor) to President Carter⁶

Washington, January 10, 1980

SUBJECT

• Request for Presidential Approval of the XM–1 Tank, PERSHING II and M–X Missile Systems as Programs of Highest National Priority

(U) Highest priority for industrial resources is essential to meet development/procurement and deployment schedules for the above systems.

(U) Your approval will allow assignment of a Brick-Bat (DX) industrial priority rating to our contracts with industry. This priority will assure the three weapon systems will receive materials, components and other resources first in the event of conflict with other Defense or commercial contracts.

(C) Industrial experience has shown lengthy leadtimes for many materials and components utilized on these systems. Failure to apply this highest priority rating to these programs could make it necessary to resolve individual resource bottlenecks and conflicts on a case-by-case basis, possibly causing costly delays. Further, elevation of their priority would serve as a signal of U.S. intent and resolve with respect to the defense of our NATO allies. Additional pertinent information is set forth in Enclosure 1.⁷

(U) I recommend your approval of the three systems as programs of Highest National Priority. Enclosure 2⁸ contains the text of a suggested reply.

W. Graham Claytor, Jr.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 6, Defense Department: 2/80. Secret. Sent for action. At the top of the memorandum Carter wrote: “Zbig. J.” Stebbins and Welch sent the memorandum to Brzezinski for his signature under cover of a February 15 memorandum in which they noted: “The package was delayed while we sought interagency advice on the DOD request, since it had the potential to affect the programs of other agencies.” (Ibid.)
2. Carter underlined “XM–1 tank,” “MX,” and “Pershing II missiles” in this sentence.
3. Carter underlined “space reconnaissance,” “anti-submarine warfare,” “Cruise Missile,” and “TRIDENT” in this sentence.
4. Carter drew a question mark in the right margin next to this paragraph.
5. Tab A was not attached. Carter approved the recommendation and wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “Retype memo, J.” In a February 19 memorandum to Brown, Carter wrote: “I approve your request to assign the highest national priority to the XM–1 tank and MX and PERSHING II missile programs. Additionally, I would like you to consider ways to minimize delays in production of the XC cargo aircraft. Please provide me your recommendations as soon as possible.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 6, Defense Department: 2/80)
6. Secret. Carter initialed the upper right corner of the memorandum.
7. Attached but not printed are additional details about the manufacture of the XM tank as well as the MX and PERSHING II missiles.
8. Attached but not printed is a draft reply.