Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

159. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, September 22, 1979

SUBJECT

• Telecommunications and C3I Policy Issues (U)

Last month, you requested my reaction to five proposed objectives which could serve as the basis for a national security telecommunications policy.² I endorse your concept and support the objectives you proposed. However, these objectives alone may not provide adequate guidance for governmental, legislative and industry actions to enhance telecommunications capabilities. Therefore, I have prepared the attached alternative statement of national security telecommunications policy which, I believe, might be more useful for this effort. The statement is unclassified, so as to allow broad discussion and dissemination. I believe a policy statement along these lines, endorsed by the President, could have a significant impact on the Congress, Executive Branch planning efforts, the Federal Communications Commission and the telecommunications industry as a whole.

I also agree that a meeting of the Special Coordination Committee to discuss a national security telecommunications policy and related C3I issues would be most desirable.

Harold Brown

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense³

Washington, undated

NATIONAL SECURITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY

It is essential to the national security of the United States to have a telecommunications capability to meet the needs of the Nation during and after any national emergency, including nuclear war. This capability is required in order to gather worldwide intelligence, conduct vital diplomatic functions, execute command and control of the military forces, provide for continuity of essential governmental functions, and reconstitute the political, economic and social structure of the Nation. It is National policy that the telecommunications resources of the country shall have inbeing attributes to ensure the flexibility, adequate residual capacity and restorability to fulfill these needs.

In support of national security policy and strategy, the Nation’s telecommunications must provide:

— Connectivity between the National Command Authority and the Strategic forces to support a flexible execution of retaliatory strikes during and after an enemy nuclear attack.

— Support for the vital functions of worldwide intelligence gathering and diplomatic affairs.

— Responsive support for operational control of the armed forces, even during an extended nuclear war.

— Support of mobilization in all circumstances including nuclear war.

— Continuity of government and all essential government functions and services before, during, and after a nuclear war or natural disaster, to include those functions essential to life support, weapons construction, and the survival or reconstruction of the industrial complex.

— Recover of the political, economic, and social structure of the Nation during and after a nuclear war or natural disaster.

The following objectives are established:

— Telecommunications requirements for national security, continuity of government, and government functions vital to the national survival should have priority in the restoration of services and facilities in national emergencies.

— Interstate common carrier networks (including specialized common carriers and domestic satellite carriers) shall be interconnected and capable of interoperation in emergencies at selected, proximate, breakout points outside of likely target areas.

— Outside of likely target areas, the backbone facilities of interstate common carriers should be situated to avoid collateral damage from nuclear attack. The Government will make available the necessary information to allow such siting.

— The Government shall plan for emergency use of industry private line communications that have significant capabilities.

— All functionally similar government telecommunications networks shall be capable of interchange of traffic in emergencies.

— A national telecommunications control system is required to manage the restoration and reconstitution of the national telecommunications system following an emergency.

— All private line and public communications which carry information vital to the national security or which is otherwise important to the national interest shall be protected from exploitation by hostile powers.

— The Government will place substantial reliance upon the private sector for advice and assistance in achieving national security and preparedness goals.

— Common carrier communications should be used to the maximum extent feasible. Government owned and operated facilities will be used where necessary to ensure availability of vital communications under all conditions in support of functions vital to national security.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 83, Communications: 7–12/79. No classification marking.
2. See Document 149.
3. No classification marking.