Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

158. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre) to President Carter¹

Washington, September 10, 1979

SUBJECT

• The Defense Budget

The two of us, together with Cy, Zbig and Lloyd Cutler, believe it important for you to resolve the Administration’s position on the defense budget issue immediately, before the Second Budget Resolution reaches the floor.

Even before the Cuba situation,² many of those whose support is essential to Senate approval had joined the growing chorus calling on you to affirm your intention to propose and support real growth in defense spending. Recent events have now underscored that position. They have also emboldened SALT critics to believe that they can defeat SALT II ratification by claiming defense spending and the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba as demonstrations of an unacceptable lack of will and willingness on the part of the Administration in defense matters.

Sam Nunn has proposed as much as a 5% real annual increase,³ though his conversations with us suggest that he has some flexibility on the numbers, especially for 1980. Others have aligned themselves with 5% or even more. We believe that you can—and at least for now, should—hold the line at the amount to which your Administration and our NATO Allies have publicly committed in the past. Your civilian advisers feel comfortable in arguing that a real 3% growth will probably do what is needed, and we think that, depending on how this is interpreted in the out years, there is a good chance that the JCS can be brought along. Moreover, since this would be in effect a reaffirmation of an existing Administration position, it should help us counter cries for equivalent increases in domestic programs.

For these reasons we recommend that you base your statement⁴ on such a reaffirmation and that you make clear that your determination applies to both present and future budgets (with, inevitably, less certainty—up or down—in future than at present). You need and should go no further than that now. The Secretary of Defense will amplify our defense program plans in a separate letter.⁵

One further point: All of us believe that the best form for your communication is a letter from you to the leadership of Congress, to precede the budget resolution debate. Certainly this, accompanied by a public statement, will give the greatest impact and may be helpful should circumstances later require you to point out in subsequent weeks and months that you have made a firm commitment—indeed one far firmer than any the Congress as a whole has made to date. Whether or not Congress accepts your proposals, it is important for SALT II that everyone understand your own position on the issue.

Because your schedule is so crowded, and because the Second Budget Resolution will reach the Senate floor no later than Wednesday,⁶ we believe you should send the attached letter to the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House on Tuesday.⁷ But as soon as possible thereafter, which we understand to be Thursday, we urge that you meet with the appropriate Congressional leadership to get their views and reemphasize yours.⁸

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 6, Defense Department: 8–9/79. No classification marking. Jayne initialed the memorandum on McIntyre’s behalf.
2. On August 31, the Department of State issued a statement indicating that the United States had “recently confirmed the presence in Cuba of what appears to be a Soviet combat unit. This is the first time we have been able to confirm the presence of a Soviet ground forces unit on the island.” (Department of State Bulletin, October 1979, p. 63) Vance discussed the troops in a press conference held September 5, as well as before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee later that day; Carter addressed the issue in September 7 remarks before reporters in the White House Briefing Room. (Bernard Gwertzman, “Vance Tells Soviet Its Troops in Cuba Could Imperil Ties,” New York Times, September 6, 1979, p. A1; Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, pp. 1602–1603)
3. In July, Nunn suggested that his vote on SALT II was contingent on the Carter administration’s willingness to undertake “‘effective’ military competition with the Soviet Union” through “increasing defense spending by 4 to 5 percent in constant dollars.” (Charles Mohr, “Arms-Pact Debate: A New Script Has Both Sides Winning,” New York Times, July 30, 1979, p. A3)
4. For Carter’s September 11 message to Congress on the FY 1980 and FY 1981 defense budgets, see Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, pp. 1628–1630.
5. Not found.
6. September 12.
7. September 11. Attached but not printed is an unsigned and undated draft letter to be sent to Mondale (as President of the Senate) and to O’Neill.
8. Carter discussed SALT II and the defense budget with select Senators on Thursday, September 13, in the Cabinet Room at the White House from 7:47 a.m. until 8:40 a.m. He also met privately with Nunn in the Oval Office from 5:03 p.m. until 6:20 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation of either meeting was found. According to a report in the New York Times, “Carter told the senators he would ask for a 3 percent increase in defense spending in fiscal 1981.” (Charles Mohr, “Carter Expected to Refuse Senators on Arms Request,” New York Times, September 15, 1979, p. 3)