Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

115. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 11–10–79

Washington, February 1, 1979

Soviet Military Capabilities To Project Power and Influence in Distant Areas

[Omitted here is a cover sheet, preface, and table of contents.]

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Objectives

1. Soviet leaders continue to view the Third World as fertile ground for the expansion of Soviet political, military, and economic influence through an assertive and opportunistic policy. They see political conflict involving the use of military force or conducted in its shadow as the main propellant of fundamental changes in the Third World. They believe that military power will remain the cornerstone of Soviet policy. Their primary objectives in aligning themselves selectively with states and insurgent movements in Third World conflicts are to assert the USSR’s legitimacy as ideological vanguard of world “national liberation” movements, to secure a major role in Third World affairs, to affect the outcome of regional conflicts in favor of Soviet interests, and to neutralize Western and Chinese political and military influence. The Soviet leadership has no illusions, however, about the difficulties of attaining these objectives.

2. While broad political objectives are paramount, the Soviets pursue specific military objectives as well. These include acquisition of overflight clearances and access to facilities abroad for supporting military operations of Soviet as well as friendly forces, especially emergency air and sea lifts of military equipment and supplies to Third World states and insurgent forces. Overseas facilities also can ease the logistic problems of operating naval forces at great distances from Soviet waters. The Soviets deploy military forces in distant areas to show the flag, to maintain a military presence that can be augmented relatively quickly in time of crisis, and to monitor and, if necessary, counter the operations of Western naval forces.

3. Objectives of a lower order in Soviet policy in the Third World are to promote trade, to secure access to certain raw materials and foods, and to be capable of restricting Western access to these materials. Moscow’s efforts to foster both military and economic dependence in individual Third World countries go hand in hand, as the major recipients of Soviet arms in 1978 also account for almost half of the USSR’s nonmilitary trade with the Third World. Soviet economic aid has not always resulted in a commensurate level of influence, nor do the Soviets expect economic interests alone to buy much influence.

Policy Appraisal

4. The Soviets have undoubtedly gained from the expansion of their military activity in the Third World. Soviet policymakers are probably persuaded that they have generally been on the right track, and their most recent ventures in Angola and Ethiopia have surely reinforced that conviction. Soviet political influence has grown in some countries at the expense of the West and China. Events in Angola and Ethiopia have enhanced the USSR’s image as a great power capable of projecting military force far from its shores. Military assistance to Africa and the Middle East has demonstrated the value of Soviet support, especially under emergency conditions. Moscow also has benefited from the international perception that the military balance has changed, to the detriment of the West, and from the seeming US reluctance to use military force to counter the expansion of Soviet and Cuban presence in the Third World.

5. Soviet military involvement in Third World conflicts has evolved from military assistance programs, to occasional use of Soviet forces in defensive roles, to the extensive use of Cuban combat forces. The Cuban intervention in Angola and especially Ethiopia has probably strengthened Soviet confidence in the feasibility and effectiveness of this strategy, enhanced its appeal among political and military leaders in both Moscow and Havana, and encouraged them to press this strategy. Soviet and Cuban leaders probably will believe that, as long as such actions do not portray them as invaders and do not threaten the West’s allies or its sources of vital raw materials, the risk of Western military involvement and escalation to a wider conflict will be slight.

6. The interdependent relationship between the USSR and Cuba is complex, and both sides would probably find it difficult to determine at this stage who has gained more from their joint military ventures. The Cubans have worked closely with the Soviets, and Cuban involvement in the Third World has served Soviet policy. The foremost advantage in using Cubans or other friendly forces is the reduction in visibility of Soviet involvement in Third World conflicts. It also allows Moscow to exert influence in circumstances where Soviet forces would be unwelcome.

7. Calculation of the risks in applying military force remains a central feature of Soviet policy. The Angolan and Ethiopian ventures, though dramatic in scale and noteworthy in their use of Cuban forces, did not entail major risks for the Kremlin, but reflected Moscow’s assessment of African reactions, of political restraints on the United States, and the availability of Cuban forces. Though the initial role of the Soviets in Cuban military operations in Angola is not known, we assume that the strategy and tactics employed were coordinated with them. In Ethiopia, Moscow’s role was clearly more dominant from the outset.

8. In the few instances where the Soviets have introduced their own military forces into conflicts in the Third World, they did so to assist friendly countries and to inhibit possible Western military initiatives. In these cases, however, they have exercised a policy which strictly limits the role of Soviet forces while at the same time accepting measured risks of escalation.

— Their pilots and air defense units have engaged in combat, but to date have not operated outside friendly territory.

— Soviet naval forces have established or augmented a presence in the regions of conflict but have not engaged in combat.

— Airborne units have been placed on alert in a manner possibly designed to bring pressure on the belligerents as well as the United States.

These activities illustrate Soviet appreciation for the utility of a show of force and of implicit and explicit threats as a means of achieving policy goals.

Instrumentalities

9. Arms transfers are by far the most widely employed of the military means available to the Soviets for projecting influence in the Third World. The Soviets have more than tripled the current dollar amount of agreements and deliveries of military assistance to Third World countries over the last five years. Where the bulk of a recipient’s military forces become equipped with Soviet weapons, dependence on the USSR for advisers, spare parts, and newer equipment grows and in time becomes a potential means of influencing the recipient’s policies. In practice, Moscow’s efforts to exploit such dependence for this purpose have had both successes and failures.

10. Third World nations continue to be lured by Soviet offers of modern military equipment not usually available from other suppliers, by long-term credits at low interest rates, often by lower prices, by payment (until recently) in local rather than hard currency, and by quick delivery. Moscow is laying greater stress on the commercial considerations of its arms sales to earn hard currency. Given these factors, the market for Soviet arms remains fertile, and the trend in sales is upward.

11. Through military training, advisory, and assistance programs the Soviets attempt to create a base of enduring influence by fostering extensive ties with Third World military personnel. Since 1955, some 42,000 have been trained in the USSR. About 9,500 Soviet military advisers and technicians are currently stationed in Third World countries. In recent years, suspicions of some Third World leaders about the motives behind Soviet military assistance programs have grown and led to increasing reluctance by some to allow large numbers of Soviets into their countries. Nevertheless, the number of Soviet military advisers abroad has steadily increased.

12. Emergency resupply of high-priority military items by air and sea is the most widely publicized form of Soviet combat support to Third World states. In this regard, the USSR’s ability to provide large quantities of arms in a relatively short time is a major advantage. This service carries little risk for the USSR because few Soviet personnel are involved, they are not combatants, the deliveries are generally made to areas remote from the fighting, and other countries are reluctant to oppose such operations militarily. In addition, such resupply operations do not necessarily commit the Soviets to deeper involvement.

13. A step higher on the ladder of involvement and risk is the assignment of Soviet advisory personnel to Third World combat units. Since 1967, when Soviet pilots flew combat missions against rebels in North Yemen, Soviet personnel have seen actual combat in at least three Third World countries—Egypt, Syria, and Iraq—and have played a direct combat advisory role in two others—Angola and Ethiopia.

14. The USSR supports a number of insurgent movements in the Third World, but the type and extent of this assistance vary. It is usually channeled through third parties because insurgents normally do not operate where Moscow can provide direct aid and because the Soviets may want to play down or conceal their role. By leaving the degree of their support ambiguous, the Soviets gain freedom for political maneuvering.

15. East European states have provided a wide variety of military equipment and experts to Third World nations and insurgent movements, often in close cooperation with the USSR. While in most cases this support has furthered Soviet objectives, the East Europeans have had their own political and economic motives. The East European governments have not committed combat troops in the Third World and would be reluctant to do so.

16. Naval surface ships and submarines are the principal Soviet military forces deployed in distance areas and are supplemented by periodic deployments of naval aircraft. Although Soviet concerns over potential strategic threats from Western carrier-launched airstrikes and submarine-launched ballistic missiles remain prominent in Soviet distant operations, the Navy continues to perform important missions related to the projection of power and influence in the Third World, primarily by maintaining forces in regions of Soviet interest which can be augmented relatively quickly in times of crisis.

17. We have no evidence of Soviet contingency plans to exert political or economic pressure on the United States or its allies through interdiction of sea lines of communication in the absence of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. The Soviets probably believe that such an operation would lead to war with NATO.

18. In the principal areas of their normal deployments in distant areas, Soviet diesel submarines and naval ships have access to a number of ports for crew rest, replenishment, maintenance, and in some cases major overhaul. Moscow is seeking additional access, but the only good prospects in the near term are in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. Staging facilities for Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft are currently limited to Cuba and Angola, but Ethiopia and South Yemen probably will grant access for this purpose. Hanoi is unlikely to grant the Soviets any formal base rights in either Vietnam or Kampuchea but there are circumstances in which it might permit Soviet access to air or naval facilities. The recent Chinese incursion into Vietnam may induce Hanoi to permit a Soviet military presence at least as long as the threat exists.

Intervention Capabilities

19. The Soviets have significant forces capable of intervention in distant areas and have introduced forces into combat situations in distant areas in the past. We believe that Soviet leaders in the future would be willing under certain circumstances to use forces for this purpose. Elements of all Soviet conventional forces—ground, air, and naval—are potential resources for use in situations that call for intervention. The deployment of a large segment of Soviet forces in distant areas is constrained not only by the practical difficulties of moving large forces over long distances but by the requirement, as Moscow sees it, to retain the bulk of these forces in the USSR and Eastern Europe in readiness for their primary mission of waging war with NATO or China. On the other hand, these factors would not restrict the deployment of smaller units.

20. Where Cuban or other friendly forces are not available for use in the Third World or are deemed unsuitable, Moscow would have the option of using its own ground forces. Although Soviet air, naval, and air defense forces have been involved in conflicts in the Middle East, Angola, and Ethiopia, Soviet ground combat forces have not. Growing Soviet self-confidence in projecting power and in the USSR’s role as a global power will diminish whatever Soviet reluctance may have existed in the past to employ ground forces outside the Warsaw Pact. At the same time, there are limited situations in which allied forces would not be preferable from a Soviet point of view; Afghanistan is one where the provision of limited Soviet ground forces in a hurry might well be undertaken. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership would probably view the use of ground combat units, even in modest numbers, as a significant escalation of Soviet involvement. The major constraints would be concern over the likelihood of Western or regional counteraction and the impact on Third World perceptions of Soviet policy. We believe, therefore, that Moscow would employ ground combat units only where, and to the degree, it considered such action essential to preserve vital Soviet interests in the region.

21. Over the next 10 years the Soviets will continue to make modest improvements in amphibious lift, logistic support ships, naval tactical air support, gunfire support, and airlift. Such improvements, when added to current naval, airborne, naval infantry, and command and control resources, will result in an increased ability to deploy forces in distant areas and to come to the assistance of any ally. For example, the Soviets might introduce an airborne or naval infantry unit at the invitation of a government, particularly if Moscow believed there was little danger of Western reaction and that the intensity of combat would be low or the presence of an armed Soviet contingent would be sufficient to accomplish Moscow’s objectives. Indeed, a single Soviet airborne division is larger than the armies of many Third World states.

22. We believe, however, that the Soviets are unlikely to invade a Third World country. They have never mounted an airborne assault or amphibious assault operation in a distant area. Nevertheless, Soviet forces have long been capable of undertaking such an operation against the light opposition which could be expected in most areas, and the above-projected improvements will expand this capability. But, over the next decade the Soviets will still not have built the forces capable of transporting, landing, and sustaining a large joint assault operation against substantial opposition in the Third World.

Outlook

23. Policy. Although a change in the makeup of the top Soviet leadership is highly probable in the next five years and virtually certain in the next 10, we do not believe that Soviet policies or long-term objectives toward the Third World will change substantially for this reason alone. We do not foresee the present or any likely future Soviet leadership altering these objectives to secure short-term economic or political benefits from the West. Although future Soviet leaders will attach varying degrees of importance to detente relations with the United States and other Western powers, we believe it unlikely that Soviet leaders will be any more dissuaded from pursuing opportunities in the Third World in the future than in the recent past by concern over adverse effects on detente. Indeed, Soviet leaders will probably continue to calculate that major issues like the strategic arms limitation talks will be largely unaffected and that costs in less critical areas of US-Soviet relations will be bearable.

24. Regional Prospects. We believe the Soviets will persist in a steady course of creating and exploiting opportunities in distant areas, utilizing wherever possible their comparative advantages in military instruments of influence. They will continue to regard military means—principally arms sales, military assistance, and support of insurgent movements—as the most feasible way of bringing about the changes they seek in the political structure of the Third World.

25. In Latin America, opportunities for expanding Soviet influence through military means are less favorable than in other regions of the Third World, with the exception of the continuing Soviet role in Cuba. Although Moscow has designated Latin America as an arena for Soviet-US competition and has made some economic and diplomatic inroads, prospects are still limited. There will undoubtedly be incidents of unrest and turmoil that should lend themselves to exploitation, but Soviet efforts will be hampered by prevalent anti-Communist sentiments in Latin America and by the USSR’s inability to provide the kinds of nonmilitary assistance Latin Americans need. Most Latin American governments are wary of Soviet overtures and concerned as much about Soviet expansionism as about US regional influence.

26. In Cuba, there are signs that the Soviets are continuing to strengthen their influence on the island as well as to upgrade Cuba’s military capabilities. There are differing views, however, on the extent to which the Soviet military presence on the island will grow:

— According to one view² both the Soviets and the Cubans are aware of US sensitivities concerning the permanent basing of nontechnical or nonadvisory Soviet military personnel in Cuba and, for this reason, Moscow would be unlikely to station any combat or reconnaissance unit there permanently because it would exacerbate US relations with both the USSR and Cuba and further endanger Cuba’s position in the nonaligned movement.

— Another view³ can be summarized as follows: The Soviets continue to view Cuba as a means to expand Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere and to test US reactions to increased Soviet military use of Cuba. Although the Soviets retreated from their attempt to place offensive weapons on the island in 1962 and to use Cienfuegos harbor to support nuclear-powered submarines in 1970, they continue to use Cuba in a variety of ways to support their objectives. The Soviets will probably expand their military use of Cuba. The most likely way would be to extend the frequency or length of their current naval ship or naval air reconnaissance deployments until their presence there becomes permanent; this would not require additional support facilities. The last naval deployment in 1978 lasted more than 90 days, the longest period overall involving a Soviet Navy task group in Caribbean waters since 1973. The Soviets are carrying out other military activities in Cuba [1 line not declassified] and there are indications that small elements of Soviet ground forces are on the island, although the nature of their activity is uncertain. (Possible explanations range from demonstrations or testing of Soviet equipment and tactics or training of local advisory and security personnel, to specialized training of Soviet tactical units.) Moscow is also significantly upgrading Cuba’s military capabilities by supplying its forces with equipment and by providing military advisers and instructors to train Cuban forces. And, for the first time, the Soviets have given Cuba an F-class submarine and MIG–23 Flogger air defense and ground attack aircraft, the latter with a range sufficient to reach the southeastern United States and the Panama Canal. Soviet pilots, already in Cuba, occasionally fly these aircraft, probably to maintain proficiency; this flight activity could be expanded in the future to include other roles.

27. In South Asia, the Soviet outlook is somewhat brighter than in Latin America. The Soviets are expanding their role in Afghanistan and are maintaining close relations with India. India’s current government, however, is not as well disposed toward the Soviets as its predecessor and has begun seeking to make Indian foreign policy more genuinely nonaligned by improving relations with both China and the West and by reducing its dependence on the USSR for arms aid.

28. In Southeast Asia, Soviet support to Vietnam—and the Friendship Treaty of November 1978—gave Hanoi significant external backing for its invasion of Kampuchea in early 1979. Nonetheless, Hanoi remains fiercely independent, and Soviet influence in the region will remain largely dependent on Hanoi’s sufferance.

29. In the Middle East, opportunities to expand Soviet influence will depend, at least in the near term, mainly on the outcome of the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations and the evolution of events in Iran. Over the long term, underlying antagonisms toward, and deepening suspicions of, Moscow’s motives will qualify Soviet prospects. Soviet opportunities could greatly improve, however, if peace negotiations in the Middle East fail, raising the likelihood of renewed hostilities. As a result of the instability in Iran, the Soviets undoubtedly anticipate significant changes there and in the conservative regimes of the Persian Gulf area that will lead to opportunities for new Soviet ties with the oil-producing states and to further reduction of Western influence.

30. The best opportunities for the USSR will lie in Africa, where political instability is commonplace and where conditions that promote subversion and insurgencies will remain rife.

31. Preservation of Influence. This will remain the overriding problem in Soviet efforts to project power and influence in the Third World through military means. Even where Soviet influence is strongest, it is vulnerable to unpredictable changes in the local political leadership or in its attitudes. Nationalist-minded states will continue to resent the arrogant behavior and thinly veiled prejudice often displayed by Soviet representatives. Many Third World leaders will remain suspicious of Soviet motives and probably would be reluctant clients of the USSR. Those who do accept Soviet assistance can be expected to react against instances of exploitative military agreements, poor-quality assistance and training, and interference in internal affairs.

32. To preserve Soviet influence in a country where, for example, dependence on Soviet military support has diminished or expulsion of Soviet personnel is threatened, Moscow has essentially three alternatives beyond the continuation of present policies:

— Use friendly outside forces more extensively to carry out Moscow’s policies.

— Seek to acquire through Soviet advisers sufficient control of the military and internal security forces to prevent the leaders of the client state from taking actions inimical to Soviet interests.

— Garrison Soviet troops in the client state, at its invitation, ostensibly to protect the state against some external threat but in reality to preserve in power a government that is friendly and beholden to Moscow and that will enforce policies in line with Soviet interests.

33. The last alternative would have unforeseeable ramifications for Soviet foreign relations, but it is nonetheless an option that conceivably could attract serious consideration by Soviet decisionmakers. The deployment of Soviet forces for this purpose, however, would be a drastic departure from the policy Moscow has followed in the Third World.

34. Despite Soviet difficulties in preserving political influence in most Third World countries, Moscow will have ample opportunities to play a major role. Soviet policy in the Third World feeds on political turbulence, military conflict, and civil strife. During the next 10 years these disruptions are likely to recur, especially in Africa and the Middle East, and the major role the Soviets have effectively played—a source of arms and military assistance and a protector of clients—will remain relevant to the needs of many countries.

[Omitted here is the body of the NIE and six annexes.]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files. Top Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the estimate: the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Energy, and Defense, and the National Security Agency, with the participation of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
2. The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency; the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; and the Director, National Security Agency. [Footnote is in the original.]
3. The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Senior Intelligence Officers of each of the military services. [Footnote is in the original.]