Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

114. Report Prepared in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics¹

Washington, January 30, 1979

[Omitted here is the title page, the forward, and the table of contents.]

SECTION I—INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

A. (C) Background

In November 1975, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) began a study that resulted in a report in April 1976 to Congress on U.S. Conventional Reinforcements for NATO.² The study effort continued into a broader review of mobilization and deployment planning. Concern about this area was greatly reinforced by an Army exercise, MOBEX–76. In response, besides undertaking some immediate actions, the Secretary of Defense called for extensive testing of the full mobilization process.

In this context, exercise NIFTY NUGGET–78 was designed and scheduled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was to: (1) determine the adequacy of plans, systems and procedures for full mobilization, (2) examine limitations and shortfalls in manpower and logistics through the period of initial deployments, (3) fully exercise the mobilization and deployment responsibilities (without actual call-up or movement of units) of the Military Departments, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the transportation operating agencies (Military Airlift Command, Military Sealift Command, and the Military Traffic Management Command), the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and participating Federal departments and agencies, and (4) assess the effectiveness of deployment planning.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to fully exercise the support provided through the civilian Federal agencies and the coordination needed to gain that support, encouraged and helped in the design of a companion civil sector exercise REX–78. REX and NIFTY NUGGET were held simultaneously, 10–30 October 1978, with some organizations extending their play into November.

As planning for NIFTY NUGGET progressed, its potential value in identifying serious deficiencies and energizing remedial work became apparent. Three things were done to make the exercise of more value:

— A complementary exercise, PETITE NUGGET, was designed and held prior to NIFTY NUGGET to examine the premobilization assumptions of the latter exercise. Less an exercise than a discussion, PETITE NUGGET was nevertheless situation oriented and it forced the players to make what in reality would be very difficult decisions. PETITE NUGGET shed light on our lack of preparation for such decision making.

— A decision was made to involve senior level civilian personnel in NIFTY NUGGET. Heretofore, Joint Staff exercises had used exercise control groups or a few, action level OSD staff members to represent the Secretary of Defense and his staff. As a result, crucial decisions that must be made by civilian authorities were assumed away. For NIFTY NUGGET the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), Stanley R. Resor, acted as the Secretary, and Richard Danzig, DASD for Program Development (MRA&L), acted as Deputy Secretary of Defense. Many Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense participated. The Military Departments established a similar policy. This level of participation was unprecedented, and led to an extremely rich harvest of insights.

— An evaluation of DoD performance and OSD management preparedness was commissioned. Although each Military Department and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had designed its own evaluation, it was believed that much would be gained by specific focus on policy, planning and procedures at the OSD level. A former Assistant Secretary of Defense (M&RA), William K. Brehm, assisted by two recently retired general officers and a small staff, undertook this difficult task. Now almost complete, that evaluation is reflected in this report.

B. (C) An Assessment of Capability

The two exercises, PETITE and NIFTY NUGGET, tested thousands of functions and relationships under extreme conditions. Many passed with flying colors. However, the exercises also underscored important respects in which the DoD can and ought to improve its capacity to mobilize and move forces rapidly to reinforce our NATO Allies. The exercises bred a conviction that more attention should be given now to management of the systems that would mobilize, augment and deploy national resources.

Planning for mobilization needs to be improved. The current plan is an assembly of old and unconnected Presidential emergency orders, policies, regulations and procedures. Each covers a single aspect of the process but not all aspects are addressed. With little warning, mobilization execution would have to be decentralized; but plans need to be improved if the process is to proceed without major blockages. More must also be done to plan for a graduated build-up. We can profit from further study of how to augment the deterrent value of our forces during periods of rising tension.

Mobilization and deploying resources do not meet the demand under the most stringent conditions. Under a NIFTY NUGGET scenario the Army cannot meet its demand for trained manpower without reallocating personnel from later deploying units to those deploying early. At present, under this scenario, more Defense strategic lift assets are needed, and our existing prepositioned stockpiles of equipment and ammunition are in many cases significantly short.

Deployment transportation planning needs to be better integrated, made more detailed, and made more flexible.

War planning was found wanting to a lesser degree. Yet, the exercises revealed that the simultaneous execution of war plans in different geographic areas could not be effective because each used common forces and strategic lift assets.

Federal civil agencies were often unaware of and/or unprepared to support defense needs. Substantial work needs to be done in this respect.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the report.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Russell, Box 112, Mobilization Planning Study: 1/79–8/80. Confidential. According to the title page, the report, entitled “A Review of Military Mobilization Plans,” was prepared for the House Committee on Armed Services. For more on NIFTY NUGGET, see Document 94.
2. Reference is to Robert J. Murray and Herbert C. Puscheck, A Report to Congress on U.S. Conventional Reinforcements for NATO. (Washington: Government Printing Office, June 1976)