86. Letter From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter1
As you requested, I am writing to provide material to supplement my letter of May 29, 1978,2 for possible use in your Annapolis speech. In doing so, I will try to minimize repetition of points made in the letter.
I.
The United States and the Soviet Union each face a strategic choice—do we want to seek broadened areas of mutual interest as we compete in other areas, or will we revert to the days of general antagonism? We prefer the former course. It means a safer world and a more secure America. A relationship of this kind would include the following elements:
A. We would expand areas of cooperation in our mutual interest, such as arms control agreements that enhance our security, or agreements for cooperation in science and technology which promise a better life for our people.
B. We would recognize and accept the continuation of competition, but within moderating limits. The American people should not expect, in this generation, to see an end to competition with the Soviets. We, too, will compete ideologically, politically and economically. But both sides should be fully aware of the dangers, to their bilateral relationship and to world peace, if they fuel local and regional conflicts, rather than work together and with others on peaceful solutions.
[Page 409]Soviet and Cuban actions in Africa have exacerbated conflicts and increased bloodshed. No one quarrels with the right of a country to appeal to friendly powers for assistance in maintaining territorial integrity. We have helped meet that call from Zaire. But such help should be coupled with a commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes. And it should not be a pretext for prolonged military intervention and political dominance.
We call on the Soviet Union to adopt a policy of restraint in Africa, forsaking the temptation to achieve short-term political gain at the expense of long-term stability. We also call on the Soviet Union to play a constructive part in finding peaceful solutions for the future of Eritrea and for the remaining problems of decolonization and majority rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia.
Competition in areas like Africa will not deter our efforts to find agreements that serve the security interests of both countries. But when peaceful competition turns to confrontation, it cannot help but erode the political base for cooperation in both nations. This is not a threat, but a fact of life. Our intention is not to gain an advantage, but to try to head off a deterioration in our relations that would follow a continued pattern of excessive competition.
C. We would also expect the continuation of strong defenses on both sides, and the maintenance of the military parity. Despite the Soviet build-up over the past ten years, the United States and our Allies are strong, and fully equal to the challenge we face.
D. Support for human rights, not as an effort to undermine governments, but to uphold an international standard to which both nations are committed.
II.
As we cooperate and compete, we must also remain strong. This will include:
A. Demonstrated resolve not to allow any nation to gain military superiority over us. This will involve the strengthening of vital military programs in the U.S. and its Allies, as we are doing.
B. Achievement of dependable arms control agreements that enhance our security.
C. Public and Congressional support for efforts to assist old and new friends in need of security or economic assistance.
D. Maintenance of an American leadership that recognizes the necessity of working with other nations, and that acknowledges the desire of many developing nations to preserve real sovereignty and independence, and to resist an unhealthy overdependence on either the United States or the Soviet Union.
[Page 410]E. The continued assertion of our national ideals, the most powerful ideas in the world.
F. Our superior technological capacity, our unmatched industrial base, our expanding trade relations around the world.
G. The cohesion of our society, and our ability to criticize our shortcomings openly, and in a constructive spirit, so as to better correct them.
III.
We are determined to pursue policies of unsurpassed readiness and cooperation in managing our relations with the Soviet Union. No issue is more central to the foreign interests of the United States, and none is nearly as important in assessing the strategic and nuclear threats to world peace. Our views must be made clear to the people of this country and of the Soviet Union, and they will be. But effective diplomacy can suffer if the tone of public debates between our governments is heated. The resulting atmosphere makes it less likely that firm positions quietly conveyed will be fully understood by the other side.
Providence has destined that both the United States and the Soviet Union are great powers with global interests. Although we do not share a similar world view, neither should seek to impose its conceptions on others or to exclude the other from constructive participation in the issues that face mankind. We are confident of our future and our ability to help build a world at peace.
Taken together with the May 29 letter, I hope that these points may be helpful.
Respectfully,
- Source: Carter Library, Hertzberg Donated Historical Material, Speech Files, Box 5, Annapolis, June 7, 1978. No classification marking. There is no indication that the President saw this copy of the letter.↩
- See Document 82.↩