Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

84. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, May 31, 1978

SUBJECT

• Reflections at Midweek: The US and the USSR

I believe this has been an important and potentially very constructive week. It has involved the conjunction of four important developments:

1. NATO countries displayed more unity on vital matters than expected, and I have not the slightest doubt that they also gained a great deal of personal confidence in your leadership. In fact, I think the Summit has been an important personal success for you;²

2. For the first time, the Soviets and the Cubans are beginning to take our concerns about their African policies seriously. Till now, they have dismissed them; they are now beginning to show signs of genuine concern;

3. Similarly for the first time, the Chinese are beginning to take us seriously, and this could pay dividends in the longer run. In part, this is due to my visit; more importantly, to your public statements and posture;

4. The public is beginning to perceive this Administration as realistically prepared to face the realities of global power. I consider Tuesday’s editorial in The Washington Post to be particularly significant,³ as was Meg Greenfield’s column in Newsweek. I believe you will be hearing significant echoes of Congressional support in the days to come, and this will not be without its domestic political effects.

It is essential that these benefits not be dissipated but be exploited towards positive ends. Let me specifically suggest the following:

1. That you take advantage of an early opportunity to stress that detente has to be reciprocal and comprehensive. The issue is not detente itself, but the Soviet violation of the code of detente. This lesson has to be driven home in a responsible and persistent way.

2. It is essential that we do not convey the impression of uncertainty or anxiety. Premature whispers to the Russians about our desire to promote friendship might be misconstrued by them as an indication of a new zig-zag and as evidence of lack of resolve. It would be useful if you were to indicate to State your determination that the Administration cohesively convey the same tone—a point which The Washington Post editorial so well stressed and so much welcomed.

3. It should be made clear to the Russians that our purpose is not to humiliate them, and that we are prepared to deal with them seriously, on the basis of reciprocity. Accordingly, I think it would be useful if you were to instruct Cy and me to have separate talks with Gromyko and Dobrynin respectively, or each alone with Dobrynin—in order to convey the same message. That message ought to be that we are still interested in SALT, etc., but that we cannot sustain a selective detente which they exploit to their own advantage in a manner inimical to our vital interests; and that any positive gesture by them would be reciprocated by us. For example, tangible even if quiet steps to reduce the Soviet/Cuban military presence in Africa (notably Ethiopia and Angola), and a commitment not to exacerbate the situation around Rhodesia would be reciprocated by us. On the other hand, Soviet unwillingness to give us these assurances will necessarily force us not only to support our friends but also to seek friends where we can find them (and here the China alternative is a very subtle but persuasive argument).

4. In regard to China, we should be very careful to continue stressing the proposition that our long-term interests are congruent not because of tactical anti-Sovietism, but because of our joint commitment to a world of diversity (a point I stressed in my report to NATO).⁴ Subtle hints of long-term congruence of interest are more likely to induce the Russians to compete for our favors.

Above all, what we now need is to demonstrate prudent resolve so that the four gains mentioned at the outset of this memorandum are translated into tangible benefits internationally and lasting domestic advantages politically.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 79, Brzezinski Chron—To/From President: 5–6/78. Secret. The President initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.
2. See Document 83.
3. “A Long-Haul Foreign Policy,” The Washington Post, May 30, 1978, p. A–16.
4. During the summit meeting, Brzezinski delivered a report on China. (Power and Principle, p. 221)