Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

73. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter ¹

Washington, April 7, 1978

SUBJECT

• NSC Weekly Report #53

1. Opinions

To achieve your foreign policy objectives—a more peaceful world based on a reduction of arms, a deeper understanding with the Soviet Union, and restraint and the resolution of conflicts in the third world—it will take more than simply negotiating each of these matters in their isolation and in terms of the technical questions they pose. To have full public and political support here and abroad for overcoming the kinds of obstacles we have encountered, we must orchestrate our efforts so they will be mutually reinforcing and not mutually contradictory.

Foremost among those steps we will be taking shortly is the Vance mission to Moscow² and the possibility of significant progress in SALT. That visit, to be successful, needs to be part of a broader effort on a number of fronts. It is important that the mission itself not be merely a negotiating session devoted to the specifics of SALT but that it address other issues in the US/Soviet relationship which are the source of deep concern, both in your government and with the public at large.

It is clearly in the Soviet interest, and part of the Soviet strategy, to focus attention on SALT, and to proclaim the agreement to be evidence of a general improvement in US-Soviet relations. This then leaves the Soviets free to pursue their political objectives elsewhere and by other means.

In addition to negotiating, with an agreement being clearly also in the U.S. interest, it is therefore imperative that the U.S. focus also on the larger dimensions of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Indeed, the U.S. side should open the discussions with a broad review of the relationship, emphasizing that we seek a detente that is increasingly comprehensive and genuinely reciprocal. Unless we do that, we enable the Soviets to set the tone and to define the priorities of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, clearly to their own advantage. Moreover, I am quite convinced that unless detente becomes comprehensive and reciprocal, we will face an increasing rebellion at home, and SALT will not be ratified.

I think it is not unfair to summarize the Soviet strategy as involving the following elements:

1. Keep movement going forward on detente in the area of arms control relationships. This both restrains any U.S. build-up, and generates a more passive U.S. attitude on other issues;³

2. Create the impression of a special U.S.-Soviet relationship, which frightens both the Europeans and the Chinese;

3. To induce the Europeans increasingly into a self-Finlandized attitude, in part out of fear of the Soviet Union, and in part out of wishful thinking that a genuine detente truly exists;

4. To prevent a rapid resolution of the Middle Eastern problem and to increase U.S. difficulties, in the hope of radicalizing the Arabs and of gaining greater leverage;

5. To exploit any opportunities in Africa, or elsewhere, to advance Soviet interests, either directly or indirectly;

6. To intimidate the U.S. and its allies by massive propaganda campaigns, such as the one directed at the neutron bomb, and through general vilification of U.S. motives, policies, and society.

Our response, accordingly, must be one in which we stress the importance of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, as well as our determination to compete in all areas of the relationship if cooperation does not in fact develop.

We should, in view of the above, tell the Soviets very frankly that their behavior in Africa is intolerable.⁴ If Soviet/Cuban forces are intruded into the Southern African conflict, this will jeopardize detente as a whole and we will react strongly. This should be stated directly, unambiguously, and forcefully.

In this connection, specific reference should be made to the Brezhnev-Nixon communique, in which joint rules of restraint were explicitly defined.⁵ The Soviets should be told that we view them as having violated these jointly agreed rules.

In addition, the Soviets should be told that our relationship is now at a watershed. We are willing, anxious, and ready to try to improve it, to widen the scope of cooperation, and to work together on a wide range of issues. We will not stand for a selective detente, in which the Soviet side arbitrarily defines the rules of the game. Decisions that will be made this summer on SALT as well as on other issues will affect our relationship for many years to come.

Subject to your revisions of the above, I would recommend that a letter of instructions from you to Cy be drafted and given to him prior to his departure.⁶ I do not believe that either U.S. interests, or your own leadership, will be well served if the sessions in Moscow become merely a bargaining exercise on the specifics of SALT.⁷ The state of U.S. public opinion, as well as the thrust of recent Soviet actions, simply do not give us that luxury. Moreover, the Soviets tend to respect a broadly gauged approach. A realistic and non-belligerent toughness draws from them a respectful response. Eagerness or a narrowly focused negotiating attitude tends to be exploited.

There are also a number of specific actions and events that need to be orchestrated to support your overall objectives:

—Africa: We need to intensify our political effort to call attention to Soviet/Cuban intervention. We should encourage the Yugoslavs and Algerians who are questioning Cuba’s non-aligned credentials—something that apparently troubles the Cubans significantly.⁸ We should also see, in our proposed private, direct contacts with the Cubans, if we cannot discourage further adventures in Eritrea and Southern Africa, holding out the prospects of significant steps in normalization.

— NATO: The Summit Meeting⁹ will provide an important opportunity to stress your concern for security issues and to repair whatever strains may exist as a result of the neutron bomb episode.¹⁰ We should make this a significant event in your Presidency, including major accomplishments in terms of both political content and adoption of allied defense programs. Given the stresses of the last few weeks, we believe we will be in a strong position to press the Allies to be forthcoming on the long-term defense program. We should also stress the importance of a Soviet response to our MBFR initiative which will be tabled next week.¹¹

—Defense Debate: There is strong Hill pressure for an increase in defense spending above your budget. I believe it is important that we not simply resist these increases across the board but, rather, indicate we are prepared to accept some increase and work to shape those increases that will take place. I have in mind, for example, acceleration of the MX/Trident II missile and a modest Continental Air Defense package, both aimed at diminishing opposition to SALT.¹²

—China: We are putting together a strong technology package and program for the China trip. We should also emphasize some other security dimensions to our relationship. I will be providing further suggestions to you.

— UN: The Special Session on Disarmament will be an opportunity to place the monkey on the Soviets’ back to be forthcoming in response to your neutron bomb decision, on MBFR and in other forums.¹³ We should press them hard but avoid picking up for the sake of propaganda some longstanding ideas in the disarmament community which will provoke an extremely bad reaction among crucial defense-oriented Congressmen as well as our NATO allies. I believe we can have an an aggressive posture in the SSOD without creating fears that we have become soft.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to foreign policy opinions.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 2–4/78. Secret. The President initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.
2. Vance met with Brezhnev in Moscow April 19–23; see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 99–103.
3. The President placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this and the subsequent five points.
4. The President underlined the word “intolerable” and placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.
5. The President underlined the phrase “Brezhnev-Nixon communique” and wrote “give me a copy” in the right-hand margin next to this sentence. Presumable reference is to the “Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” signed by Nixon and Brezhnev in Moscow on May 29, 1972. The text is printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1972, pp. 897–898. A separate communiqué, which references the “Basic Principles,” was released at the conclusion of the May 1972 Moscow summit meeting and is ibid., pp. 898–902.
6. In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote “Prepare draft.” For the President’s April 14 letter to Vance, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 96.
7. The President underlined “bargaining exercise” and wrote “I agree” in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
8. In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote “I agree.” In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote “Should support Owen on Cuba troop estimate.”
9. See footnote 2, Document 72.
10. On April 7, the President released a statement indicating that he had decided to “defer production of weapons with enhanced radiation effects.” The statement underscored that the Carter administration would continue to consult with Western European allies and discuss “appropriate arms control measures” to broach with Soviet officials. (Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, p. 702) Documentation on ERW is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. V, European Security, 1978–1983.
11. The President underlined “our MBFR initiative” and wrote “what is it?” in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.
12. In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote “good items if budget increased.”
13. See footnote 5, Document 24. In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote “Let’s push SS 20 argument.”