Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

71. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, March 3, 1978

SUBJECT

• Speech on Defense Policy

At Tab A is an outline of a speech on this Administration’s defense policy for your consideration.²

The speech should note briefly that you conceive national security to be more than military affairs and that your efforts in the non-military areas of national security have been many. That must not, however, lead anyone to the mistaken view that you neglect the military dimension of this country’s security. If we and our allies seek a world of “peace without victory” while others, pretending to accept that spirit of detente, actually seek “victory without war,” the world will not be safe, and the military factor will become crucial. Recent Soviet behavior is not reassuring on this point.

You, as Commander-in-Chief, will make clear to the American public and our allies that military power is a fundamental component of national security. Furthermore, a strong and rich nation cannot escape the political responsibility of military power. Well-reasoned examples of this Administration’s decisions on future military programs will show that you carefully have considered the trends in national security affairs and are providing the flexibility needed to cope with the wide range of contingencies which the U.S. could face during this decade. Your personal involvement in maintaining military readiness will be highlighted.

The speech would set forth the following principles:

—We do not seek military superiority but we will not allow others to attain it.

—It is not our policy to intervene militarily in the domestic affairs of other countries or to exacerbate regional and local conflicts, and we cannot view with equanimity interventions by other powers in such conflicts.

—We shall seek arms agreements when they are possible and prudent, but we shall sustain and improve our military capabilities where necessary.

—We shall be forthcoming in encouraging further economic and technological cooperation with those who act to restrain destabilizing military competition.

It would be easy for a number of states, not only Saudi Arabia and Iran, but also Yugoslavia and our NATO allies to reach a mistaken conclusion about where we are going because we have emphasized cooperation for the past year. This speech should redress the balance and set the backdrop for other statements you may find important to make on national security as events unfold in Africa, the Middle East, and a post-Tito Yugoslavia.

In sum, the image to be conveyed is not belligerence or alarm, but rather competence and confidence in the pursuit of the national strategy which you set last summer.³

Jim Fallows has been consulted on this outline. I have also invited Harold Brown to make inputs into the preparation of this speech.⁴

Are we heading in the right direction with this outline?⁵

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 64, Speeches: Wake Forest University: 10/77–3/78. Confidential. The President initialed the top-right hand corner of the memorandum. Brzezinski also wrote “ZB file” in the top-right hand corner of the memorandum. Huntington sent the memorandum and the speech outline to Brzezinski under a March 3 cover memorandum, indicating that he, Odom, Putnam, and Westbrook had attempted to incorporate Brzezinski’s and Aaron’s suggestions. Huntington also requested that Brzezinski send both the memorandum and the outline to the President.
2. Attached but not printed. The undated, 3-page outline is entitled “Defense Policy Speech.” For the text of the address as delivered by the President on March 17, see Document 72.
3. See footnote 2, Document 36.
4. According to an NSC Correspondence Profile, Brzezinski sent a March 3 memorandum to Brown requesting his views. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 64, Speeches: Wake Forest University: 10/77–3/78) Brown’s March 18 reply is ibid.
5. The President indicated his approval by checking the “Yes” option. He wrote “but” next to the option and drew a line from it into the lower margin where he added: “ok—Let Harold have a major input. I want it to answer questions raised by Sam Nunn, Goldwater & others, & also to teach the average American what we have & are doing. Keep language simple—not too much theory—J.” He continued: “p.s. One or two newsworthy specific items would help. (ASAT—MX—CM—CTB—SALT, etc).”