Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

57. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, October 21, 1977

SUBJECT

• NSC Weekly Report #33

1. Opinion

We need to look ahead and develop a coherent strategy—including priorities, timing, and yes, linkages—for managing our dealings with the Soviet Union, including the barrage of arms control negotiations, and such major political issues as CSCE, human rights, and the Middle East. We need this strategy to guide our own planning and action, and to make sure we do not run into difficulty with Congress and the public on the Soviet front.

For the American public, how the Soviet connection is managed is a central standard for evaluating the foreign policy performance and competence of any administration. The public becomes anxious when they think things are going badly with the Soviets; but they equally—and sometimes more so—become nervous when they think things are going too well because they suspect good relations are being bought with concessions. Above all, the American public wants a sense that the Soviet connection is under control and that those managing it know what they want.

Simply put, we may have something of a problem in how the public sees our conduct of Soviet Affairs. Pat Caddell’s recent poll is one of a number of straws in the wind. It shows a considerable negative shift in opinion concerning performance on Soviet policy and the related area of human rights. To some extent, attitudes toward our Soviet policy reflect a broader concern (one that you are familiar with) that we are trying to do too much too quickly on too many different fronts. To the extent that we can convey coherence and control in our Soviet policy, we will counter this perception and build public confidence in our general foreign policy efforts.

A key issue is whether we should try to wrap up CTB with SALT in the near term. There is a strong connection between them in that both are about strategic nuclear capabilities—and to conclude both at the same time would be a powerful realization and demonstration of your commitment to the control of nuclear weapons. Indeed, at one point we accelerated our CTB efforts when it seemed that SALT might be indefinitely stalled.

This said, it is not clear that it is feasible to get to a CTB in the desired timeframe without conceding points important to us. Indeed, if the Soviets sense that we are eager to wrap CTB up with SALT, they would have a major incentive to link the two and try to wring more concessions from us. There is also a good risk that Congress and the public, rather than applauding the simultaneous conclusion of SALT and CTB as two blows struck for peace, instead will question whether we bought the double deal with unwarranted concessions. PNE’s, for example, is an area where we may ultimately have to compromise. But it is such an article of faith on the left and the right that they should stop, that any such concession in the SALT II timeframe will be scored as a retreat.

On balance, I think we need a controlled and phased strategy to guide us through the minefields I have sketched above. I think that a step-by-step approach is not only the best way to handle the Soviets substantively, but also to convey a sense of competence and control to Congress and to the public, and to avoid the sort of progressive euphoria which, in the past, has been followed with sharp questions and suspicions about what it really cost. In essence, I am talking of building and staging our relations and agreements with the Soviets over the span of your first term in office. The timetable might look something like this:

—A SALT II agreement, combined with a Summit, in late winter or early spring after Panama. It could well take us that long to get there in any event.

—An Indian Ocean stabilization agreement concluded at the same time or perhaps earlier if it looks desirable. It is a moderate step within reach which might help maintain momentum in the relationship, while buying us time on more serious and difficult fronts.

—A grey area systems initiative, possibly linked to MBFR, to follow shortly after SALT II and demonstrate our continued concern for Backfire, SS–20’s, etc. We have started planning work on this.²

—A CTB agreement in late 1978, perhaps before the elections.³ Your Spring Summit meeting could be used to open the way.

—Intensive negotiations in 1979 looking to the expiration of the SALT II Protocol which coincides with the end of your first term, and is, therefore, a major political benchmark.

These are the key elements. A comprehensive plan would have to fit in such negotiations as MBFR, ASAT, CW, radiological weapons, civil defense, and conventional arms restraints. Each of these could be fitted into a general scheme of steady and controlled progress in our dealings with the Soviets. Indeed, if we want to add something to SALT for a possible Spring Summit, ASAT in some ways is a more directly related subject and perhaps more feasible on terms acceptable to us, than CTB.

Finally, a major argument for the approach I am describing is the need to phase the various negotiations and agreements to give the Soviets a continuing incentive to moderate their behavior in our relationship generally. The Soviets have gotten used to some pressure on human rights and their tack now is to down-play the issue and to suggest that we have learned our lesson. You may have to speak out again publicly on the issue to disabuse the Soviets and to head off domestic charges that you are backing off human rights. When you do speak out, the Soviets’ reactions will be moderated to the extent they are enmeshed with us in a controlled process of negotiations, and have something to lose.⁴

Similarly, in the period immediately ahead, getting to Geneva on the Middle East and what happens once we are there will be real tests of Soviet intentions. How they respond cannot be divorced from SALT or any other negotiation. Especially disruptive Soviet behavior in the Middle East could not help but affect SALT and, above all, how any SALT agreement is received here in the country at large. This is a point which, before long, we ought to convey quietly to the Soviets.⁵

Please indicate if the above approach makes sense. If it does, it might be useful for you to spell it out to Cy, and perhaps some key Congressional leaders (e.g. at one of the breakfasts)—with the added benefit of conveying to all that you have a deliberate and staged strategy on this vital issue.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to foreign policy opinions.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 10–12/77. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. Both the President and Mondale initialed the memorandum. In an attached note to Brzezinski, Inderfurth wrote: “For your file. DA [David Aaron] has pursued the action item. Rick.”
2. In the right-hand margin next to this point, the President wrote: “I don’t favor deliberate delay—just hold firm on PNE, etc & not be in a hurry.”
3. Reference is to the November 1978 mid-term elections.
4. In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, the President wrote: “Brezhnev attacks on [Arthur] Goldberg are helping us.”
5. In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: “I agree.”