Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

55. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, September 21, 1977

SUBJECT

• Your Meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko

Your meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko could be a turning point. Soviet policy is apparently confused and uncertain.² Brezhnev claims he has serious concerns about you and about the general thrust of our policies. The talks with Gromyko, therefore, are an opportunity for you to shape the relationship personally and directly. But the talks will also be the first chance for the top leadership to assess you personally. Gromyko’s report of his meeting here in Washington thus will be a critical input to the politburo and Brezhnev’s future decisions.

The Soviet Perspective

Over the next month or so, Brezhnev will be putting the finishing touches on whatever programmatic statement he and the politburo intend to issue in honor of the new constitution and the 60th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. These occasions tend to take on more than a purely ceremonial significance. Probably, there will be an appraisal of the general international situation, and in particular, the future course of Soviet-American relations. While the Soviets could opt for a freeze in relations, Brezhnev’s preference probably is to reinstate “detente.”

—He knows that you will certainly be in office to deal with his successor; moreover, the Soviets cannot ignore the fact that the US has emerged from the Vietnam-Watergate turmoil with a new sense of confidence and thus in a far better strategic position to endure a period of stagnation or even confrontation.

—In contrast to our situation, the Soviets are approaching the end of the Brezhnev period which will be symbolized by the new constitution. While this period has been marked by certain Soviet successes in containing dissent at home and in East Europe and in expanding Soviet influence, in the past several years troubles have also grown—in relations with the US, in the Middle East, in India and Africa. The growth of Soviet military power has not provided a basis for permanent political influence, in part because international concerns have broadened to include newer issues in which the USSR risks irrelevancy. And, finally, the USSR is constrained by the fact that it finds itself deeply indebted to and dependent on the Western world for its economic growth.

Your Objectives

Since the Soviets, including Brezhnev, profess confusion over your policies, you may want to use this as an opening theme:

• (1) laying out the general line of your policy;
• (2) relating it to Soviet-American relations, and
• (3) indicating quite frankly some specific problems we have with Soviet behavior.

1. American Foreign Policy

Your policies have been designed to be responsive to the rapid changes occurring in the world and to reflect the new sense of confidence and moral consciousness among our people:

—We recognize that a number of the challenges that arise from this process of change impose special responsibilities on the most advanced industrial countries—for example, non-proliferation, economic and social justice, the desire for individual liberty, and the gap between rich and poor nations, transcend ideological boundaries and the traditional great power rivalries.³

—The US identifies with these aspirations and will pursue policies to help shape the process in a constructive manner.

—This is the context in which we view the question of human rights.

—A major part of your UN speech⁴ will deal with the global agenda.

A second element in your policy will be the continuing close relationship with our allies in Europe and Asia; we intend to give the alliances a new sense of purpose by cooperating not only in the traditional areas of military and political affairs, but increasingly in new areas.

Third, the US will continue to maintain a strong defense posture. This is not said as a threat but reflects the realities of the present period.⁵

Finally, we want to work for a reduction in tensions—both in regional conflicts such as the Middle East and Africa, and in functional areas of arms control, arms transfer, and non-proliferation.⁶

2. US-Soviet Relations

US-Soviet relations will occupy an important place in your policies and can contribute to the growth of a new international order.⁷

—We recognize that strong elements of competition and rivalry persist in that relationship. They have deep historical roots and reflect the differences in our two societies.

—Recognizing these realities we nevertheless believe that stronger elements of a cooperative relationship can emerge if we accept the principles of restraint and reciprocity. These can be the foundations of a genuine detente; on this basis we can gain domestic support. Otherwise, relations will be erratic.

The current task is how to give our common interests a new impetus, so that the cooperative elements will become the predominant feature of the relationship.

We see the following agenda:

—Soviet policy in the Middle East is a test of whether we can work together to promote the general international objective of building a lasting peace, or whether the USSR will be bound by the narrower national interests of maintaining its alignment with the most radical elements of Arab politics.⁸

—We will continue to work for a Geneva conference, but the question is whether the Soviet Union will use its influence to create the necessary preconditions—both procedurally and substantively—or simply try to isolate Israel while fueling an arms race.

—Soviet behavior thus far raises some serious questions for us.

Similarly, we are puzzled by Soviet policy in Africa:

—The US has taken the lead in trying to arrange a peaceful settlement in Southern Africa—but we have had little support from the USSR—indeed, we have mainly heard criticism.⁹

—Both countries should have learned lessons from Vietnam and Angola that involvement of the two strongest powers in explosive regions turning regional conflicts into confrontations can only lead to disasters.

3. Arms Control

The US has taken the initiative in almost every area of arms control, in SALT, the test ban, and the Indian Ocean, proposals for discussing ban on interference with satellites, and discussing civil defense.

—Constant criticism from the Soviet Union suggests to us that the Soviet Union is more interested in making propaganda points than negotiating: the campaign against our SALT proposals and the neutron bomb are cases in point.

Nevertheless, we are now prepared to move to a broad front:

—We will continue to press for an end to all nuclear explosions as soon as possible; the Soviets have only raised political conditions. If we want to demonstrate a genuine interest in halting proliferation of nuclear weapons and reducing the threat of war, then a comprehensive ban without political conditions, or exceptions for peaceful tests, is an issue where immediate progress is possible. We do not even rule out a temporary cessation of all testing to give the negotiation a momentum. It is now up to the Soviet side.

In the Indian Ocean, we are also ready to take a new initiative to stabilize the situation immediately and then bring about some reductions; next week we will present a new plan to the Soviet negotiators.

—In general, we are willing to restrict our activities, if the USSR is ready to reciprocate.

—For example, we would give assurances that we do not intend to deploy B–52s in the area if the USSR would, in turn, not deploy strike aircraft.

—We will not alter our present submarine operations if the USSR reciprocates.

In short, our approach reflects the basic principle of reciprocity, which should govern all our relations, and above all be manifested in the SALT negotiations.

—In SALT, you have had a chance to discuss our most recent proposal.

—We are not seeking unilateral advantages over the USSR, but the Soviet Union must recognize that we have some serious concerns about future strategic relationships; no agreement that ignores these concerns would ever pass the Congress or obtain popular support. Indeed, we could not sign such a treaty.

—On the other hand, we have taken account of Soviet concerns, and have gone more than half way to meet them. Our proposals on cruise missiles have a far greater impact on US forces than on Soviet forces.

—The Soviet response has been discouraging; we cannot engage in a process in which the US makes a series of proposals but the USSR simply rejects them or picks out an isolated element for agreement.

In sum, arms control and SALT in particular is an area where we can give the relationship a more positive character. Or, it can become a wedge that drives us apart and leads to actions that both sides may regret.

As President, you will have to submit a new defense budget to the Congress.

—If there is progress on the major arms control issues, you can reflect this in your budget.

—If not, then the American people will expect us to respond to the challenge we see in the unconstrained build up of Soviet military forces.

4. European Security and Cooperation (CSCE)

(The Soviets are quite nervous about the Belgrade Conference; they frankly do not know what to expect, so whatever you say on this issue will be a significant foreshadowing of our line in the Conference.)

—We are not seeking a confrontation, nor will we turn this Conference into a polemical debate.

—What we want is constructive outcome that will show progress in all areas; we will make some new proposals and are prepared to consider Soviet ideas.

—But the Conference will have to undertake a full and frank review of performance of all participants, including performance in human rights (Principle VII). If the original agreement is to have any meaning, then each participant must be willing to submit their record to a frank scrutiny.¹⁰ We are ready to accept criticism, and in turn, we have to make our own concerns known.

Our overall goal in CSCE is to set a higher standard of conduct for all nations to observe—and to underline the proposition that obligations, once freely undertaken, must be fully respected.

5. Trade

We recognize that over the longer term US-Soviet relations will have to have a greater economic dimension.

—At present the Congress would not be ready to consider changes in the law.¹¹ Later, after Soviet-American relations have developed more positively, you are prepared to take up the issues of MFN and credits. Frankly, this depends on Soviet policy in critical areas—the Middle East and arms control—and also on the question of emigration.

—We will not impose conditions, but merely face the realities of the mood in this country.

6. In Summary:

We seem to be approaching a crossroads; we hope that the Soviets are willing to take the more constructive path. The message Gromyko should carry back is that the US wants a cooperative relationship, but it depends on whether there is reciprocity and restraint. We want a comprehensive and reciprocal detente—and are prepared to work for it with the Soviets.¹² This is the message, in addition to personal greetings, that Gromyko ought to convey to Brezhnev.

7. Specific Agenda

The above could serve as a point of departure for a discussion of more specific issues, and I would assume that you would wish to deal with them in the following sequence:

• —SALT
• —CTB
• —The Middle East
• —Southern Africa
• —Other Items (Secretary Vance suggests human rights issues in the USSR)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Outside the System File, Box 48, Chron: 9/15–21/77. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Brzezinski sent the memorandum to the President under a covering memorandum in which he made two suggestions for the conduct of the upcoming meeting with Gromyko. He suggested that Carter begin the meeting with a plenary session in which he could “expound systematically your approach to US–Soviet relations and your view in general of US foreign policy.” Secondly, Brzezinski offered that the President, at the conclusion of the meeting, “invite Gromyko to your office for a personal conversation with you alone. The meeting will thus end on a cordial note (which is more important than the illusion of cordiality before serious discussions) and you can then convey a final and personal message to Brezhnev.” Attached but not printed are a Comprehensive Test Ban background paper, a Comprehensive Test Ban issues paper, and two papers on the Indian Ocean and the Middle East.
2. Gromyko met six times with Carter and Vance in Washington September 22–23; see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 50 and Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Documents 182 and 183.After attending the UN General Assembly meeting, Gromyko returned to Washington to meet with Carter and Vance on September 27; see ibid., Document 184.
3. In the right-hand margin next to this point, the President listed: “Technology, Food, non-prolif, LAmer, Mid E, S Africa, NATO, PRC, V Nam, Cuba, Japan, S Korea.”
4. See Document 56. In the right-hand margin next to this point, the President wrote: “Hum Rts.”
5. In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, the President wrote: “strong defense.”
6. In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, the President wrote: “Arms Sales, MBFR, CTB, SALT, Indian Oc, Satellites.”
7. In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, the President wrote: “US/SU, Peace, Competition.”
8. In the right-hand margin slightly above this paragraph, the President wrote: “Mid E–SU coop?”
9. Immediately below this point, the President wrote: “S Africa–SU Coop?”
10. The President underlined “each participant” and “submit their record to a frank scrutiny.”
11. Reference is presumably to the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act (P.L. 93–618; 88 Stat. 1978), introduced in 1973, which President Ford signed into law on January 3, 1975. The amendment denied most-favored-nation trade status to nations with non-market economies that restricted emigration. The President could, however, grant yearly waivers to the ban.
12. The President underlined the words “comprehensive” and “reciprocal detente.”