141. Memorandum From Hedley Donovan to President Carter1
Maybe this is already going on somewhere in State or NSC, but if not, I believe you and the country would be well served by a high-level study of U.S. foreign policy options and objectives, 1980–85.
I do not have in mind a public Presidential Commission! I was thinking of a few very good people detached from operational duties for a few months.2 They should work under the general direction of Cy or Zbig (or somehow both?) with a firm understanding that this study is expressly ordered by the President.
The underlying principles and premises of U.S. foreign policy should be re-examined, clothed in concrete detail, and ranked by priorities.
There is considerable confusion today, among our Allies, probably in the Soviet leadership, and certainly in U.S. opinion, about the basic philosophy of your Administration in foreign policy. The confusion will be exploited and compounded as the election campaign unfolds. But there is also genuine and legitimate confusion. It is not simple to answer the simple question: Has Carter’s foreign policy changed? What is left of detente? How Allied are our Allies?
Along with these profound questions about the direction of policy, there are almost equally important questions of the ways and means. How should our impending military buildup be shaped to give maximum support to our long-range strategic objectives in foreign policy? [Page 708] What kind of intelligence capabilities are needed for whatever kind of world we foresee?
I have been struck in my brief experience here with the difficulty that even the most thoughtful people have in finding time to think about the year after next. Iran and Afghanistan have of course imposed exceptionally heavy day-to-day pressures. But even pre-Iran it was my impression that the top people in foreign policy, including the President, had little chance to stand off from immediate problems and think ahead.
I have also been struck by the high quality and quantity of the compartmented wisdom within the government foreign policy community. I had an interesting conversation the other day with our Ambassador-Designate to Turkey.3 He has quite concrete policy proposals and is prepared to guess/hope that within specific periods of time these could lead to certain specific improvements in the internal stability of Turkey and its dependability as an Ally. These proposals would add up to his U.S. “program” for Turkey over the next several years. Some of his ideas may be debatable; there may be Jim McIntyre constraints he doesn’t appreciate, etc., but I am confident that the intellectual resources exist in Washington to establish a coherent set of U.S. objectives and expectations for Turkey. And I’m sure the appropriate experts could build a list of U.S. “programs” and scenarios, 1980–85, for the 30 or 40 most important countries and all the major regions. These could be valuable pieces of paper; still more valuable would be a systematic effort to look at the separate programs and scenarios in relation to each other.
I have asked previously whether you were satisfied there is enough “contingency” planning in our foreign policy. I ran up a list of a dozen or so contingencies, some obvious, some perhaps outlandish. A much larger and more knowledgeable list could of course be drawn up. This kind of thinking should be a major element in the foreign policy study I am proposing. And again, there should be a systematic effort to relate different places and situations to each other. If Contingency A happens in Country B, does it increase the likelihood of Contingency C in Country D, and what might be the further consequences in Countries E and F?
To be factored into all these projections: Assumptions about energy, trade and investment, aid, the dollar.
- Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Donovan Files, Box 1, Foreign Policy Study, 1980–85 [CF, O/A 706]. Eyes Only. There is no indication that the President saw the memorandum. A copy of a subsequent report, which consists of two binders and is entitled “U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives and Priorities, 1980–85,” is in the National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981: Lot 82D298, Box 20.↩
- In a 3-page August 12 memorandum from Donovan to the President, contained within the final report (see footnote 1 above), Donovan indicated that the Department of State, National Security Council, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and International Communications Agency prepared the 24 chapters constituting the report.↩
- Reference is to Spain, whom the President appointed Ambassador to Turkey on February 19.↩