Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

132. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 29, 1979

SUBJECT

• Our Response to Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan (U)

One of our basic problems with the Soviets, as has been the case with all our recent predecessors in office, is maintaining our credibility in Moscow. We have frequently protested Soviet actions (bases in Vietnam, Cubans abroad, etc.). Since we have not always followed these verbal protests up with tangible responses, the Soviets may be getting into the habit of disregarding our concern. (C)

Warren Christopher will be meeting with our major Allies in London on Monday.² They will be looking to us for leadership, for specific evidence that we are unwilling to let the Soviets get away with this invasion with impunity. With this in mind, you may wish to instruct Christopher to inform these governments that we are taking tangible steps in our bilateral relationship with Moscow to manifest our displeasure. (S)

Since in your conversations yesterday with European leaders³ you drew a parallel between the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 and the one in Czechoslovakia in 1968, it may be useful for you to know what actions Johnson and Rusk took after the August 20, 1968 Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. (You may be sure the Soviets have the list at hand and will draw comparative conclusions about the international environment in which they operate. The same will be true of most countries of the world, especially those anywhere near Afghanistan.) Within three days of the invasion:

(1) The President made a strong public statement.⁴

(2) Secretary of State made a public statement.⁵

(3) We initiated a Security Council meeting.

(4) We suspended bilateral talks with the Soviets on peaceful uses of the atom.⁶

(5) Embassy Moscow was instructed to restrict all official and social contacts with Soviet officials.⁷

(6) We sent the same instructions to all US diplomatic missions worldwide.

(7) Rusk told Dobrynin on August 23 that there would be no movement on other issues until the situation in Czechoslovakia was clarified.⁸

(8) The State Department actively discouraged US business ties with the Soviet Union.

(9) We stopped, turned down or delayed requests for export licenses to the Soviet Union.

(10) We stopped participation in trade fairs in the Soviet Union.

(11) We cancelled pending cultural exchanges with the Soviets. (C)

As you will recall, the invasion of Czechoslovakia also resulted in the cancellation of the scheduled first round of SALT talks between Washington and Moscow. While I would oppose any freeze on our efforts to achieve SALT ratification, I think it would be a mistake to confine our response to this Soviet intervention in Afghanistan to words. In this connection, I enclose a memorandum from Marshall Brement of the NSC Staff which lists a menu of actions we could take to evidence our displeasure with Moscow.⁹ I would welcome your guidance on what you feel might be done. I do think something definite in our bilateral relationship with Moscow should follow this extraordinary act of Soviet arrogance and brutality and that Warren Christopher should inform the Allies on Monday what specific steps we intend to take. In my judgment, such resolve on our part would have significant benefits for us, both domestically and internationally. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Historical Material, Geographic File, Box 17, Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf Afghanistan: (12/26/79–1/4/80). Secret; Sensitive; Outside System. Sent for action. Brzezinski added the date to the memorandum by hand. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 25–27.
2. December 31.
3. In a December 28 memorandum to Brzezinski and Aaron, Blackwill provided a brief summary of the President’s calls to Thatcher, Schmidt, Cossiga and Giscard d’Estaing that day. (Ibid.) At 4:30 p.m. that day, the President spoke to reporters assembled in the White House Briefing Room and commented: “I have discussed this serious matter personally today with several other heads of government, all of whom agree that the Soviet action is a grave threat to peace. I will be sending the Deputy Secretary of State to Europe this weekend to meet with representatives of several other nations to discuss how the world community might respond to this unwarranted Soviet behavior. Soviet military action beyond its own borders gives rise to the most fundamental questions pertaining to international stability, and such close and extensive consultations between ourselves and with our allies are urgently needed.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, p. 2287)
4. Presumable reference to Johnson’s August 21, 1968, statement, recorded for broadcast by radio and television networks. Johnson asserted: “The tragic news from Czechoslovakia shocks the conscience of the world. The Soviet Union and its allies have invaded a defenseless country to stamp out a resurgence of ordinary human freedom. It is a sad commentary on the Communist mind that a sign of liberty in Czechoslovakia is deemed a fundamental threat to the security of the Soviet system.” (Public Papers: Johnson, 1968–69, Book II, p. 905)
5. Reference is to Rusk’s August 22, 1968, news conference, held at the White House; see Department of State Bulletin, September 9, 1968, pp. 261–263.
6. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, Document 289.
7. See ibid.
8. Rostow transmitted a summary of the Rusk–Dobrynin conversation via telegram to Johnson at the LBJ Ranch in Texas on August 24; see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XIV, Soviet Union, Document 290.
9. Not found attached.