Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

127. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, September 21, 1979

SUBJECT

• NSC Weekly Report #110

1. Opinion

The Parallel: 1961 but not 1962

Most people think you are in a situation now which parallels that of Kennedy in 1962: the Cuban missile crisis. Accordingly, subconsciously (and in the case of politicians, expedientially) most people will compare the outcome, and you personally, to Kennedy’s “success” in October–November 1962.

Yet the situation is really not analogous; we face a political challenge, and we cannot fully undo the reality we don’t like, whereas in 1962 we faced a direct military challenge, and we could—through direct military pressure—undo it. Yet if the outcome in the end appears to be inadequate, most people will declare you as having been “defeated” and perhaps even blame you for both generating the problem (note what Javits said at the meeting) and then for being timid in responding to it.

In fact, you are facing a situation much more like that faced by Kennedy in 1961, when the Soviets suddenly put up the Berlin wall. That situation was “unacceptable,” but we had no choice except to live with it. Kennedy was not prepared to knock it down. Neither are we prepared to create a military confrontation in order to get the Soviets to remove their troops from Cuba.

But Kennedy did something else also, and hence the foregoing argument is not an unexpected plea from me for acquiescence. Kennedy responded to this “unacceptable” situation, with which he had to live, by taking a number of steps designed to indicate to the public that he would assert U.S. interests, and if necessary, be prepared to use force. He sent additional troops to Berlin, and he put more emphasis on our overall defense efforts—in addition to adopting a very tough public posture on the Soviets. At the same time, he did not pretend—through some cosmetic formula—to have solved the problem.

I personally do not favor sending more troops to Guantanamo, because Guantanamo to most Latin Americans looks like an imperialist outpost from days gone by—and it tends to reinforce the legitimacy of the Soviet troop presence in Cuba. I do favor the other steps, which I have incorporated in your speech outline: more defense, more intelligence, some limited steps regarding China (because that actually does concern the Soviets and we have to do at least one thing that genuinely bothers them), and a more generally tough line on Soviet adventurism and disregard for our interests.²

We should do all of these things, even if the Soviets give us something on Cuba. The fact is that they will not give us enough to enable us to proclaim a victory, and, much more important, even if we did, I have not the slightest doubt that the public will not accept some cosmetic arrangement of relocation within Cuba as a Carter “victory.”

For the foregoing reasons, I would recommend:

1. That we start talking up the Berlin wall analogy;³

2. That we take the specific steps that I recommend in the speech outline, including at least one that genuinely hurts the Soviets;

3. That for the next several months at least we maintain a tough posture on the Soviets in our public pronouncements.⁴

What about SALT then? My view is that you will not get SALT ratified if the public thinks that we were timid on this issue. What I advocate above permits us also to argue that SALT is necessary for our national security, that it stands on its own feet, that it permits us to pursue a genuinely mature foreign policy toward the Soviet Union, which includes:

1. More defense

2. SALT ratification

3. Assertive competition.⁵

In the next few days you will be under considerable pressure to adopt a cosmetic solution and consider the case closed, or to exclude any response directed at the Soviet Union from our menu of responses—or both. In my judgment, such an outcome would be domestically politically self-defeating, and it will undermine the only basis for getting SALT ratification, namely public confidence in our firmness.⁶

[Omitted here is information unrelated to foreign policy opinions.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 6–9/79. Top Secret; Sensitive. The President wrote “Zbig. C” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.
2. The President addressed the nation regarding the Soviet brigade in Cuba on October 1; see Document 129. According to Brzezinski, the President had already, by the third week of September, decided to give such a speech “because national concern had greatly increased.” (Power and Principle, p. 349)
3. In the right-hand margin next to this point, the President wrote: “You & Jody & State do so” and drew an arrow from it to the point.
4. In the right-hand margin next to this point, the President wrote: “ok.”
5. In the right-hand margin next to these points, the President wrote: “ok.”
6. The President underlined “public confidence in our firmness.”