Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

112. Address by Vice President Mondale¹

Minneapolis, Minnesota, February 22, 1979

Preserving Freedom and Peace in a Nuclear Age

Today I want to talk with you about how our nation can preserve its freedom, its beauty, and its peace in a nuclear age.

Our own Hubert Humphrey once said that: “In this world, disaster is but a step away. There is no margin for error.”² Returning to a dark age of unrestrained nuclear arms competition would reduce that margin. Allowing any nation to gain military advantage over the United States would be equally dangerous.

We must not—and we will not—let either happen. This is the determination of the Carter Administration. This is the view of the vast majority of the American people—who overwhelmingly support both an arms control agreement and a strong national defense. And I am confident that Congress shares this view as it prepares to consider both the strategic arms limitation treaty and our proposed defense programs.

There are some Americans, however, who fear that we are not strong enough as a nation to move ahead with SALT. That view—of the current military balance and of SALT—is wrong, and it can lead us in the wrong direction. It not only underestimates America’s overwhelming nonmilitary advantages, it seriously misjudges both our relative military strength and the effect of a SALT agreement.

Our military position today is secure, and we are taking steps to assure that it remains secure. And a sound SALT agreement will make us stronger as a nation because it will contribute to that security.

Let me make that point again. The SALT agreement we hope to present to the American people is not a gift to the Soviets; it is an agreement which serves the security interests of our nation and of the world. It does not weaken us; it strengthens us.

We have watched carefully the steady growth of Soviet military power in recent years. In some areas, the Soviets are ahead of us; in others, we are ahead of them. What matters for us is not whether the two forces are identical, but whether they are in an overall balance—for that is the basis of security today.

For example, the Soviets have always had a larger land army. But we do not need to match them man-for-man because of the strength of our more numerous allies. The Soviet Union has always had more tanks. But we have three times as many antitank weapons in Western Europe as there are Soviet tanks in Eastern Europe.

The critical question is not whether we match the forces the Soviets have built to meet their own security needs but whether we meet U.S. and allied security needs. Without question, our forces meet those needs.

U.S. Strategic Advantages

To begin with, the United States has certain strategic advantages.

• We have friendly neighbors on our borders. The Soviet Union has far longer and far more vulnerable borders.

• We have only one major adversary. The Soviets face two. Fully 25% of its combat forces are deployed on the Soviet-Chinese border.

• We have easy access to the sea. The Soviets are restricted by narrow straits, by a long and icy winter, and by other natural barriers.

Our military capabilities today are enormous and growing stronger. And our allies and friends significantly increase our overall strength.

Nor are we standing still. Because of steady growth in Soviet defense spending and capabilities over the past decade—particularly in central Europe—we have had to reverse the pattern of shrinking American defense efforts. We and our allies committed ourselves last year to increasing individual defense expenditures.³ The defense budget President Carter submitted to Congress last month reflects that commitment.⁴

We must continue to protect our own and our allies’ interests. We are strengthening our forces in Europe. We are improving our ability to speed additional ground and air forces in the event of a crisis. And our European allies, who provide most of NATO’s combat forces, are steadily improving their forces’ readiness and effectiveness.

But it is the awesome power of our nuclear weapons that I want to emphasize this afternoon.

Many of you here today remember the shuddering reality of our first atomic bomb. Today, the United States has over 20,000 nuclear weapons.

• Each warhead on one of our Poseidon missiles is two times more destructive than the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. One Poseidon submarine carries more than 140 warheads. Each Poseidon can deliver more destructive force than all the bombs—nuclear and conventional—that were dropped during World War II. We have 31 of these Poseidon submarines.

• More than half of our 1,000 Minuteman missiles are equipped with multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV’s)—which enable one rocket to carry a number of warheads and thus strike at several different targets. Each of the Minuteman warheads carries eight times the force of the first atomic bomb. And soon we will double that destructive power.

We have 348 heavy bombers which can carry 2,000 megatons of total power. Let me illustrate what that means. If every car of a train that extended from Minneapolis to Winona⁵ were filled with TNT and blown up, that would be one megaton.

I cite these facts to give you a sense of the enormous scale—and the great diversity—of America’s nuclear strength.

The Soviets, of course, also have a large arsenal. But the factor that keeps us at peace is not simply what each of us has; it is whether there is any possibility that a nuclear attack on us or our allies would not mean massive destruction for the Soviets.

Let me take the worst case. It is possible that, in the early to mid-1980’s, the Soviets—with a surprise attack—could destroy most of our land-based missiles while keeping a large number of their missiles in reserve. In doing so, they also must consider the grim possibility that we would have already launched our missiles before theirs arrived. The possibility, even theoretical, that our missiles would be vulnerable is something we are working very hard to avoid.

But even if our land-based missiles were vulnerable to a surprise attack, we could still totally destroy the Soviet Union as a viable society with the rest of our nuclear arsenal. No sane leader could expect to gain an advantage from launching such a suicidal attack.

Modernization and Restructuring

To assure that our strategic forces will be a convincing deterrent in the future, we are carrying out the most extensive modernization and restructuring of our nuclear forces in over a decade.

First, we have put three-quarters of our strategic warheads in our largely invulnerable submarines and mobile bombers; three-quarters of the Soviet Union’s warheads are on more vulnerable fixed land-based missiles.

Second, we are adding to the capabilities of our strategic bombers. Our B–52 force is being equipped with long-range cruise missiles. That force eclipses Soviet air defense expenditures. These missiles will enable our B–52’s to remain outside Soviet air defenses and still strike significant Soviet targets with extraordinary accuracy.

Third, we are placing more powerful, sophisticated missiles in our existing submarines. We are about to launch our new, longer-range Trident submarine; and we are developing a still more powerful and accurate missile for these Trident submarines.

Fourth, we are substantially improving our land-based missile force. Our Minuteman III’s will be considerably more accurate. We are accelerating development of a new and much larger land-based missile called the M–X. And we are carefully analyzing the alternatives available for making our intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM’s) less vulnerable. The SALT agreement now being considered will not constrain a single one of these alternatives. Indeed, it will help make these alternatives feasible and safe.

We will continue to maintain a convincing deterrent with a nuclear weapons force. But in a world of nuclear weapons, more is not necessarily better. We are not more secure today because we and the Soviets have tens of thousands of warheads rather than thousands.

For the stark reality is that neither of us can win an all-out arms race. It is a futile search for a temporary advantage. We will match what they do, and they will do the same, in a spiral of ever-increasing risk and cost.

Thus the power we share with the Soviet Union carries this imperative for our security: We must slow, and ultimately reverse, this dangerous and burdensome competition. That is an imperative recognized for nearly three decades. Every President since the beginning of the nuclear era—and both major political parties—have understood that security depends on both a sound defense and sound arms control.

Background to SALT II

Building on the efforts of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, President Kennedy concluded the first arms control agreement with the Soviet Union in 1963—halting poisonous nuclear-weapons testing in the atmosphere.⁶ Later we reached agreements that banned nuclear weapons from the ocean floor and from outer space.

The 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty now binds more than 100 nations.⁷ It has not yet removed the specter of nuclear proliferation, but it has advanced that objective significantly.

Since first proposed by President Johnson, we have been engaged in broader Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. During the Nixon Administration, these negotiations severely restricted both sides from building new antiballistic missile systems. These systems would have cost billions of dollars and added new dangers to the arms race.

Under President Nixon, SALT I placed the first limits on the number of strategic offensive missiles. It prevented the Soviets from continuing to increase the number of their missiles by several hundred each year.⁸

For the past 6 years, three Presidents of both parties have been negotiating the next step in arms control—the SALT II agreement. The negotiations have been intense. We have proceeded carefully and deliberately. And we are near agreement.

What SALT II Will Accomplish

Let me explain what this agreement will accomplish.

First, it will establish equal limits on the number of missiles and bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the other side. The first SALT agreement in 1972 froze the number of strategic missiles, leaving the Soviets with a numerical advantage which was then offset by U.S. technological superiority. The new agreement firmly establishes the principle of equal numbers.

Second, these limits will be lower and more encompassing than those in the first SALT agreement. The new overall limits would force the Soviets to eliminate over 250 strategic missiles and bombers. This is a 10% reduction and about 750 fewer than they are likely to have in the absence of SALT. On the other hand, because we are below the new limits, we would actually be able, if we chose, to increase the overall number of our strategic weapons in operation.

Third, the agreement will place lower limits on specific weapons, including those with more than a single warhead.

Fourth, for the first time, we will curb the number of new systems and begin to limit the race to make existing systems more deadly. Only one new ICBM will be permitted to each side. The number of warheads on a single missile would be limited. And there would be restraint on increasing the size of land-based missiles.

What would be the major effect of this agreement on our security? Instead of an estimated 3,000 Soviet strategic weapons by 1985, there would be 2,250. The strategic balance will be more stable and, therefore, safer. We will have greater confidence and certainty in our own defense planning. And the defense programs that we and our allies need and have planned can proceed forward on schedule.

Verification and Competition

But how do we know the Soviets will not violate the agreement? The answer is—we can see for ourselves.

We have powerful and varied systems for observing the Soviets. Besides our photographic satellites, we have other highly sensitive and, therefore, highly classified means of verification. The large size and limited number of bases for intercontinental missiles, heavy bombers, and nuclear submarines eases our task.

And the SALT agreement itself makes a major contribution. SALT II would forbid any interference which would impede our ability to verify compliance with the treaty. And for the first time the Soviets have agreed to regularly exchange precise data with us on each country’s missiles.

This is not a new and uncertain challenge. We have monitored Soviet compliance with SALT I. We know what we can see. And we know that we can detect any violation large enough to affect the strategic balance—and do so in time to respond effectively.

Yet with all this, some critics suggest that we should not move ahead with SALT, even if it strengthens U.S. and allied security. They contend that Soviet actions elsewhere—in the Third World or on human rights—compel us to withhold approval of SALT II. This would be a profound mistake.

As President Carter said two days ago, we “. . . cannot let the pressures of inevitable competition overwhelm possibilities for cooperation any more than [we can permit] cooperation to blind us to the realities of competition . . . .” And the President said this:

It is precisely because we have fundamental differences with the Soviet Union that we are determined to bring this most dangerous dimension of our military competition under control.⁹

We will continue to compete peacefully with the Soviets. In this competition, we hold many cards—not only our military aid but our economic ties, our understanding of diversity, and, most of all, our support for the determined sense of independence in emerging nations around the world.

But as we compete, we must also cooperate to limit the most dangerous competition—nuclear weapons. This is in our calculated self-interest. SALT is not a reward for Soviet good behavior. It is a benefit for ourselves and for mankind.

With or without SALT, competition with the Soviets in many areas will continue. We will respond to any Soviet behavior which adversely affects our interests. Without SALT, that competition becomes more dangerous, and the possibilities for cooperation are dimmed.

We must recognize our overwhelming strengths as a nation. We must see the future not as a threat but as an opportunity to make our children’s lives safer and more rewarding than our own. The emerging SALT agreement represents such an opportunity.

Military competition today is carried out in highly technical terms. The debates on SALT will be very complex. Let us not, as we explore the technicalities in all the detail they deserve, lose sight of these simple truths: A nuclear war would destroy much—if not all—of what we love. We must do everything in our power to see that it never happens. We prevent it today with a military defense strong enough to deter our potential adversaries. We will maintain that deterrence.

But that alone will not make us secure. We must also, at long last, reverse the dangerous race in nuclear weapons that each year increases nuclear stockpiles and each year makes us less safe. That is what SALT is about.

With the vision that set him apart from other men, Hubert Humphrey defined our present challenge over a decade ago. He not only cared deeply, he thought deeply about the nature of America’s security in a nuclear world.

Nuclear power has placed into the hands of men the power to destroy all that man has created. Only responsive statesmen—who perceive that perseverence in the pursuit of peace is not cowardice but courage, that restraint in the use of force is not weakness but wisdom—can prevent international rivalries from leading to an incinerated world.

Let us have Hubert’s wisdom—and summon Hubert’s courage—as we set the course which will help define our future for years to come.

1. Source: Department of State Bulletin, April 1979, pp. 14–16. Mondale delivered his address at a conference organized by the Department of State, the Greater Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce, and a consortium of other Minnesota organizations. Additional information about the address is in the Minnesota Historical Society, Mondale Papers, Vice Presidential Papers, Special Assistant for Speech Writing, Speech Text Files, Remarks, SALT Conference, Minneapolis, Minnesota, February 22, 1979.
2. The quotation is from Humphrey’s Vice Presidential acceptance speech, made before the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey, on August 27, 1964. Humphrey, in extolling Johnson’s leadership qualities, highlighted Johnson’s November 27, 1963, address before a joint session of Congress: “I’m sure you remember these words—’Let us continue.’ Those simple and direct words of President Johnson reached the hearts of our people. Those words rallied them, lifted them, and unified them. In this world disaster is ever but a step away. There is no margin for error. The leader of the free world, the leader of American democracy, holds in his hands the destinies not only of his own people but holds in his hands the destinies of all mankind.” (“Transcript of Acceptance Speeches by Johnson and Humphrey at Atlantic City,” The New York Times, August 28, 1964, p. 12)
3. The NATO allies expressed the commitment in the final communiqué issued at the end of the May 30–31, 1978, summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council. See Document 83 and footnote 1 thereto.
4. See footnote 3, Document 109.
5. Approximately 100 miles.
6. See footnote 5, Document 56.
7. See footnote 4, Document 2.
8. See Document 52.
9. For the full text of the President’s address at Georgia Tech on Feb. 20, 1979, see Bulletin of Mar. 1979, p. 21. [Footnote and brackets in the original. For the address, see Document 111.]