Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976, Second, Revised Edition

82. Telegram 8875 From the Department of State to the Embassies in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom¹

Washington, January 14, 1976, 0049Z.

Subject: Meeting of European Socialists in Denmark—January 18–19, 1976. From the Secretary for Ambassadors Hillenbrand and Richardson.

1. For Bonn. Please deliver the following letter personally to SPD Chairman Brandt:

Begin text: Dear Mr. Chairman:

I should like to address you personally because I believe that a number of serious distortions of my private statements concerning the problem of communism in Western Europe have appeared in the press in recent weeks and may also have reached you personally. I have always valued our excellent personal relationship, going back for so many decades, even before either of us occupied positions of responsibility in our national governments, and I have considered the friendship and trust, going far beyond the formal terms of alliance that grew up between our governments during your term of office and since, a cornerstone of our foreign policy and one of the guarantees for peace and progress and in the world. As you know, I have admired your foreign policy and did my best to support it. For that reason, I would wish to see nothing, above all false or mischievous characterizations of our attitudes, that could cast even the smallest cloud upon our personal relationship or this government’s relationship with your party and government.

I believe all of us in the Atlantic world must address the new situation that is arising as a result of the political gains of certain Communist Parties in Western Europe. I am fully conscious of the fact that many of these parties have undergone major changes since the days when they were mere instrumentalities of Soviet foreign policy and when their internal organization and political activities were closely patterned on those of the Soviet party. These changes are a part of the reason, though not the only one, why some of these parties have come to play a serious role in the interplay of democratic political forces in Western Europe. Nor is there any doubt that this evolution poses serious problems for the Soviets and may indeed to some degree be contributing positively to the evolution of Soviet policies. We are quite conscious of the fact that for these and other reasons democratic parties in several European countries have found it if not desirable then at least politically necessary to reshape their relations with the Communists.

Despite certain potentially positive aspects of these trends we nevertheless are bound to see these developments with the utmost misgivings. I should say at once that none of this, in our view, applies in any way to the political situation in the Federal Republic; nor has anything that I or any other member of the administration have ever said or implied referred to the Federal Republic in this regard.

But there can be no doubt that if one or more countries in the Atlantic world acquire governments in which Communists either participate actively or indirectly, the political nature of our Alliance and of our broader political association is bound to change. References are often made to Titoist Yugoslavia in this regard. We of course were among the first to have encouraged Tito’s move away from Moscow in 1948 and we continue to join with our friends and Allies to do all we can to support his aspirations for independence. Yet it must also be said that, the issue of independence apart, Yugoslavia’s policies in the world more often than not follow quite different lines from ours and in many instances actively injure our Western interests. Consequently, in regard to Western Europe, we are not impressed by the Yugoslav example and certainly would not wish to make it a goal of our policy to encourage its repetition there.

More fundamentally, however, we think that all of us in the West must continue to be concerned with the historic phenomenon that the Soviet Union is now in process of emerging as a great power on a world scale. This historic process is occurring irrespective of what transformations may or may not be occurring within Soviet society or whatever restraints and cooperative elements it has been possible through our joint Western policies to build into East-West relationships through the numerous agreements and understandings we succeeded in negotiating with the USSR over the past several years. Certainly, we must continue the policies that you, we and others have been pursuing along those lines and there is reason to believe that the present Soviet leadership has similar impulses.

But it has always been a sine qua non of these “détente” policies that the essential balance of physical power between the USSR and the outside world must be maintained. NATO’s role in this regard remains indispensable; our own undiminished military role in Europe remains crucial; continued progress toward European unity remains indispensable. Our deep concern is that if Communist parties should over time reach positions of major power and influence in the policy-making councils of European states, all of these essentials will be placed in question.

For it is quite clear that among the reasons why Communists have in some instances succeeded in being viewed as respectable political elements in Western political life is that they have managed, rightly or wrongly, to project an image of primary concern with social and economic issues and administrative efficiency. Questions of security, however, are not and indeed cannot be a part, certainly not a significant part, of Communist programs. All our Western countries already encounter serious problems of maintaining defense programs essential to the maintenance of an adequate balance of power vis-à-vis the continuing military growth of the USSR. These problems cannot help but be exacerbated if Communists become major determinants of the political and budgetary priorities of Western states, and this, over time, is bound to have a dangerous effect on the power equation in Europe, whatever Soviet intentions and vulnerabilities may be, and on prospects for continued East-West negotiations in the mutual interest.

I would stress another point also. Over the past few years, Europe and America have developed consultative practices of extraordinary intensity and candor, perhaps unique among sovereign states. Although far from perfect in all respects, the degree of policy harmonization that has been achieved has been remarkable. I cannot believe that this very salutary evolution, valuable for its own sake but also crucial for the conduct of the complex policies vis-à-vis the East that must be pursued over the coming years, can endure if Communists occupy governmental positions in any of our governments. We already found ourselves confronted with this problem in a very practical way in NATO during the height of the Portuguese crisis, which you played such a major role in reversing.

It is for all these reasons, to which can be added some possibly more arguable questions relating to the democratic character of even the most emancipated Communist Parties once they reach positions of power, that we have taken so strong a position in warning about the dangers of coalitions with Communists in Western Europe. We intend to continue to do so because we believe the issue goes to the very heart of our security, the security of Western Europe which is vital to us, and ultimately to the maintenance of peace and freedom. There is no contradiction between a policy that seeks relations of restraint with the USSR and opposes coalitions with Communists in the West. Indeed there is total consistency between them.

Let me make very clear to you that any imputation that in these matters we make no distinction between Socialists and Communists is wholly false and indeed absurd. Nor have we intimated that the evolution that so concerns us is inevitable—that “all of Europe will be Marxist” in some foreseeable time. In the first place, we obviously know very well the difference between democratic parties growing out of a Marxist tradition (such as yours) and those that grew out of the Leninist-Stalinist mutation of the Marxist tradition. Indeed, if anything, our relations today with your government and many other governments directed by Social Democrats are better than they have ever been before. We count many of the leaders of those parties, in your country, in Britain and elsewhere among our staunchest friends and among the most effective political leaders of the Western world today. We are convinced that the democratic parties of Western Europe, of all shadings, have the inherent strength and wisdom to cope with the trends that have manifested themselves in some of the countries of the region. Our entire policy, including public and private statements on the issues I have discussed in this letter, is designed to buttress the continued evolution of a strong and secure Atlantic world, encompassing a confident, vigorous and prosperous uniting Europe. I have no doubt that you yourself understand this, but I wanted to be sure that in view of the often simplistic and sometimes malicious press reporting on these matters there is not even a trace of misunderstanding between us.

Warm regards,

Henry A. Kissinger. End text.

2. After presenting the letter to Brandt, you should make the following points orally:

A. As to the situation in Italy, it is clear that there can be no viable democratic majority in the present Italian Parliament without the participation of the Italian Socialists—a fact clearly evident in the present Italian Government crisis. That party’s ambivalence as to its political allegiance reflects its serious doubts about the strength and will of the Christian Democrats to resist the Communists and its fears that the Communists will take over the non-Communist left in Italy. Italian parliamentary elections are scheduled for early 1977: they will be a crucial test of whether the Christian Democrats can stabilize the electoral situation in Italy. If there is to be any hope of doing so, the Christian Democrats need the support of the PSI to get through this critical period. In the interests of security and stability in Europe, we hope that you will encourage De Martino to return to a policy of cooperation with the Christian Democrats so as to give Italy’s democratic forces the time needed to rally support.

B. Concerning Spain, we share with the Europeans the objective of helping Spain evolve along lines which will permit its entry into the community of democratic European nations. We do not believe, however, that there should be pressure exerted on the Spanish Government to hasten that evolution. The West should act instead to help strengthen the King and his moderate, pro-European cabinet in their efforts to steer a realistic course. The Western countries should, in our view, do nothing to help the Spanish Communists whose demands, if implemented, would polarize Spanish society and bring about an atmosphere of chaos in which they would thrive.

C. With regard to Portugal, the Pinheiro Azevedo government is moving swiftly and with surprising determination to consolidate its position. An encouraging trend toward political centrism is emerging. The Portuguese Socialists will play a critical role in preserving the cohesion of the moderates, who have benefited from the strong support given to Soares’ Socialist Party by the European socialists. This support has been a critical factor in strengthening and encouraging the moderate elements in Portugal. We hope that this assistance will not only continue but be expanded, particularly in view of the economic crisis which is looming on the Portuguese horizon. We also hope that you will emphasize to Soares that while we understand the tactical reasons for his call for a conference of Southern European Socialist and Communist Parties, the long-term effect of this tactic would be the legitimization of his greatest potential enemy.

3. After making the approach to Brandt, please seek an appointment with Chancellor Schmidt, show him the letter to Brandt and make the points in paragraph two orally, stressing that you have been asked by the Secretary to make this personal approach to the Chancellor on his behalf.

4. For London: Please seek appointments with Wilson and Callaghan, show them the letter to Brandt, and then make the points in paragraph two orally, stressing that you have been asked by the Secretary to make these personal approaches to the two leaders on his behalf. You should indicate that the points in subparagraph 2.B are in response to the Secretary’s promise in Brussels to send Callaghan our latest appraisal of the situation in Spain. The President will also be responding shortly to Wilson’s letter to him concerning Spain. Please emphasize to Wilson and Callaghan the need for utmost discretion concerning their knowledge of the Brandt letter.

5. FYI only. Messages similar in substantive content, but obviously without the references personal to Brandt are being sent to certain other socialist leaders attending the Helsingor meeting.

Kissinger

1. Summary: The Department forwarded a letter from Kissinger for delivery to SPD Chairman Brandt concerning the problem of communism in Western Europe.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Sonnenfeldt and David Anderson in EUR/CE; cleared by Woods and Lowenstein; and approved by Kissinger. In his January 23 reply to Kissinger, Brandt noted SPD efforts to strengthen the non-Communist left and commented on the situations in Italy, Portugal, and Spain. He also affirmed, after noting that the situations of some non-Soviet Communist parties posed problems for the notion of a centralized world Communism, that “there is certainly no reason to relax our watchfulness regarding the challenges posed by Communism.” (Telegram 1275 from Bonn, January 23; ibid.)