Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976, Second, Revised Edition

57. Memorandum From the Counselor (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, April 24, 1974.

Mr. Secretary:

I think Art is right in suggesting that we should have some sort of line on our attitude regarding European unity. If you don’t approve one in this set of talking points, it will merely come back to you because the Europeans will hound us with questions about our attitude—as they did me at the Bilderberg meeting. So I think there is value in getting you to focus on and approve a line to be used, if you prefer, in response to questions rather than spontaneously.

Art’s proposed line, page 2 of his memo, is one way to do it; another would be to say that we have always supported unity but of course must now ask ourselves what the purpose of that unity is—it cannot be an end in itself to us, or an abstraction. We cannot be expected to support a unity whose main reason for being is opposition to the US; moreover, such a unity would undermine the indivisibility of our security, to the detriment of interests on both sides of the Atlantic. The unity we support, therefore, is one in which Europe will work . . . . [and then go on with Art’s points in his memo].

Recommendation

That you approve a contingency line such as the above.

Agree

Other

Sonnenfeldt

Attachment

Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, April 22, 1974.

Your Comment on my EC Talking Points

I realize that “a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds adored by little statesmen . . . .” But I am convinced that, because of our previous statements on European unity (a collection of which is attached at Tab A), if we do not reiterate our support for European unity the charge will be made that we have changed our basic policy. In fact, Jobert has already said just that in his “Le Monde” interview.

The line that the French are taking is that if the British want to leave the Community, that is their choice to make. The next step could be a French charge that the American “special relationship” with the British has been revived and that we and Wilson are out to “do in” the European Community. The French are already citing your conversations with the British—which someone on the British side must have let out—and specifically a remark attributed to you that you were not sure after the past year whether European unity would strengthen the West. We do not wish to become the scapegoat for the ills of the Community which the French, more than anyone else, have brought about.

The argument that we have been engaged in with the “Europeans,” but really only with the French, is about how European unity is to be defined. We have had some success in gaining recognition for our point of view not only from the British Government but, as you heard in your recent conversations, from the Germans, Dutch and Luxembourgers as well. There are positive advantages for us in taking the high road and saying at this time that we are in favor of a unified Europe that can work confidently and cooperatively with the United States directly in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. That position still leaves us free to say that the decisions on what form their unity takes are for the Europeans themselves to make.

Most of the EC members would be prepared to say that such a unified Europe is indeed their objective. Why hand the field to the recalcitrant French? I agree, as you said in your comment on my memorandum (Tab B), that we should not “push”. But I believe that setting out our view about the kind of cooperative relationship we want will help us to avoid becoming involved in what is bound to be a divisive debate in Europe. On the other hand, a sudden silence by us, which would be taken as implying a change in our policy, could have the opposite effect of involving us in the debate in a way which would line us up with a combination of Gaullists and “Little Englanders.”

Recommendation:

That the line you approved in my earlier memorandum (Tab B) be altered to include the following point which should not be “pushed” but should be made as appropriate in order to avoid any charge that we have backed off our long-standing support for European unity:

—We continue to support European unity, as we have throughout the post-war period. Implicit in this support, however, is the assumption that a unified Europe will work confidently and cooperatively with the United States, directly and within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. We do not want a weak Europe that we can dominate but rather a strong partner with whom we can work together on common problems.

Attachment

Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, April 12, 1974.

UK–EC Negotiations: The US Position

Purpose

The purpose of this memorandum is to obtain your approval of the initial position that we should take on the UK’s renegotiation of its participation in the European Community.

Problem

European officials will want to discuss the UK renegotiation with US officials in Washington and abroad in the coming weeks. The problem will certainly arise when Peter Shore, the new British Minister of Trade who is a leading opponent of UK participation in the Community, visits Washington April 17–19 and sees officials in Treasury, Commerce and other departments as well as in State. We need a detailed study of this problem and we have begun this work. But completion must await further clarification of British thinking.

Discussion

My own strong feeling, as you know, is that a British role within any European structure is essential to prevent a Franco-German polarization. I know that Heath was little help to us in our political problem with the EC, but his government—and the British in the Commission—worked actively with us to further trade liberalization objectives and launch the Tokyo Round negotiations. Wilson will, in addition, join us more closely on political matters. These are the matters we will be examining closely in our study.

Recommendation:

In the meantime, I recommend that we follow the line you have indicated in several of your conversations (suitably amplified on the trade side which you have not covered):

1. We continue to support European unity. We do not want a weak Europe that we can dominate but rather a strong partner with whom we can work cooperatively on common problems.

2. The form that Europe takes is for Europeans to decide, but we cannot accept a European identity whose main definition is opposition to US policies. We see no inherent contradiction to growing European unification in the framework of an Atlantic Alliance.

3. We need both the political will and procedures to carry out effective consultations to assure that our policies are not in conflict. The purpose of the declarations was to register that act of political will.

4. Specifically, the British request for renegotiation of some of their arrangements with the EC is not a matter for specific US advice or comment. Our view is that any economic agreements reached by this important trading partner that affect our interests should support the understandings we already have with them to move toward further world-wide liberalization of trade through GATT negotiations.

If you agree I would like to circulate this guidance to other agencies and to the field.

1. Summary: Sonnenfeldt requested Kissinger’s approval of a position on European unity.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 4, HS Chron—Officials, Jan–Apr 1974. Confidential. Kissinger initialed his approval of the contingency line on April 24. All brackets are in the original. On Hartman’s April 22 memorandum, Kissinger initialed his approval of the recommendation on April 24, writing in the margin, “as amended by Sonnenfeldt.” Attached to Hartman’s April 22 memorandum, but not published, is Tab A, undated. On Tab B, Kissinger crossed out point 1 of the recommendation and wrote at the bottom of the page: “Delete 1st point. I don’t want us to push unity but we should not oppose it either.” Kissinger discussed the UK entry into the EC, European unity, and the United States with his senior staff members at an April 23 staff meeting. (Ibid., Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 3, Secretary’s Staff Conference, April 23, 1974)