54. Telegram 53312 From the Department of State to All North Atlantic Treaty Organization Capitals1

Subject: Atlantic Relations. Geneva for CSCE Del; Vienna for MBFR Del.

1. The German Ambassador, Von Staden, called on Secretary on instructions March 16 to discuss Atlantic relations in light of President’s March 15 letter to Chancellor Brandt. Von Staden inquired concerning what we had in mind concerning “more organic consultative relationships” and what meaning should be attributed to that part of the President’s letter which referred to letting the situation mature.

2. In his reply the Secretary made the following points:

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3. A Presidential trip to Europe in April is out. There is no chance that meaningful declarations could be worked out in the short remaining interval.

4. As we see it, the entire Year of Europe initiative surfaced grave problems which we had not known existed. One example is the fact that French intransigence could force the Nine into positions which essentially reflect the French anti-American posture.

5. Hence, there would be no further US initiative of any sort. If the Nine had suggestions we would be glad to listen.

6. We see three options being open:

A. Drop both EC and NATO Declarations and this we are prepared to do;

B. Pursue completion of both declarations if the Nine wish to do so. However, the USEC Declaration as it now stands is too unbalanced in that it reaffirms US acceptance of European identity while offering little or nothing to us in the way of an organic consultative link. Regarding the latter what we have in mind is the possibility to express our views and have them considered prior to EC decisions in a manner we understand to be relevant to the EC decision-making process.

The present NATO Declaration is basically acceptable to us, but there are still some points at issue.

C. Forget the EC Declaration, which is not acceptable in its present form, and continue with work on the NATO Declaration. In this case, it would be necessary to include provisions which sharpen the consultative relationship as we had endeavored to achieve in the USEC Declaration.

7. The Secretary requested Von Staden to report to the FRG and he assumed the FRG would consult with the other eight. We had no fixed views at this time which of the three options would be the best. Whatever course is chosen it is essential that we proceed privately between us and that there should be no further public disclosures or debate. Another failure would not be tolerable. We will wait to see what the Nine might have to propose and their ideas on possible timing.

8. For action posts: You should not take the initiative in discussing the above conversation with the governments to which you are accredited. However, in the event that your views are solicited it is important that you make clear that we are not pressing the Nine to make any proposal and that we are in any event not prepared to accept a proposal which does not deal in a straight-forward manner with the fundamental problem which faces us in our relations with the Nine. At the same time, we do not regard the present situation as, nor do we desire, a confrontation with the Nine. The President and the Secretary place highest priority on our relations with Europe, both in the framework of [Typeset Page 229] the Nine and the Atlantic Alliance. It is in our mutual interests that relationships be as clearly and decisively defined as possible and we are therefore willing to consider in the spirit of friendship and partnership which has characterized transatlantic relations in the past 25 years such proposals as the Nine may wish to put forward. The main point here is that we are ready to consider serious proposals but we are not anxiously awaiting them.

Kissinger
  1. Summary: The telegram reported a March 16 discussion between Kissinger and Von Staden on the EC-Arab initiative and the EC and NATO Declarations.

    Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 266, Agency Files, NATO Jan–May 31, 1974, Vol. XVII (2 of 2). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also sent immediate to the Mission to the EC. Sent for information to the Mission in Geneva and Vienna. Drafted by Stabler; cleared by Fry in S/S, Scowcroft, and Sonnenfeldt; and approved by Kissinger. A draft memorandum of conversation on Kissinger’s March 16 talk with Von Staden, during which Von Staden outlined a formal process for EC–U.S. consultations, is in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 142, Germany (Federal Republic of Germany), Chronological File, March–April 1974. On March 18, Kissinger, McCloskey, Sonnenfeldt, Hartman, Hyland, Lord, Eagleburger, and Springsteen reviewed the U.S. approach to the EC and NATO Declarations, reaching essentially the same conclusions outlined in this telegram. (Memorandum of conversation, March 18; National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 4, HS Chron-Official, Jan–Apr 1974)