Office of the Historian

376. Memorandum From the Counselor (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger1

Washington, July 27, 1976.

SUBJECT

  • Scranton’s Italian Talks

Scranton saw five DC leaders, including Andreotti, Cossiga, Marcora, Orlando and Bisaglia. He also saw Cardinal Wright in the Vatican, an old friend of his. These contacts are now a week old and to some extent overtaken by developments since then (see Rome’s 9085 and 9086 NODIS) which have clouded Andreotti’s chances as well as increasing the CPI hold on parliamentary commissions and hence on policy formulation.

At the time, Scranton’s judgment was that there was a chance of a six month or so interim period with an Andreotti government in office seeking to implement a pretty solid economic program. Scranton says he forcefully put forward our conditions for support both in the political area and in the economic sphere. He said all his contacts accepted the message, expressing their strong preference for private approaches rather than Schmidt’s public warnings. Scranton said he found all his contacts committed to reforming the DC but less sure of how to go about it.

Scranton’s contacts thought that once the vote of confidence for a government had been won, there would be a better parliamentary situation for the program. But no one had a clear idea how to get the vote of confidence. This problem is of course even greater now.

Scranton found Andreotti determined and impressive. He said he would not include Moro, Rumor, Colombo and Fanfani in his government but would rely on Stammati (technocrat, now minister of finance—not Treasury but more like OMB), Cossiga and Forlani. These are all relatively in their late forties. Andreotti said he would welcome it if Simon’s people could establish running contact with Stammati as he develops the economic program. Scranton thinks this is a good idea. [Typeset Page 1140] Scranton’s generally favorable view of Andreotti is tempered by the recognition that to younger people in Italy and the DC he does not connote change.

Scranton found a general worry about the Soviets and the CPI. The going theory is that the PCI will remain “democratic” until Tito leaves the scene at which time the Russians will make a major push in both Yugoslavia and Italy. (On Yugoslavia, see a sensitive report Scranton brought back from Belgrade, where there are similar fears, TAB A).

Scranton found his friend Cardinal Wright inexplicably complacent. The Cardinal questions that Italy can go Communist nationally; he takes heart from the interest of the young in the Church. Scranton notes, however, that Wright is not directly involved in matters of this kind in the Vatican.

In sum, Scranton thinks, as of a week ago, that there is a chance for a DC start under Andreotti with a satisfactory program, with a crisis coming some six months down the road, depending on the attitude of the unions and the small parties, especially the PSI, which a week ago was at even looser ends than now. Scranton found plenty of speculation about a possible popular front after the six-month interim, though also some hope that with a new DC leader at that time, there could be a democratic coalition. The Italians want our help, he says, but understand our conditions. This latter judgment must now I think be seriously tempered by the Gelb-Ugo Stille canard about the “Kissinger formula.” Please note Rome 9048, which indicates that a “collaborator” of yours supposedly told Stille, Schmidt had attacked the wrong target and that your “initiative” in Puerto Rico was designed to give us greater flexibility vis-à-vis DC–PCI collaboration!

  1. Summary: Sonnenfeldt reported a series of talks between Italian leaders and William Scranton.

    Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 5, Italy—Sensitive—July 1976. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Tab A is attached but not published. Notes on Henry Cabot Lodge’s discussions with Italian leaders in Rome indicate that he too assessed the post-election political situation and conveyed the message “that the U.S. often helps its friends, but that it is not part of our traditions to subsidize our enemies. This seemed to register.” (Ibid.) Andreotti announced his new Cabinet on July 29.

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