Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976, Second, Revised Edition

35. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 26, 1973, 1:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Secretary’s Lunch with French Foreign Minister Jobert

PARTICIPANTS

• French Side

  • Foreign Minister Jobert
  • M. Puaux

• U.S. Side

  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Stoessel
  • Mr. Sonnenfeldt

(When the Foreign Minister arrived, the Secretary was on the telephone with Senator Kennedy discussing the vote that morning in the Senate approving the Mansfield Amendment for troop cuts. After the phone call, there was a brief conversation about the parliamentary situation in the Senate.)

The Secretary: We really have a great system. People in the Congress want to completely reform the Soviet system; at the same time, they want to cut our forces.

M. Jobert: When I talked with Gromyko, I told him I had seen people in the Soviet Union in blue jeans. I said the Soviets had lost the battle of the blue jeans and the Western Hemisphere was gradually creeping into the Eastern Hemisphere. He did not seem to know about blue jeans.

(The group then moved into the dining room.)

M. Jobert: You are always complaining that we come with empty hands, so this time, we brought a lot.

I will speak in English, although it is difficult for me.

The Secretary: You do not need to know much English to say “no”.

M. Jobert: Oh, I never say no.

The Secretary: It is true. I think you have conducted a very clever campaign this past six months.

M. Jobert: It was no campaign. I am like a leaf in the wind. I am passive. First, I am blown to the West, then to the East.

The Secretary: Many people want me to see you because they feel you are the only person who can get the better of me.

M. Jobert: But we are good friends personally.

The Secretary: This is quite true. And also we are friends officially. We do not have a problem solving serious questions. Only the procedural questions are difficult.

M. Jobert: I saw James Reston this morning. He called Brandt a personalite endouyante. I don’t know what that means in English.

The Secretary: Perhaps someone with a kaleidoscopic nature, a personality who changes a lot.

Someone once said about an American politician, “There is much less there than meets the eye.”

M. Jobert: Reston likes you.

The Secretary: And I like him. He is a decent man.

M. Jobert: We agreed that you would have to change your position on some things.

The Secretary: What things?

M. Jobert: For example, think of poor Andersen (the Danish Foreign Minister); he is very unhappy following his talk with you.

The Secretary: I really did not start out to try to make him happy. Of course, I was just defending your position.

M. Jobert: In any case, he is very unhappy.

The Secretary: Well, why should we hide our real views?

M. Jobert: Are you really annoyed with the European Community draft?

The Secretary: May I be direct with you?

It would not be right to say that I am “annoyed”. There are two problems: First, of procedure, and, second, of substance. On the first, we have two objections. We thought we had an understanding with your President and that there should be bilateral talks. Out of deference to the French point of view, we did not insist on a multilateral meeting in July. While you might have refused to come along on this, it would have been difficult for you to do so, since the others would have come.

M. Jobert: They agree to everything you want.

The Secretary: Anyway, we did not press for a multilateral meeting out of respect for you. We also talked bilaterally with the Germans, the British, and somewhat with the Italians. We had an understanding with you that after this process, there might be a multilateral meeting. All of you promised to produce drafts, and you said that yours would be the best of all.

M. Jobert: You said that it would be, since it would represent the views of France.

The Secretary: Then we were told in July that we would receive a response through the Nine. You said you did not want this and you urged us not to press for a response from the Nine.

M. Jobert: It would be better not to speak of the Nine, but rather to say Eight against One. If you talk of the Nine, it is really Nine—with the U.S.—against France.

The Secretary: We felt some advantage had been taken of us, but this is all meaningless. What does it achieve? Then the Nine talked and we had no idea what they would come up with.

M. Jobert: But you saw the English text.

The Secretary: Definitely not. We received nothing.

Mr. Stoessel: That is true. We definitely did not receive a text.

The Secretary: Then we were confronted with the European Community text which, moreover, was published in full in the papers.

M. Jobert: Well, this was done by a delicious person called Flora Lewis.

The Secretary: Yes, she never has anything good to say about me.

M. Jobert: Nor about me.

The Secretary: Publicizing the document is unimportant. However, people now have a benchmark against which to compare subsequent texts. Then, the Dane comes to see me. He can’t negotiate; he is really only a messenger. Those who can talk can’t negotiate, and those who negotiate can’t talk.

This will create an adversary relationship in the long run which could be very bad. We do not want to be present when you make your decisions in the Community, but we want to be present in the formative period.

Now about substance. The EC document is a collection of phrases from the EC Summit and from the Tokyo Declaration. There is no mention in it of Atlantic relationships. It asks us to recognize Europe. Of course, this is not difficult for us. I recall the endless quarrels with De Gaulle; we were more for Europe than he was.

M. Jobert: The Atlantic things should be in the other paper.

The Secretary: It is not that we object to points in the EC paper, but it is not complete as it stands.

M. Jobert: Today, the NAC postponed the consideration of the agenda point about working out a new Atlantic Declaration.

It is important that you have agreed to a meeting to consider the European Community draft.

The press tried to say that we were against a common European position, but this is not true. We are together in the Nine, although there are some differences when we are with the Fifteen.

After the meeting with you and the Nine this week, then there could be another meeting later in Copenhagen. This shows that you can have a dialogue with us.

(There was a discussion about finger bowls and Jobert mentioned that there are no finger bowls used in China.)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to U.S.-European relations.]

The Secretary: On European matters, how do you visualize the process continuing?

M. Jobert: If I may make one remark to you, I would say that you do not speak enough of Europe. You put Europe at the end of your speech and did not talk much about it. Also, you spoke of restrictive trading blocs. This seems to be a reference to Ortoli’s area. If I could make a counsel, I would say that you should not attack Europeans as a whole. We will do much better in the future.

Secondly, about Japan. I am told that you gave a paper to the Japanese about relations between Europe, the United States and Japan. This had quite an effect on the other Europeans. They were horrified that you could seem to speak for the Europeans on this matter.

The Secretary: The Japanese have produced a paper themselves and they said they would discuss this with you in Europe. We didn’t give them anything.

M. Jobert: I must make a speech tomorrow at the Council on Foreign Relations. I wondered if I shouldn’t speak in French since it would be much easier.

The Secretary: I think it would be better for you to speak in English. With all respect, your French is so complex that the interpreter would never get the full flavor. Also, given the anti-French attitude of the Council, you should try to make some human contact and this would be easier in English.

M. Jobert: I will return to Paris to be there next week and then will come back to New York October 9 and 10.

I will be seeing Brandt today and will need an interpreter with him.

The Secretary: I thought he made a strange speech at the UN General Assembly today. It was really a hodgepodge of various things, but perhaps it was good for domestic consumption. On the other hand, maybe it reflects what he really thinks.

M. Jobert: Now, what will we do? We don’t want to quarrel with you and we do want to have a real dialogue. Since your speech, we have had a great deal of discussion about what to do. You are really an agitator.

The Secretary: It is hard to have a dialogue when the Europeans don’t produce anything until this week.

M. Jobert: But the Europeans have done something and please don’t destroy it.

About the President’s visit, what do you think? Are there domestic problems which would indicate that he could not come, or do you really want him to come?

The Secretary: I talked about this with the President last night. I can say that there are no domestic interests which would indicate that he should go or should not go.

M. Jobert: This is my view as well.

The Secretary: Many Europeans seem to think that he wants to come to Europe to have a big dramatic scene and that this would help us domestically. Actually, if we are to be responsible about what we wish to achieve, what we do in Europe won’t help us, but will only hurt us domestically.

Whether or not the President goes depends on two things. First, is that of substance. He does not want to go just to tour capitals. There would be no point in that. Secondly, under no circumstances will he sign a document with persons who are not at his level. He will not meet multilaterally with people below his level. If this is contemplated, then there can be no Declaration.

M. Jobert: You know our position and that in this we are not on the same ground. I haven’t spoken with my President. However, you know I am a mischievous spirit. Why don’t you wait until the end of 1974?

The Secretary: By then, it would seem to be senseless. But maybe yes, and maybe no. It should be remembered that by that time, the Presidential campaign will be beginning and we couldn’t achieve what we want to do. Sometimes I really believe the Europeans are playing Russian roulette.

M. Jobert: No. We are not devoted to bloody games.

The Secretary: You may not intend to do so, but this wouldn’t be the first time in your history that you have made a mistake.

M. Jobert: That is true.

The Secretary: Thinking ahead, just look at the cast of characters on the U.S. scene. There is no one around who would be as sympathetic on European matters as the present Administration. No one would favor your nuclear deterrent—either the form or the symbolism of it. Also, some would favor a condominium.

Perhaps, we could wait until the spring of 1974.

M. Jobert: Do you understand why I say late 1974?

The Secretary: Because France will then be in the chair of the European Community?

M. Jobert: Yes. This could solve Pompidou’s problem. We are a small country, but we do have our own public opinion problem. Without this, matters would be easy to solve. However, I can see that the timing I suggest would be late.

The Secretary: After all that has happened, it is difficult to wait until summer. This could be after a CSCE Summit and after a U.S.-Soviet Summit. It would also be after a full session of Congress. I do not know if we could hold the situation.

M. Jobert: It is important to fix a date in advance.

The Secretary: This idea can be considered.

M. Jobert: There are two declarations on the table. Perhaps there will be a third one.

The Secretary: The utility of the third is that it could include the Japanese.

M. Jobert: On that point, perhaps we could think of a two-stage rocket. We, the Europeans, could do something with Japan, and then you could come after that. If you try to do all three now, it might be difficult.

The Secretary: This is not impossible.

M. Jobert: And, please, don’t put Australia in the third declaration. Let’s leave them in their Pacific.

The Secretary: We will have to consider the question of a date for the President’s visit. Also, there is the question of the forum and the way in which the President would participate.

M. Jobert: I am convinced, at least at present, that Pompidou would never wish to go to Brussels. As for Brussels II—the NATO meeting—then it might be possible for Messmer to go. I don’t know if this would be satisfactory to you.

The Secretary: We would have to consider it. However, it would be an odd result. After all, our President has proved that he is the closest emotionally to the French point of view. It would be hard to explain why Pompidou would not meet with him to sign a Declaration, particularly a Declaration where we don’t get anything very much, but the Europeans do.

What we will get is something which may help to mobilize public opinion in favor of the Atlantic Alliance and which could be useful over the next ten years. Of course, I understand your public opinion problem.

With regard to the European Community, we could accept that the President of the EC Council could meet with our President, provided that the Declaration to be signed was worth it and that both declarations were satisfactory.

This is a constructive idea. If your President is in the chair of the EC next July, then it is not excluded that we could agree to a visit then if, in the interim, we could do some concrete things. We might say that a meeting would take place on July 15 and that we are doing things in the meantime.

M. Jobert: Then we should stop talking about whether the President is coming, or he is not coming, etc.

The Secretary: And we should stop things coming out of Paris.

M. Jobert: What sort of things?

The Secretary: Well, I am thinking of the Newsweek article which was so critical about the “Year of Europe” and the President’s visit. We think this came largely from your press spokesman, M. De Laye.

I think you have really out-maneuvered me.

M. Jobert: I am not so sure of that. On newspaper articles, we can complain, too—(Jobert showed the Secretary an AFP ticker which apparently said something about the Secretary agreeing to see Scheel in Bonn, but not Jobert.)

The Secretary: This is total nonsense. It probably comes from the Germans.

M. Jobert: I saw Scheel this morning and I asked him if is trying to knife me.

The Secretary: I do plan to go to London in October, and after that, I might meet Scheel there, but not in Bonn. If I have to go to Bonn, I certainly would go to Paris.

M. Jobert: Paris always will be ready to welcome you.

The Secretary: There is no possibility of my going to London and to Bonn and not to Paris. My original intention had been to go to London to make a speech and also to have a Chiefs of Mission meeting.

M. Jobert: That would be good for your Ambassadors.

The Secretary: Our Ambassadors are not so good.

M. Jobert: I don’t know about that, but your Ambassador in Luxembourg—that woman—isn’t so good.

The Secretary: In Paris, we have a good Ambassador. In Italy, ours won’t change the course of history, nor will yours.

M. Jobert: Only Togliatti can do that. And this with the help of his good friend, Brezhnev, who wants to make an official visit there. He will have to eat a lot of spaghetti.

The Secretary: Brezhnev is not so adept. The Chinese are.

On European matters, our effort must seem to be constructive to the public, not an adversary proceeding. At the end, it should not be that someone has won and someone has lost. Also, we should take care to try to influence the press in a helpful way. In this respect, Europe has been worse than the United States.

M. Jobert: Do you really think so?

The Secretary: Yes. We haven’t begun to work on our press. It could easily turn against the whole thing. Europe is not very popular in the United States. Don’t be confused by Reston—he represents nobody.

I think there has been a tendency in your Foreign Office to be critical. Your briefings in Reykjavik were brutal.

M. Jobert: Those were given by the Office of the Presidency, not by the Foreign Office. I was not Foreign Minister then. No, I guess I was Foreign Minister. I am like you. I don’t know where I am.

The Secretary: You always do.

We should make a serious effort to avoid mutual criticism.

We can’t make a decision now about the President’s trip, but we will before I go to Europe. If the trip is delayed, we must think of concrete things which we could do in the meantime. I do not exclude a meeting in July, if the date could be firm and if the documents are adequate. But we can’t agree to a date in July and then have this used against us. You could squeeze us.

M. Jobert: No!

The Secretary: If we could agree on this and that there will be good results, then we could consider it.

M. Jobert: But it shouldn’t be mentioned too soon.

The Secretary: No, I won’t even say that the President won’t be going to Europe soon. Of course, we don’t want to leave ourselves to your mercy.

M. Jobert: The document will be on the table and you will know what you are dealing with.

The Secretary: Internally, we had thought of the timing for a trip as being in November or in February. February might be more likely than July.

M. Jobert: On the question of the Fifteen, I said that we would be willing to write something and I can give you today something unofficial and then you could let me know unofficially what you think about it. Whether this is here or in Paris, will depend on you.

The Secretary: I don’t want to mislead you. We may wish to press ahead with both declarations. And we may not be prepared to filibuster with you indefinitely.

If we agree with you on a date in July, then everyone will be furious at us.

M. Jobert: No, I don’t think so.

The Secretary: Then you could tell us in May or June, just before the visit, that you have changed your position, and then we would be forced to yield to you.

M. Jobert: I will give you a paper now, you don’t have to wait until May. There is a machinery in Brussels and a staff which is waiting for things. We have to make it go slowly.

The Secretary: But we may want it to go reasonably, at least.

M. Jobert: If so, there will be discussion for three months and no prospect for a visit. If you press for something, then everyone will say that Dr. Kissinger is angry and they will do what you want.

The Secretary: Why not suggest a compromise, such as February?

M. Jobert: There would be no objection to preparing a paper. That is why I worked for you to prepare a paper.

The Secretary: Where are we left concretely?

M. Jobert: If you would be willing to work on our text unofficially, then we could have an exchange before putting it on the table in NATO as a French draft.

The Secretary: Stoessel and Sonnenfeldt can analyze it and will give you comments before you leave on Friday.

How do you compare your draft with the Canadian draft, is it stronger or weaker?

M. Jobert: We think it is more generous. I hope it is well translated. I can tell you that it was done by a hand which is friendly to you (Francois De Rose).

The Secretary: We will let you know our view by Friday. We want to keep in the closest contact with you. However, this is difficult. We are told that you have proposed two main lines about us.

First, you said that we are like the pyromaniac who helps his victims put out the fire.

M. Jobert: That is really terrible. The Italians actually said that in Copenhagen. This shows that there are leaks from our meetings.

The Secretary: Secondly, you supposedly tell the Europeans not to be so conciliatory toward us because you are getting everything for them.

M. Jobert: No, that is not true. We said that we had good relations with you, although, of course, all of us have different problems.

(Jobert then told a story about a talk between Mirabeau and Cocteau and the telephone.)

The Secretary: What concrete decisions must we reach?

M. Jobert: I will give you our text and you will give us your reactions. We will then put it on the table as a French text. I do not know if it will be acceptable to you. Before I left, I talked with Pompidou and he asked if the draft would be acceptable to Nixon. I said I did not know.

About the other text, the EC text, that will be considered Saturday morning. Puaux will be there. Then we will see if another meeting is necessary.

The Secretary: I don’t want to mislead you. Perhaps we will also present our text.

M. Jobert: It would be better to present additions to our text. We don’t want to give the impression of too much difference.

The Secretary: I agree. We will proceed that way. We won’t raise the issue of whose text it is.

M. Jobert: And you will tell us your ideas about the President’s visit?

The Secretary: The President will want to have bilateral talks in Paris, and this could take place whenever you want, at the beginning or at the end of his visit.

M. Jobert: And he will get a good reception from the French people. When I saw Frank of the German Foreign Office, he said that a visit by Nixon to Germany could give rise to immoderate events. Also, this could happen in the UK as well. But it won’t be a problem in France.

It also facilitates the whole thing to think that the Soviets will not say anything about the declaration or the visit. I am convinced this is the case.

The Secretary: I am positive about this too. For this reason, it would be good to have the declarations before the conclusion of the CSCE.

M. Jobert: The Soviets won’t move before a SALT II Agreement. There won’t be anything before then.

The Secretary: Our judgment is that there will be no Soviet agitation during the next six months on any of this.

M. Jobert: They have good contacts with you and they want better ones.

The Secretary: Our impression is that they are more interested in CSCE than in SALT. SALT II will be very difficult. It is not easy now to see how it could be concluded.

(There was discussion of the possibility of the Secretary and Jobert meeting when the Secretary comes to Europe.)

The Secretary: It would simplify my life and schedule if it were possible for us to meet in London; otherwise, I could come to Paris. Let’s aim to meet in one place or another, perhaps on the 16th. I will be seeing Douglas-Home on the 14th, and he will also be seeing Scheel.

M. Jobert: There is a Council meeting in Brussels on the 15th and 16th.

The Secretary: We could perhaps meet before Brussels or after, if you wish.

M. Jobert: My only problem is that it not seem that I am responding to a directive from you.

The Secretary: In that case, I could try to come to Paris.

M. Jobert: No, I think I can make it to London somehow.

The Secretary: We could meet either on the 14th or the 16th, probably in London. But I will come to Paris if necessary.

M. Jobert: If we can do this without publicity, it would be good.

The Secretary: Let’s be clear. I can’t promise that if you see me.

M. Jobert: I don’t know what Pompidou’s reaction will be. My own reaction is that I will come to see you.

The Secretary: We will see each other then and we can make a decision about the approximate date for the President’s trip.

I will be having a press conference this afternoon.

M. Jobert: You could say that it is the “Year of the World.”

The Secretary: For Jobert, every year is the “Year of Europe.”

There are a number of processes going on. European unity is developing and we support that. Also, there is the question of Transatlantic relations. I could say that we have to spend time on sorting these out.

M. Jobert: The impression is that you are angry at Europe and that you don’t like the Community draft and want bilateral talks.

The Secretary: What we can’t accept is a fait accompli. I will be constructive in my remarks to the press.

M. Jobert: If you could give us your impressions of our draft for NATO, this would be helpful. We would be pleased to have a French text on which all could agree. If you say you agree, this will do it.

The Secretary: Even so, we may want to present our own draft and then gradually work toward yours. We will see.

1. Summary: Jobert and Kissinger discussed the outcome of the September 10 EC Foreign Ministers meeting and next steps in the Year of Europe.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Top Secret Files 1970–1973, Entry 1613, Box 25, Miscellaneous Refiles. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Stoessel. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s apartment at the Waldorf Towers. In a September 26 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt offered his initial reaction to the French draft of a NATO declaration, suggesting that Kissinger “could tell Jobert tonight, that the defense language looks like a pretty good basis for proceeding and that overall we welcome the spirit of his paper.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1336, NSC Secretariat, NSC Unfiled Materials, 1973, (11 of 12))