Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976, Second, Revised Edition

334. Telegram 59655 From the Department of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, March 11, 1976, 2032Z.

Subject: Pakistani nuclear facilities. Refs: State 38854, 40475. For Ambassador.

1. Please deliver following confidential letter from Secretary to Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues as soon as possible.

Quote. Dear Jean:

I am writing you on a matter of profound importance to our efforts to promote stability and deter the spread of nuclear explosive capabilities: The threat posed to those efforts by increased national access to sensitive nuclear technology—particularly chemical reprocessing facilities—especially in areas of conflict and instability.

I have been heartened by the progress we have made since our Presidents met in Martinique in 1974. The meetings of nuclear suppliers in London have succeeded in strengthening and expanding guidelines for nuclear safeguards and controls. We take very seriously their provisions for consultation, restraint in sensitive nuclear exports, and encouragement of multinational alternatives to such exports. We have applauded the active cooperation of France which has made possible the success of this effort.

I continue to believe, as I noted last September to the UN General Assembly, that the further spread under national control of reprocessing facilities will seriously aggravate the problem of nuclear proliferation. My concern is all the greater in the case of countries whose incentives to acquire nuclear weapons are substantial. This is why we welcomed Korea’s decision to forego acquiring a national reprocessing plant, and why we deeply appreciated France’s constructive stance which contributed so much to our efforts. We have made emphatically clear to the Korean Government that future U.S. cooperation should not hamper or replace its peaceful nuclear cooperation with France.

We are therefore at a juncture where we can move to consolidate a pattern of restraint in sensitive nuclear transfers while fostering effectively safeguarded cooperation in non-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. It is in this context that we are asking France to join us in an act of leadership to deter or delay Pakistani acquisition of a national reprocessing capability and to pursue, when the need is clear, safer and more economic alternatives such as a multinational venture in the region.

In this connection, we have asked Pakistan to consider cancellation of present plans to acquire a reprocessing plant until its future nuclear program is sufficiently developed to establish clear need and until other alternatives have been more thoroughly explored. I expressed my personal concern about these plans to Prime Minister Bhutto. I must be frank in pointing out that compared to Korea, Pakistan is pursuing a much larger plutonium-production capability, for which it has no economic need but it does have considerable potential for being used either to counter India’s nuclear capability or to try to obtain concessions for not doing so. We must also face the danger of contravention or abrogation of even the most effective safeguards agreement if a nation finds this to be in its national interest.

I believe that I understand the difficulties that my request may present to your government. While I would prefer that France participate with us in persuading Pakistan to cancel its facility, it would help our efforts with Prime Minister Bhutto if France could delay further actions on this transaction for a reasonable period of time. I believe that we can make no more enduring contribution to international stability than a decisive act to forestall further transfers of national reprocessing capabilities, particularly in circumstances where there is a substantial risk that they might be used for non-peaceful purposes. Warm regards, Henry A. Kissinger. Unquote. Signed original follows in pouch.

2. Ambassador should inform Elysee (Pierre-Brossolette) of U.S. démarche and underline to both Quai and Elysee seriousness with which USG views national reprocessing transactions (even under IAEA safeguards) to sensitive countries such as Pakistan, which has security incentives to match Indian nuclear capabilities and which lacks credible economic justification for acquiring complete nuclear fuel cycle.

3. Ambassador may note that Secretary Kissinger, in March 9 appearance before Senate Government Operations Committee, stressed importance USG attaches to supplier consultations on sensitive nuclear transactions and noted strong U.S. preference for restraint on such transactions, particularly in case of countries such as Pakistan, and U.S. support for exploring regional multinational alternatives as needed. In context of emphasizing non-proliferation as a central U.S. policy objective, Secretary expressed common concern of administration and Congress on need to constrain spread of national reprocessing and other sensitive nuclear facilities, and confirmed U.S. policy of avoiding export of sensitive nuclear technology.

4. For Ottawa. Department intends to inform Canadian Embassy of Secretary’s letter to Foreign Minister and to indicate that any supportive actions Canada might take would of course be welcomed.

Ingersoll

1. Summary: The Department forwarded a letter from Kissinger to Sauvagnargues on the proposed sale of a French reprocessing plant to Pakistan.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent immediate for information to Ottawa, Bonn, Islamabad, and Tehran. Drafted by Jan Kalicki in S/P; cleared by Passage, Ortiz, Bartholomew, Vest, EUR, NEA/PAB, OES, H, and EA (in substance); and approved by Sonnenfeldt. In his March 16 reply to Kissinger, Sauvagnargues argued that the proposed sale was in keeping with the principles that emerged from the 1975 London nuclear suppliers meetings and he thus saw “no reasons not to sign the requisite agreements on the scheduled dates—that is, this week.” Sauvagnargues noted that France had kept the U.S. informed about its negotiations with Pakistan and that the U.S. had had almost a year to discuss the issue with Pakistan; moreover, France had actively contributed to the success of the London meetings. “This campaign against our nuclear exports,” Sauvagnargues concluded, “seems to us tendentious.” (Ibid., Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 9, POL 2 France)