Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976, Second, Revised Edition

296. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, April 15, 1976.

THE NEW GERMANY, EUROPEAN STABILITY AND THE ACHESON SYSTEM

We are hearing a good deal these days concerning a “sea change” in Germany, about the Germans “feeling their oats” again and even of the return of German “arrogance.” There also is some concern that, having done penance in the third quarter of this century for their deeds of the second quarter, the Germans somehow may become again an unmanageable force in the last 25 years of the 20th century. Others, eschewing such sweeping conclusions, nonetheless perceive a “New Germany” posing questions about the future balance of power in Europe. The attached paper, written by a member of my staff, argues that these concerns are both overdrawn and misleading.

Summary of the Paper

The paper argues that we are in fact dealing with a “New Germany”:

—A West German Federal Republic which has legitimated itself both internally and externally as a result of a quarter century of exemplary international behavior, of solid political and economic success and of Brandt’s decision, confirmed in the 1972 election, to subordinate the dream of German reunification to the identity of the FRG system.

—To our credit and good fortune, that successful evolution has occurred within what we may call the Acheson system—the post-1945 Atlantic order designed, inter alia, to channel West German political, economic, and military power into Western multilateral institutions and thereby to afford post-war West Germany a legitimate home in lieu of national unification.

—Besides the FRG’s tangible achievements and growing power relative to America and other West European states, the Germans also have freed themselves from their post-war sense of moral inferiority, partly due to generational change but also because of the perceived decline of American predominance and moral authority.

The character of US/FRG relations has evolved:

—The US/FRG relationship has shifted over the post-war years from one of substantial German dependence to a curious amalgam of FRG security dependence and genuine if still asymmetrical interdependence.

—Bonn generally continues to be a very cooperative supporter of US political and economic initiatives, but does of late drive a harder bargain, especially when considerations of FRG national sovereignty, vestiges of occupation, and money come together on any given issue; (German resistance to the Offset/Northag concept is a recent illustration).

—German cooperation is premised on Bonn’s continued dependence on the American security guarantee.

—But the decline of German assurance in the diplomatic purpose, military power and political capacity of the United States, flowing out of the tough chain of events in America since 1963, and from growing signs of US neo-isolationism is causing significant erosion of German confidence in the US defense guarantee.

—In reaction, Brandt sought reinsurance in the early 70’s through the now stalled Ostpolitik, a policy also used to legitimize the FRG system and to complement and reinforce the Alliance with America.

—Of late, Schmidt has also explored a bit more with France the possibilities in the European option, only to find that the European pillar is becoming increasingly soft;

—Finally, Bonn knows that neither of these approaches can replace the US security umbrella and that either of them, carried too far, could disrupt the Acheson system.

The epiphenomena of German assertiveness thus reflect only dimly more salient and still gathering forces:

—The real problem for the New Germany lies in the danger that a future vacuum may be opening on the western side of the East-West equation.

—Rather than a New Germany grasping for power, we are witnessing a Federal Republic, as the strongest European “middle power,” which fears that it could be drawn, essentially against its will, into compensating for current US and West European weakness.

—As a result, the FRG could become increasingly vulnerable to charges of political ambition from both East and West in Europe.

The central problem for future American policy lies in the resultant modification and erosion of the Acheson system. The paper concludes (at pages 21–25) with a 10-point strategy for addressing US/FRG relations. These elements, many of which continue present policy, should be adequate for the management of our German connection if, the paper states, the larger American decline can be checked.

The paper does delineate a further scenario—a deepening of present trends and major shocks to the Acheson system that could force Bonn to basic choices. An annex briefly examines possible German choices in such an extreme “what if” situation.

Comment

As you can see, the study’s focus on the “New Germany and the Acheson system” raises some of the basic questions concerning future European stability and security. There inevitably will be room for differences of judgment, particularly in the paper’s judgments on the motivations behind Ostpolitik and the extent of “the American decline” and its weight in German policy. But the analysis is pointed and interesting.

1. Summary: Lord summarized a memorandum written by a member of his staff entitled, “The New Germany, European Stability and the Acheson System.”

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 19, NODIS Briefing Memos, 1976, Folder 1. Secret. Drafted by Phillip Kaplan in S/P. Attached but not published is the paper, which was drafted by Kaplan on April 5.