195. Telegram 6750 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State1

For Ops Center. Fol msg recd from Madrid this date h/w rptd for your action: Quote Madrid 7616. For Assistant Secretary Stoessel. Subject: Secvisit: Second Day of Secretary’s Visit to Madrid (Dec 19). Request clearance on following draft message to be cabled to Washington:

Begin draft: 1. Following is summary of events of second day, Dec 19, of Secretary’s visit to Madrid. Beginning at 0945 Secretary, accompanied by Ambassador Rivero and Mr. Eagleburger, had meeting of about 15 minutes with Chinese Ambassador to Madrid, whose office is located in Palace Hotel, where Secretary and his party were staying. Secretary met with President of Government Carrero Blanco from 1030 to 1100. After a visit to the Prado Museum, Secretary participated in a working session with the Spanish Foreign Minister and other Spanish and U.S. officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, lasting from about 1220 to 1345. He then spent about 10 minutes talking to Section Chiefs of the U.S. Embassy and for about an hour hosted a working lunch at the Ambassador’s residence attended by participants in the MFA working session. After proceeding from the residence to the airport, the Secretary and Foreign Minister spoke briefly there to news media representatives. The Secretary and party departed Madrid at 1600. A joint communiqué was issued following the Secretary’s departure.

2. During meeting at Presidency, Secretary and Carrero discussed the current situation in the Middle East and Mediterranean security. Carrero noted that the USSR, while avoiding all out war, was pursuing its objectives through limited military operations in various areas and through subversion. The Russians, he said, were seeking to exploit the Middle East to increase their influence in the area. This implied a confrontation between NATO and the USSR and was also important to Mediterranean security. The security of the West, Carrero stated, would depend on keeping the Russians from having bases in North Af[Typeset Page 629]rica, for which the West should try to get Arab support. The Secretary noted that the U.S. had supported Israel in order prevent the situation in the area from being determined by Soviet arms but the U.S. was also moving to develop closer relations with the Arabs. Carrero opined that while NATO had the structure of a military alliance, it ran into complications by mixing political and military considerations. The Secretary responded that military and political considerations could not be separated. Carrero pointed out that the Pyrenees could provide a second line of defense behind which Western forces could reorganize and receive supplies from America, if the first line of NATO defense was overrun; now, he noted, NATO had no second line of defense and no logistic coordination. Carrero emphasized that Spain could cooperate with Western defense only on a basis of equality.

3. At MFA working session:

A. FonMin set forth Spanish position along following lines: Spain could help overcome weak points in Western defense but it would do so only on basis of equality with other Western countries. If US could not provide assurance of Spain’s admission to NATO as equal partner, Spain could contribute to Western defense through bilateral defense treaty with US. Such treaty would include a defense commitment to Spain as NATO countries had, granting of certain military facilities to US in Spain, and close cooperation in defense sectors. Spain no longer was interested in grant aid but wanted to purchase material, with credit and other terms, and to obtain technical assistance.

B. Secretary noted distinction had to be made between reality and form. He pointed out that submission of treaty proposal was not in interest of Spain or US because it was most difficult agreement on which to obtain Senate approval. The bases were advantageous to Spain as well as to the US. To obtain the more formal relationship desired by the Spanish, it would be best to search for something between a treaty and simple extension of the existing agreement, perhaps something like an Atlantic Declaration.

C. ForMin agreed on approach of working together to develop principles and content of Alliance, leaving aside its legal form for later determination. Secretary agreed to give agreement maximum legal form that congressional situation permitted.

D. The Spanish Chief of the High General Staff supported the FonMin’s presentation and highlighted the need for provisions for joint planning for defense in areas of common interest. He emphasized Spanish interest in assistance for training, technology and logistic support.

E. The Secretary agreed that military assistance should not be considered simply as hardware provided in exchange for bases but that consideration should be given to the purpose it served. He and the For[Typeset Page 630]eign Minister were in accord that the agreement should contain provisions for cooperation in various non-military sectors as well as in defense.

F. The Secretary and Foreign Minister agreed that work on the new agreement could begin immediately by exchanges of views through Ambassadors and later through establishment of a working group.

G. The Secretary and Foreign Minister agreed that work would proceed on a bilateral declaration of principles as simultaneously as possible with the Atlantic and USEC Declarations, with a view to adapting them to Spanish circumstances. The Foreign Minister gave the Secretary a draft of a proposed bilateral declaration based on a version of the Atlantic Declaration which the US had given the Spanish on Sept 5.

H. Two other subjects were briefly mentioned: the Foreign Minister stated that British retention of Gibraltar was an anachronism, that regaining Gibraltar was necessary to maintaining control of the Strait of Gibraltar, and that Spain wanted to convert this point of friction to a point of cooperation in the wider interests of Western defense. The Foreign Minister also pointed out the close relationship between Spain and Latin America, particularly in cultural and economic sectors. The Secretary indicated he wanted to invite the Foreign Minister to visit the US, as the negotiations developed, and the Foreign Minister accepted the invitation.

4. At Luncheon:

A. Secretary told Foreign Minister that Spanish would be informed in advance of declarations of principles texts worked out in NATO and between US and EC. He noted that more substantive content and emotion could be put in US-Spanish declaration than in USEC draft.

B. Secretary indicated he might visit Argentina, Brazil and Peru prior to his Mexico meeting in late February with Latin American Foreign Ministers.

C. In reply to Lopez Rodo’s question, Secretary explained there was no practical distinction between functioning of embassies and liaison offices exchanged between US and PRC but designation of liaison office enabled US maintain recognition of Taiwan.

D. Secretary told Foreign Minister US Ambassador would be sent to Stockholm if there were no inflammatory speeches following convening parliament next month.

E. Secretary observed to Foreign Minister that US had established principle that any country attacking US would pay a price; otherwise countries would feel free to hit US increasingly, which would stimulate left-wing elements in these countries.

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F. Foreign Minister noted Mexico was only country that still recognized so-called Spanish Republican Government and latter’s Ambassador in Mexico City controlled large amount of treasures looted from Spain. Secretary promised to speak to Mexican Foreign Minister about this and inform Lopez Rodo of response.

G. Lopez Rodo stated Spain and Poland would establish diplomatic relations next February and he expected similar action subsequently with some other East European countries.

5. In exchange of toasts at luncheon:

A. Secretary stated: He was moved by friendship he found here; it was expressed in program followed that morning and would be pursued next year to move forward in relationships in all sections; he could see from visit that Spanish nation was not decadent; US supported Spain’s membership in EC to extent Spain worked it out; US also supported Spain’s membership in NATO and in consultation with Spain would take steps to this end at an appropriate moment; US would work closely with Spanish on Atlantic Declaration; US would put its existing relationship with Spain in more concrete form; all could be achieved in a spirit of friendship.

B. The Foreign Minister responded: It was a great pleasure to receive the visit of a personality whom the whole world admired; all Spanish hopes placed in the visit were amply fulfilled; the talks with a great personality and great friend of Spain recalled a Spanish proverb “deeds are acts of love, not good reasons” (“Obras son amores y no buenas razones); he trusted in the realistic diplomatic sense of the Secretary, who would translate into concrete action the friendship between the two nations which Spain extended sincerely.

6. Talking to news media representatives before departure:

A. Secretary stated: he had found substantial identity of views in intense and friendly conversations held during his visit to Madrid; Spain and the US had agreed to prepare a bilateral declaration of principles parallel to such declarations being developed between the US and other countries; it had been agreed to strengthen Spanish-US contacts at a high level; he was glad to note that the Foreign Minister had accepted his invitation to the US.

B. The Foreign Minister remarked: Professor Kissinger had a depth of knowledge, historic vision and sense of the future which enabled him to perceive problems of our time with clarity and assurance of correctness; looking at the present without taking account of the direction of the evolution of peoples risked making mistakes; but distinguishing between nations with a future and those in decadence would enable the

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new international order to be established on solid foundations; a principle architect of this new order was Dr. Kissinger. Rivero. Unquote.

Bassin
  1. Summary: The Mission forwarded a message from Madrid on the second day of Kissinger’s visit to Spain.

    Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. From December 18 to 19, Kissinger visited Madrid. On December 18, he met with Franco and with Juan Carlos; memoranda of conversation recording these talks are ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 706, Country Files, Europe, Spain, Vol. IV, January 1972–(June 1974) (1 of 2). According to telegram 7563 from Madrid, December 19, Kissinger also met privately with Lopez Rodo on December 18. (Ibid., NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 43, HAK Trip Files, HAK Trip—Europe & Mid East, Dec 8–22, 1973, State Cables, Memos & Misc) No other record of this conversation was found.