Office of the Historian

164. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State1

Washington, October 10, 1975.

SUBJECT

  • Private Talk Between Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Melo Antunes

The Secretary told Foreign Minister Antunes that we would support him and his associates in Portugal. He suggested a special channel of communication between him and the Foreign Minister, in case problems arose about which the Foreign Minister might desire to contact the Secretary directly. The Foreign Minister agreed to this. The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister if he had sufficient confidence in Ambassador Carlucci. The Foreign Minister indicated that he did, that he had no reason for any doubts about him, particularly if he enjoyed the Secretary’s trust. The Secretary asked if the Foreign Minister thought it might be desirable for them to have an alternate channel as well. The Foreign Minister said he thought it would be, so as to facilitate overcoming any obstacles that might arise. The Secretary said he would designate the appropriate person, and asked how that person should communicate with the Foreign Minister. Antunes said that, since it would not be desirable to do it through direct contact, in view of his position, it should be through someone of his confidence: Major Goncalves Da Costa, his staff director.

The Secretary, prefacing his next question by mentioning his inclination to consider even highly unlikely events, inquired as to what the Foreign Minister thought the possibility might still be for civil war to break out in Portugal. The Foreign Minister replied that it seemed certain to him that this could still happen. Although he considered that the highly critical period had passed, conditions still existed in Portugal for possible serious confrontations between certain population groups and the Armed Forces. But such a danger did not seem imminent. The Secretary indicated that, in the event of a tragedy, we would be ready to support the Foreign Minister and his group. But the Foreign Minister would have to tell us when. At any event, we had preliminary plans for this purpose. The Foreign Minister expressed gratitude for the intended support, which he said would of course be very helpful in the event of need. He went on to stress that the position of his group was [Typeset Page 558] clear and had been made so from the start; namely, that they stood ready to hold out to the very end, both politically and militarily, against any threat by the Communists to take over power in Portugal. The Secretary wished him the best, and said he looked forward to seeing him again at the Brussels meeting in December.

  1. Summary: Kissinger and Antunes discussed the political situation in Portugal.

    Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Chron—Official, Oct–Dec 1975. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Nodis. Drafted by the interpreter, Neil Seidenman. A memorandum of conversation on the discussion among Kissinger, Antunes, and U.S. officials that preceded this talk is ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files, P820123–2184.

    ↩