Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976, Second, Revised Edition

158. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 12, 1975.

SUBJECT

• Portugal

PARTICIPANTS

• Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
• Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
• Frank C. Carlucci, Ambassador to Portugal
• Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
• William G. Hyland, Director of Intelligence and Research
• L. Bruce Laingen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
• L. Paul Bremer, III, Special Assistant to the Secretary

Amb. Carlucci: Let me briefly review the situation as I see it. For the first time since I have been in Portugal, with perhaps one exception, moderate elements seem to be pulling themselves together, in both civilian and military circles. At the same time the communists have been overplaying their hand and there is evident irritation with them among some in the AFM and in the government.

Secretary: Is there a government now?

Amb. Carlucci: No, but what passes for one is becoming very unpopular. The church is increasingly active. Military moderates are resentful at being linked to the CP. The Antunes manifesto was well written. Its authors have impeccable revolutionary credentials who speak for a good deal of the military. But let’s not forget that even these people are clearly leftists.

Secretary: Yes, and a good way to the left of most of the European socialists. So I am not going to draw any unmitigated comfort from this.

Amb. Carlucci: We have had contact with Antunes who says he does not intend to give up his fight. Soares is with him and has taken a courageous public stand of support. So there is a fighting chance for the moderates, although the communists have strong assets in the media, labor groups, and still some within the AFM. The communists are a dedicated and tough element.

Secretary: But what will the outcome be?

Amb. Carlucci: Antunes’ objective is to get enough signatures for his manifesto to be able to go to Costa Gomes and say: Vasco has got to go. I think it may work.

Secretary: But then what?

Amb. Carlucci: I see several possible scenarios. One could be with Antunes becoming Prime Minister. Another would be for Costa Gomes to serve as both President and Prime Minister with either Antunes or Crespo as Deputy Prime Minister. But the communists will not give up without a fight; there could be more terrorism and civil war is possible although I don’t personally adhere to that view.

Amb. Carlucci: The biggest danger is from right wing reaction, particularly if the ELP in Spain or Spinola tries something. Spinola is totally discredited in Portugal, and if he tries something I can see a repetition of the events that followed the March 11 abortive coup.

Secretary: That depends on whether he succeeds or not.

Amb. Carlucci: Yes, I agree but his track record is very bad.

Secretary: Are you sure he was behind the coup in March?

Mr. Hartman: Whatever the facts, he certainly lent himself to something or was tricked into it by the communists.

Amb. Carlucci: I agree he may well have been tricked into taking the stand he did, but one cannot be sure.

Secretary: I am not so much against a coup as such, shocking as it may sound to some of my colleagues . . .

Amb. Carlucci: No, I am also not against a coup if it worked. But if Spinola tries, it won’t work. Antunes can command a following; Spinola cannot. He is a very dangerous man in my view.

Secretary: Well, we are not doing anything right now with Spinola.

Amb. Carlucci: I hope not. I have seen one CIA report out of Latin America that indicated some kind of contact and gave me some concern.

Secretary: Is that true?

Mr. Hyland: Not that I know of.

Amb. Carlucci: The other potential danger point is the Azores.

Secretary: I agree; [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Hartman: That point is covered in our paper.

Secretary: I haven’t read your paper. I haven’t read any paper. Where would this paper be at this particular point in time?

Mr. Hartman: I think it is on your desk. I have not yet given a copy to JCS; only to the CIA.

(The Secretary reads through the paper.)

Secretary: Well frankly I regard a $1.3 million program as an amateurish operation. It just amounts to permitting everybody to cover his ass and being able to say he did something. If you can set things right with this kind of program then I don’t think I understand what revolutions are all about.

Amb. Carlucci: The main thing is our offer of economic assistance.

Secretary: You have already told them that.

Amb. Carlucci: Yes, but we need to reiterate this position. We have pretty good contact with them. We should not offer covert financial assistance to Antunes or to other military contacts. I think they would resent that. Such help should be offered to the parties instead, with the understanding that they will support moderate elements in the AFM.

Secretary: Yes, but why not come up with an effective program and we will get the money we need. I still regard this Forty Committee paper as an amateurish, high school kind of program.

Mr. Hartman: But the point is that Antunes has come to us with a reminder that Portugal will need large economic assistance if he is successful.

Secretary: I told you that that is all right.

Mr. Hartman: He may come to us for really big money in that area.

Secretary: Look, I want to get it in Carlucci’s head that we want an aggressive political program. We will get it one way or another. We will get it either around you or with you.

Mr. Hartman: It is understood that Antunes will come back to us if he really wants assistance of that kind.

Secretary: What do you think, Bill?

Mr. Hyland: I am not so sure that dollars or a covert program will make that much difference now. It’s hard to say.

Secretary: I think that’s right. We may be beyond that point. But suppose they ask for weapons?

Amb. Carlucci: That’s possible. But they have not done so yet.

Secretary: But it is important that they shouldn’t be turned off from such a request.

Amb. Carlucci: I agree but I have been very careful in considering requests I have had in this area to date. They have clearly not represented either Soares or Antunes. If it is clear that the requests come from them, then that will be a different matter. But that hasn’t happened yet. And I don’t want to start giving arms to irresponsible elements.

Secretary: I agree; obviously they should be a responsible group. But I have read a report of at least one of your talks on this subject with someone who made contact with your Mission and it was not self-evident to me that this was not someone working for Soares.

Amb. Carlucci: I disagree; I clearly established to my satisfaction in that instance that he was not speaking for Soares. They may begin asking for weapons if this thing turns into civil war. Where they can use money covertly is in the political field.

Secretary: I am more interested in organizational support for the parties than in money as such.

Amb. Carlucci: I agree, and Soares has problems on that score.

Mr. Hartman: The problem is that the British tell us he hasn’t even used effectively the organizational help already offered, including some from them.

Amb. Carlucci: The PPD also needs assistance.

Secretary: I agree with that.

Amb. Carlucci: This is also covered in our paper.

Secretary: Let me say again that you should not be constrained by money. Whatever it costs, let us know and we will find the money.

Amb. Carlucci: O.K. One other thing; the situation has now changed so that I think we can be involved directly in political support of this kind rather than working through third countries. We have the contacts in Portugal and we should benefit from direct contact.

Secretary: I would have to follow your judgment on that. I would feel more comfortable if it is done through you.

Amb. Carlucci: O.K. So I have the green light to offer [less than 1 line not declassified] whatever they need in this area. As for weapons, we will examine any request that looks legitimate.

Secretary: Yes, if in your judgment the requests come from responsible elements.

Amb. Carlucci: I have told my military people who are getting some approaches that I have got to know exactly for whom they speak and what they have in mind before we even consider such requests.

Secretary: Yes, but your people should also know that you are ready to run some risks.

Amb. Carlucci: Yes, there are risks in this program, given the unpredictability of men like Carvalho and others. The risks are substantial but we have reached the point now where I think these risks are worth taking.

I also understand we are ready to move on the economic front.

Secretary: O.K., you put together a program that we can put to Congress fast when we are ready to move with it.

Mr. Hartman: Yes. We should do this and think in large figures.

Secretary: How much?

Amb. Carlucci: It should be at least in the $60–70 million range.

Secretary: If we get an acceptable government in Portugal, we can easily get $60 million—especially if this is matched by the Europeans.

Amb. Carlucci: It should be more than matched by the Europeans. Antunes and Soares have both taken this line with me.

Secretary: I am not worried about Congress. I think we can get as much as $75 million.

Amb. Carlucci: One other problem is the danger of an over-embrace on our part of the moderates. But that is my problem.

Secretary: I agree. There should be no approaches to anyone in this program except through you but I want it confirmed that we are not running a seminar here of theological students. Your Mission must know that. All of you must know that we are clearly in a revolutionary situation where there are no rewards for losing moderately. I can’t tell you how to run this thing locally but the last thing I want is a coup attempt of the type the communists can exploit the way they did after March 11.

What happens if Antunes wins?

Amb. Carlucci: First, we will be rid of Vasco. Secondly, he will move to get rid of the commie-lining Fifth Division. Third, Antunes will do what he can to end the present communist control of 90% of the press.

Secretary: That’s fine.

Amb. Carlucci: Let me make it clear however that we cannot assume there will be no communist ministers at all in the kind of coalition government that Antunes may put together.

Secretary: But let’s make sure that the Embassy doesn’t start pushing for such.

Mr. Hartman: Don’t forget that these guys are compromisers, all of them.

Secretary: But doesn’t that depend on what we tell them? Obviously we’d just as soon have all the communists out of the government.

Mr. Hartman: They should be.

Amb. Carlucci: But looking at the situation frankly, getting rid of the Fifth Division and a communist-controlled press will be more important in the short run than worrying about a communist as possible Minister of Transport.

Secretary: I agree but why can’t we get both results?

Amb. Carlucci: The communists are a powerful force. Portuguese people are not fighters; they are instinctively compromisers. The communists are fighters. But as Costa Gomes says, the current violence in the North may have helped clarify the situation for a lot of people.

Secretary: By the way, who did that memo to me on Soares?

Mr. Hartman: We did.

Secretary: I appreciated it; it was a good memo.

Amb. Carlucci: Soares has guts. He was ready to come to my house on Saturday night. He said he would back Antunes 100%.

Secretary: Imagine—a government in which Antunes is the hope of the future! But he is better than Goncalves.

Mr. Sisco: At least we can understand what Antunes says. That is impossible with Goncalves.

Amb. Carlucci: They are all naive in their political and economic theories. But Antunes at least is leaning in the right direction.

Secretary: When are you going back?

Amb. Carlucci: I leave town tomorrow and expect to be back in Lisbon on Friday.

Mr. Hartman: We also want you to look at these talking points for use with Costa Gomes.

Secretary: I have read that paper. It’s O.K.

I saw Costa Gomes in Helsinki. He looked sad enough to weep on my shoulder. But there was no time to arrange a talk.

Amb. Carlucci: Costa Gomes says the right things but then never acts.

Secretary: We need to act in Portugal. I am reminded of Chile at an earlier time when Allende was contending for election. State did not want to support the only man who was capable of winning. That’s how Allende got in in the first place. The only guy who had a chance of winning against him was Alexandre. The U.S. was supporting Frey, who had no chance to win but still we put all our money on him and that was a mistake.

Mr. Hartman: Can I raise a related matter . . .

Secretary: I want all this absolutely clear. You must understand what we want in Portugal. Do you understand, Art?

Mr. Hartman: Yes, we want the communists out!

Secretary: But we won’t get this through handwringing! You must take some risks, Frank. I want you to stop short of any actions that might trigger some kind of March 11 event. But I want it understood that what we want in Portugal cannot be done without risks. I’ll back you up if you get caught taking risks. I even back up incompetents if what they are doing succeeds.

Mr. Hartman: We also want you to look at these press talking points.

Secretary: I am giving a press conference in Birmingham.

Mr. Hartman: I think there is probably too much in these talking points that would suggest that we are embracing Antunes.

Secretary: Look, I won’t mention names. And after all, this is Birmingham—they probably think Portugal is the name of some midwestern state.

I think I’ll begin my press conference with a statement on Portugal. What do you think, Joe?

Mr. Sisco: I think the talking points are too much of a bear-hug for Antunes. I agree with the idea of an opening statement.

Secretary: I also want to include a swipe at the Soviets and get people off my back domestically.

Are the Soviets all that obtrusive in Portugal at the moment?

Mr. Hyland: I think they are trying to pull Cunhal back a bit.

Mr. Hartman: The way Cunhal is behaving he is becoming our best asset in Portugal!

Secretary: Do you suppose he really did talk the way it was reported in the Oriana Fallaci interview?

Amb. Carlucci: Yes. He is a hardliner.

Mr. Hartman: She claims to have the tapes.

Amb. Carlucci: [1½ lines not declassified] The Embassy has contacts with opposition figures [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Hartman: [2 lines not declassified]

Secretary: That’s fine.

Mr. Hartman: I want to mention two things about Angola. The Portuguese have asked us for help in getting delivery of a fourth Boeing 747 expedited.

Secretary: I am for that.

Mr. Hartman: They also want help in getting a tanker into Luanda port and berthed. But that is a security question and I gather there is some progress now relating to a fortress just alongside the berth.

Secretary: I don’t know enough about that one.

Mr. Hartman: If we can be responsive on these points, it would be helpful, in addition to asking the Portuguese whether they want help in getting people airlifted out of Angola. This could have a useful impact in Portugal because these evacuees will tend to support the moderates but we should do this without appearing to be acting for political purposes.

Mr. Sisco: I think we should do both these things, i.e., the 747 and helping get some of these people back.

Secretary: I have got no problems with that.

Mr. Hyland: It would be good if we could get some impression from Soares and Antunes what they think we should be doing about Angola.

Secretary: Look, we should help in Angola. But we want it understood by the Portuguese if we do so we expect them to back off from supporting the MPLA.

Mr. Hartman: I will talk to General Pauley in J–5 at JCS about this paper we have been discussing. They have not yet seen it.

1. Summary: Kissinger, Sisco, Carlucci, Hartman, and Hyland discussed Portugal.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff Files, Box 17, Portugal 1975 (10) WH. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Bruce Laingen.