Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976, Second, Revised Edition

153. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Bonn, May 20, 1975.

SUBJECT

• Secretary’s Comments on Meeting with Gromyko and on Portugal

PARTICIPANTS

• FRG

  • Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher
  • Dr. Walter Gehlhoff, State Secretary, FRG Foreign Ministry
  • Dr. Guenther van Well, Ministerialdirektor, FRG Foreign Ministry
  • Dr. Peter Hermes, Ministerialdirektor, FRG Foreign Ministry
  • Dr. Fredo Dannenbring, VLR I, FRG Foreign Ministry
  • Herr Ruediger von Pachelbel-Gehag, Head of Press Office, FRG Foreign Ministry
  • Dr. Klaus Kinkel, Ministerialdirigent, Head of Office of Federal Minister
  • Ambassador Berndt von Staden, FRG Ambassador to the US

• US

  • The Secretary
  • Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
  • Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor
  • Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
  • Martin J. Hillenbrand, US Ambassador to the FRG
  • Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations
  • Mr. David Anderson, EUR/CE Director
  • Mr. Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Portugal.]

(After dinner discussion)

The Secretary: I would now like to turn to the situation in Portugal.

Genscher: We consider the situation decisive at present. The entire matter is open, and we are trying to bring about economic stability so as to help the moderates and counter the expansion of the Communists, which would lead to a fiasco. We hope to create the possibilities for a moderate government in that country.

The Secretary: I will give you my personal viewpoint on the situation, on which we are not acting since we have no European support. Obviously, we cannot act without the Europeans. We therefore are conducting a parallel policy with you, with us two steps behind. Let me say to start out with that I don’t share the analysis of most Europeans about Portugal. Even if they are right, the measures that they are taking or are prepared to take are not the right ones. The Europeans seem to believe that a straight Communist takeover would be the greatest danger to Europe. They celebrate when the Communists do not win. I do not agree with this view. The most dangerous development would be Portugal’s change into a system somewhere between that of Yugoslavia and Algeria, that is, not a Communist take-over, but a leftist neutralist regime remaining within NATO. It is in this direction that I see the present Portuguese system developing. If this becomes the case, this will be the greatest danger for Europe. The pressures here in Western Europe would be very serious—toward anti-NATO, anti-power, and anti-Atlantic countries tending toward Finlandization, intentionally or not. It used to be that participation in NATO was out of the question for the leftists. This may no longer be the case. Portugal could set the example for Italy in remaining in NATO and becoming anti-US and neutralist and also, among other things, able to get more economic help. For let us be honest. If the Christian Democrats had taken over in Portugal last year, economic assistance to Portugal would not be nearly as great as it is now. We are drifting toward participation of Communists in European governments which are members of NATO, and toward creating an alliance that will become unrecognizable, a group of nations that will be anti-US and focused on a European security system. I therefore consider the situation extremely dangerous. Even a fifty percent vote for the Socialists in Portugal is meaningless if they cannot effectively use their power.

Even if the Europeans’ basic analysis is right and there is still hope of parliamentary democracy in Portugal, where is it to come from? Where are the leaders? Who is Antunes? He stands somewhere between the Communists and the left wing of the Socialists, a left wing that is far to the left of your own SPD or the Italian Socialists. There is no party on the right or even in the middle in Portugal. I simply do not understand how our economic help and yours will produce moderation. I would be willing to help Portugal if we could get it out of NATO. Put it in the record that we have told you what is coming. We see a leftward movement in Europe and Portugal’s providing a legitimization of it. The problem now is to get them out of NATO. If we could have this done, we would gladly give them assistance.

Genscher: But is it not a paradox that NATO could have a right-wing regime participating in it, such as the previous Greek junta, yet we can’t have the leftist regime?

The Secretary: The situation with Portugal is not at all the same as that which involved the Greeks. Here you have a government saying that membership in NATO is a defense against an attack by the U.S. This is bound to have great consequences for the Alliance, and reducing the influence on the Communists will not serve to reduce our fears.

Hartman: It is possible that the whole situation may soon break apart if the Communists show that they are not willing to take the election results seriously.

Genscher: No. But things are not yet that far. The position will only be clarified in the next few months and during that time we will have to try to take the proper measures.

The Secretary: We have deprived ourselves in the United States of opportunities to act and there is no European support for any action, so there is not much for us to do.

Genscher: Can we agree that the really important developments will take place in the months to come? That is the question.

The Secretary: I am just not impressed by Soares. He is the classical sociological type of victim. He won’t win. He will always be a day too late or make a speech in the wrong place. Our aid won’t help Soares. You have said that the real decisions will be made in the next few months, but I ask: what sort of decisions? Existing parties will be suppressed. The Communists will win or some left-wing dictator who will follow the Communist line. This will not change things. What do we do then?

Genscher: I do not have the feeling that the tempo toward a Communist takeover is picking up.

The Secretary: I have recently been talking to the British and they have the same position as you on Portugal, but they are much harder on Spain.

Genscher: If we can live with a right wing regime like Spain, can’t we live with a left wing one in Portugal?

The Secretary: There is no comparison. Spain is not part of NATO.

Genscher: You have made the analogy between Portugal and Italy. A few months ago we were saying that Italy was developing in a leftward direction. After a few months this stopped. Could not the same thing happen in Portugal?

The Secretary: I do not think so. If a Communist regime becomes established in Portugal, this will be taken as an example of United States impotence and will speed the drift toward neutralism in Europe. This is very depressing. I do not know what to do: we should not have let Spinola be defeated last year.

Genscher: The alliance is not in such bad shape although there are problems. The German contribution is strong and there are countries, even in Scandinavia, such as Sweden, which are useful to NATO interests.

The Secretary: I have little experience with Sweden, but I can say that developments in Italy and Greece are disturbing. I can see in Greece, for example, developments similar to Portugal where a combination of Papandreou and left wing military forces may combine, because of their dissatisfaction with the right and with the United States, and come to power. Next year France will be in a parliamentary election. Looking at trends, the only country I am not worried about is the FRG.

Gehlhoff: We too consider developments in Portugal dangerous but differ with you in that we do not consider the outcome decided. It is too easy to say that by putting $50 million into Portugal, the Soviets can simply make Portugal Communist and get it out of NATO.

The Secretary: But this is not the problem. The problem is if Portugal stays in NATO. If it gets out, then we can make aid dependent on democratic evolution as we have done in Spain.

Gehlhoff: But we are starting from the assumption that if a democratic government can be established in Portugal, then we should keep it in NATO—and we still think there is a chance to get one.

Hartman: I think we will soon know.

The Secretary: I do not believe that aid is relevant to democratic evolution in Portugal under present circumstances. But we will continue to press ahead with the $25 million that we have budgeted for this year and may possibly do something next year as well.

Gehlhoff: We are not supporting a Boumedienne-style government. We want a democratic country within the NATO. The situation is dangerous but not finally decided.

The Secretary: I don’t understand how you can justify Portugal’s being in NATO and not Spain.

Gehlhoff: I cannot fully explain that, Mr. Secretary. One of the things we have decided in order to try to help the moderates is to announce financial aid but not give the aid unless the moderates’ position is strengthened.

The Secretary: We have tried the same thing. I forced an aid package for Portugal through our government when Costa Gomes was in Washington, so that he could announce something he had achieved there. I was willing to give Soares every chance but we now think things have gone too far.

Gehlhoff: I am not convinced that is the case.

The Secretary: The question is what do we do when that point is reached.

Sonnenfeldt: There is also the question of NATO. We have to be clear what latitude we can accept in the NATO context.

The Secretary: I can see Portugal staying in NATO possibly as a member of the group of 77. We simply don’t know how long the Portuguese will stay. The problem is that if the orientation of Europe is not toward its own security but is based on the belief that there is no communist danger, that the Marxists are on the right track and the U.S. on the wrong one, then there are enough elements in Europe to make this the dominant trend.

Genscher: I think we have to wait four or five months to see how the situation develops.

The Secretary: Can we agree that a Boumedienne style of government in Portugal should not remain in NATO? We don’t have to decide now but let us agree to watch the situation and, if it develops in that direction, then we agree that Portugal should not be in the Alliance. Is that agreed?

Genscher: I agree. Let us now raise the problem of Spain.

Van Well: We have some question about recent developments in the DPC in Brussels.

Sonnenfeldt: I think you are referring to our proposal to have a sentence on US-Spanish ties and their importance for NATO in the DPC communiqué.

Van Well: Your present formulation seems to us too difficult to get through the other Allies without controversy. We think that you could get a reference to the US-Spain base negotiations and the bases’ importance to security in the Mediterranean accepted, however.

The Secretary: If you can propose that sort of compromise, we will support it. I will count on your delegation’s proposing such a formulation and I will tell our delegation to support it.

1. Summary: Kissinger, Genescher, and U.S. and West German officials discussed Portugal, as well as Spain and NATO.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820125–0430. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by David Anderson in EUR/CE on June 6; cleared by Hartman; and approved in S on October 29. The meeting took place in the Schloss Gymnich. Kissinger was in Bonn from May 20 to 21; while there, he also met with Antunes to discuss the situation in Portugal. (Memorandum of conversation, May 20; ibid., Records of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 11, NODIS Memcons May 1975, Folder 1) On May 15, as a result of an exchange of messages between Kissinger and Schmidt, Van Well met with Hartman, Sonnenfeldt, and Hyland for what Sonnenfeldt characterized as a “pretty grim” discussion on Portugal. (Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, May 15; ibid., Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 5, Germany 1975)