99. Telegram 16952 From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
16952. Subj: TTBT/PNE Negotiations—Final Summary and Comments.
1. Reference State 242830, paragraph two. Paragraphs two through five are summary of status. Paragraphs six through fourteen are comments on future course.
2. Status summary follows.
3. There were sixteen TTBT/PNE plenary meetings from October 7 through November 6, and several restricted meetings. A working recess was commenced after the November 6 meeting.
4. Statements of the two sides can be resolved into the following general themes:
(A) The U.S. stated general criteria and concerns, laid down in instructions, which any PNE agreement must reflect. The Soviets were [Page 325] asked in various ways how they proposed to accommodate these criteria and concerns. U.S. approach throughout was couched in as positive and forthcoming terms as permitted by instructions.
(B) The U.S. taking note of Soviet technical assessment of yields required for most contained applications, proposed ad referendum that contained PNE applications be limited to yields less than 100 KT, subject to suitable verification procedures. Without going into detail, elements of such verification, including observers, were stated. The U.S. did not describe any ideas for verification of excavation PNEs.
(C) A basic Soviet view regarding PNEs was that there should be no limits on yields or numbers. It was stated that in the case of contained applications most needs could be met by yields less than 100 KT, although they say they see possible long-term interest in larger yields. Most excavation needs could be met by group aggregate yields less than 1,000 KT and the number of individual explosions of yields above 150 KT would not be large. No formal commitment to these statements was made.
(D) The Soviet view of verification procedures to satisfy Article III of the TTBT was described. The essential elements were dependence on national technical means, augmented by information exchanges depending on yield and circumstance with the kind and amount of information supplied to be determined by the country carrying out the explosion. Soviet views are contained in statement by Safronov (PNE message forty-four).
(E) A major emphasis of the Soviets was on a joint cooperative PNE agreement which would involve exchange of information and of scientists and other personnel on a basis of reciprocity. A separate section would specify verification procedures to satisfy Article III of TTBT as indicated in (D) above. However, exchange of personnel (“representatives”) in projects would, it was claimed, reinforce verification. Soviet outline of joint cooperative PNE proposal is contained in PNE message thirty-four. Delegation comments are contained in PNE message thirty-nine.
5. Morokhov in statements on November 5 and 6 stated that U.S. and Soviets were far apart in their respective positions, but that they looked forward to resumption of negotiations. They do not want any constraints on numbers or yields of explosions. They see no basis for considering contained and excavation applications as separate categories. They want U.S. views on cratering explosions. They were unwilling to consider specific provisions for contained PNEs only. It is only by consideration of a complete package that an agreement could be reached.
6. Comments on future course follow.
[Page 326]7. In our judgment, progress can be made toward establishing a PNE agreement.
8. In order to move ahead, it will be necessary for the U.S. to make a beginning on presentation of the elements of a verification package which would encompass contained and excavation applications.
9. The U.S. needs to develop a basis for discussing the interrelated issues linking the LTBT, excavation PNE projects, and the verification of excavation PNE projects. If it should be the U.S. view that compliance with the LTBT will, in practical effect, rule out most excavation projects and if the U.S. should be unwilling to agree to an accommodation for excavation projects, the Soviets would without any doubt strongly oppose this view initially. We are not able to offer a meaningful conjecture on what their final position might be.
10. Significant movement by the Soviets from their present verification position will depend on their assessment of a total U.S. verification package. However, the Soviet position has not been couched in absolute or rigid terms and there are areas where one can foresee the possibility of change, including the following:
(A) Soviet interest in high-yield contained PNE applications appears long range and even visionary in some aspects. It is possible that they would be willing to accept (perhaps on an interim basis) a yield limit on contained applications. If so, most probably they would start by insisting that the TTBT yield threshold apply.
(B) The possibility of a quota on excavation events above the threshold should not be ruled out.
(C) It is possible that they would be willing, in the context of a yield limit on contained PNEs, to accept a requirement for the exchange of specified information above some intermediate yield (say 75 KT).
11. There is insufficient basis at this time to make a meaningful conjecture on how the Soviets might finally come out on the observer question. They say they are willing to listen to our ideas about observer functions, but that they will not discuss this subject except in context of a joint cooperative agreement.
12. The Soviets have clearly stated that one of their primary purposes is establishment of a joint PNE cooperative agreement. Their approach to verification is surely designed in part to encourage the U.S. to consider and accept such an agreement. Although the Soviet ideas are a bare sketch, and full of defects, the U.S. should examine them carefully for any elements of cooperation, both short and long term, which could be of interest to us. Any positive position on cooperation could possibly help gain concessions on verification issues.
13. The U.S. will need to establish a basis for discussion of the relationship between a PNE agreement and the NPT. Considerations should be reduced to an effort to induce the Soviets to:
[Page 327](A) Accept the proposition that some limitations can be imposed on PNEs without significant negative consequences to the NPT if those limitations are also accepted by the U.S. and USSR and if those limitations are essential complements to verification arrangements to assure the integrity of nuclear weapon control;
(B) Accept the propositions that any PNE agreement negotiated now should acknowledge the privileged status under Article V of NPT parties without foreclosing the possibility of agreement on provision of PNE services to non-parties; and
(C) Avoid any form of PNE “advertising” language in a PNE agreement.
14. There is insufficient basis to conclude whether or not satisfactory agreement can be reached.
15. The present Soviet delegation is heavily loaded with individuals who are committed to PNEs; and eventual realization of a well-balanced agreement may depend upon engagement of the political level of the Soviet Government in negotiations.
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Summary: The Embassy transmitted a final summary of the first round of the TTBT/PNE negotiations in Moscow. In addition, the Embassy provided comments on a possible future course toward completing a PNE agreement.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740318–1110. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Telegram 242830 to Moscow, November 5, is ibid., D740316–0401. The first round of the negotiations opened on October 7 and concluded on November 6.
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