Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

80. Report Prepared by an Ad Hoc Interagency Group¹

Washington, undated.

ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIOS FOR BILATERAL U.S.-SOVIET TALKS ON ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE²

This report has been prepared at the request of the NSC Senior Review Group in order to clarify the manner in which we might approach bilateral talks with the Soviet Union on the basis of either Option 2 or Option 3 presented in the NSC Under Secretaries Committee’s report of May 10, 1974, on “Possible International Restraints on Environmental Warfare.”

The present report provides a checklist of:

—purposes to be served by the talks from the U.S. standpoint;

—basic questions common to Options 2 and 3;

—points specifically relevant to Option 2; and

—points specifically relevant to Option 3.

Purposes

The bilaterals would be conducted with five main purposes in view:

—As agreed at the summit, to explore “the most effective measures possible to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes;”

—also, as agreed at the summit, to discuss “what steps might be taken” to bring about such measures;

—to clarify the differences—both as to substance and procedure—between the agreed joint statement at the summit and the Soviet Union’s subsequent General Assembly initiative;

—to develop a mutually acceptable approach for proceeding with respect to the foregoing matters, including the handling of this question in the General Assembly; and

—to probe—insofar as practical—Soviet capabilities and intentions respecting military uses of this technology and Soviet views concerning the control of such uses.³

Basic Questions

The questions below could be explored with the Soviet Union regardless of a specific decision between Option 2 or Option 3.

1. Is there a satisfactory conceptual approach for defining the subject matter of “environmental warfare” and for differentiating measures concerned with this matter from other arms control problems (such as the use of herbicides), from the environmental effects of weapons, and from other “environmental” problems?

The U.S. side could note that all military activities have ancillary environmental effects and that in some cases the environmental impact is direct and intentional. The U.S. side could point out that there is a distinction between the foregoing cases and the concept of “environmental warfare” in that the latter would not only affect various environments but also represent an effort to release or manipulate natural environmental processes or forces for the purposes of destruction or disruption. It could be noted that for the most part specific techniques have not been demonstrated; consequently, constraining measures would have to deal with currently unknown techniques which might emerge in time.

2. What environmental fields, in addition to climate modification, would comprise the focus of measures to overcome the dangers of military uses?

The U.S. side could note the possibility of considering measures concerned with techniques (in many respects largely hypothetical today) for modifying the weather, the oceans, and the physical processes of the earth’s interior—in addition to measures concerned with climate modification techniques which might emerge in the future.⁴

3. Is there agreement that measures should be limited to the “dangers” of military uses—that is, to destructive or “weapons” uses of environmental modification techniques?

The U.S. side would refrain from including within the scope of possible measures the use of weather modification techniques solely to protect forces from natural hazards (for example, moderating storms bearing down on friendly forces, lifting fogs from airfields in friendly territory) or the use of fog modification techniques for search and rescue missions (including missions in enemy territory). In this regard, the U.S. side could note that measures should be concerned with destructive uses of modification techniques as weapons of war.

The U.S. side would focus the talks on the use of modification techniques, not on scientific research and development. If questions should arise concerning the latter, the U.S. side could point out the intrinsically dual (civil or military) applicability of research on environmental modification and the impracticability of verifying a prohibition of military research and development.

4. What would be the prospect of verifying measures constraining military uses of environmental modification techniques?

The U.S. side could indicate the desirability of mutual understanding of verification possibilities and difficulties. (As noted below, the approach taken to exploring specific aspects of verification might vary as between Option 2 and Option 3.)

5. What further specific steps should be taken bilaterally and vis-à-vis other countries?

The U.S. side could stress the desirability of a thorough bilateral exploration of the matter before moving to multilateral discussions.⁵

6. What is the relationship between the Soviet General Assembly initiative and the agreed Joint Statement? What is the significance of the reference in Gromyko’s letter to “military and other” purposes? How should the matter be approached in the current General Assembly?

The U.S. side would not go beyond the general scope of the agreed Joint Statement. Regarding civil applications of modification techniques having cross-border effects, the U.S. side would bear in mind that while international guidelines will probably be needed at some juncture, the agreed Joint Statement deals only with military uses.⁶

Scenario for Option 2

If a decision were made to proceed in a manner consistent with Option 2, then in addition to exploring the foregoing questions and probing Soviet views, the U.S. side would focus in particular on the following aspects of the agreed Joint Statement:

—the preambular reference to the possibility that military uses of environmental modification techniques “could have widespread, long lasting, and severe effects harmful to human welfare,” and

—the emphasis the statement places on “effective” measures.

From the outset, the U.S. side would stress the desirability of precluding military uses of environmental modification techniques which—although now largely hypothetical—might have profound adverse effects on the interelationship of man and nature and relations among states.

The U.S. side could identify the following postulated military uses of modification techniques as those which, if specific techniques were developed, would have widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects:⁷

—any climate modification;

—any significant ocean modification (such as efforts to alter ocean currents);

—efforts to trigger earthquakes or generate tsunamis;

—intentionally causing damage by intensification or steering of hurricanes or typhoons or by deliberate generation of tornadic type storms;

—continuous and extended precipitation modification (for example, causing extensive flooding or drought).

With respect to the foregoing, the U.S. side would point out that preparations—or operations—to carry out such activities on any significant scale might prove to be detectable and therefore verifiable.

In the likely event that the Soviets raise the question of rain making for such purposes as aiding interdiction, the U.S. side could point out that the effects of such activities are transient and that under certain conditions they could be conducted, for example, by a single or a few aircraft which could well go undetected. This would, therefore, present verification problems.

The U.S. side would stress the verification issue and the importance of remaining within the formula employed in the agreed Joint Statement (activities having “widespread, long-lasting, and severe effects”) in order to achieve effective measures.

Under this scenario, it would be especially important to ensure that any GA resolution would be phrased in a manner consistent with the general scope of the agreed Joint Statement.

Scenario for Option 3⁸

If a decision were made to proceed in a manner consistent with Option 3,⁹ the U.S. side would cover the basic questions identified above and would also review those points considered in the scenario for Option 2 which identify activities having “widespread, long-lasting, and severe effects.”¹⁰

However, the U.S. side would not be limited to focussing exclusively on such activities but could also explore measures affecting tactical uses of weather modification as a weapon of war. Under this option, when the Soviets raise the question of rain making, the U.S. could deal with this aspect in the manner best calculated to advance overall U.S. objectives in the talks, possibly by holding out on this issue until other aspects had been satisfactorily resolved.

Since inclusion of rain making within the scope of any agreed measures would affect U.S. capabilities having possible application in wartime, the U.S. side should, under this scenario, probe to determine whether and what existing Soviet capabilities would be similarly constrained.¹¹

1. Summary: This report on potential U.S.-Soviet talks regarding restraints on environmental warfare was prepared at the request of the Senior Review Group following its August 28 meeting.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Files of NSC Logged Documents, IF/NS File for the President, Box 1, 7402102, International Restraints on Environmental Warfare (NSDM 277). Secret. Sent to Scowcroft under a September 9 memorandum from Springsteen. The minutes of the August 28 Senior Review Group meeting are Document 75. The NSC Under Secretaries Committee report is summarized in Document 74.

2. This report was prepared by an ad hoc interagency group which included representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CIA, ACDA, and the NSC staff. [Footnote is in the original.]
3. ACDA questions whether much should be made of this purpose and believes that while it would of course be helpful to learn Soviet views concerning genuine military applications and their control, we are unlikely to gain much useful information in these talks. [Footnote is in the original.]
4. ACDA believes that we should not become involved in exploring potential or hypothetical military uses of environmental modification and that elaboration of such uses in detailed negotiations about them would likely be counterproductive from the point of view of arms control since it could stimulate military interest where there is none today and stir up concern among third parties. [Footnote is in the original.]
5. ACDA believes that a broad, general multilateral agreement is of greater interest to us than a detailed bilateral one and, in particular, that a multilateral agreement prohibiting military uses, if incorporated in a general agreement regarding peaceful uses, could look less contrived than a bilateral agreement on hypothetical or potential military uses. [Footnote is in the original.]
6. ACDA believes that we should not rule out covering civil uses in discussions with the Soviets. ACDA notes that the USSR’s GA initiative seems to contemplate coverage of civil uses, and, in ACDA’s view, there would be merit in subsuming a prohibition against military uses under a more general agreement or peaceful cooperation. ACDA believes that in any case, an eventual GA resolution may not necessarily be limited to questions related to military uses of environmental modification techniques. [Footnote is in the original.]
7. ACDA believes that in view of the general lack of knowledge about the military potential of environmental modification applications, prolonged and detailed discussion of such applications would be unproductive and could leave the impression that the techniques have great military use. Moreover, ACDA believes that if it became known that the U.S. and USSR were addressing these matters in depth, others could interpret this as a diversion from more important arms control problems. [Footnote is in the original.]
8. The JCS representative notes that the Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to oppose Option 3 because they believe it would essentially deny the U.S. the use of environmental modification techniques for uses other than the protection of friendly forces against natural hazards without knowing what the Soviet side is giving up. They believe that this approach would limit or foreclose any possibly significant future military options in the event of a technological breakthrough, and would thus entail a loss of flexibility. [Footnote is in the original.]
9. ACDA continues to favor an initiative along the lines of Option 3 (but without detailed elaboration of various actual and hypothetical techniques), possibly as part of a broader effort toward international cooperation on peaceful uses. [Footnote is in the original.]
10. ACDA believes that in view of the general lack of knowledge about the military potential of environmental modification applications, prolonged and detailed discussion of such applications would be unproductive and could leave the impression that the techniques have great military use. Moreover, ACDA believes that if it became known that the U.S. and USSR were addressing these matters in depth, others could interpret this as a diversion from more important arms control problems. [Footnote is in the original.]
11. ACDA questions whether much should be made of this purpose and believes that while it would of course be helpful to learn Soviet views concerning genuine military applications and their controls, we are unlikely to gain much useful information in these talks. [Footnote is in the original.]