66. Telegram 10984 From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
10984. Subject: The Summit in Retrospect.
1. Summary. The Soviet leadership’s performance during the summit left some lingering questions. Why was Andropov absent? Why was there more emphasis on collectivity, and a de-emphasis of personal ties? Does Brezhnev have health problems? On the whole, however, their performance demonstrated continued stability and confirmed their concerted policy of pursuing better relations with the U.S.
2. Post-summit Soviet propaganda has sought to put the best face on the results. In part this is a genuine assessment, reflecting the Soviet tendency to focus on atmospherics. Nevertheless, there are signs of second thoughts about the failure to achieve progress on arms limitations. We do not know whether before the summit Brezhnev knocked heads together in his own bureaucracy in an unsuccessful attempt to forge a more forthcoming position on SALT issues; certainly there were no sore heads on display during the summit. The breadth of knowledge of test ban issues at the top on the Soviet side during the summit was [Page 208] not impressive; if the Soviet leaders are equally vague on SALT issues, they may be dangerously dependent on their experts, who seem to be predominantly military. We should hope that the new studies now under way around Moscow will prove edifying for the leaders and helpful to the SALT talks. End summary.
3. Despite the lack of agreement on strategic offensive arms at the summit, Soviet propaganda has sought to demonstrate progress on arms control issues. Post-summit commentary has put arms control achievements foremost among the week’s accomplishments. And USA Institute Director Arbatov has told visiting Americans that new studies are underway in several offices in Moscow, including his own, in an effort to draw up appropriate new instructions from Geneva.
4. The curious performance of the top three leaders on the test ban issue during the summit raises some questions. Their first run at the comprehensive test ban proposal, with long contributions from each, was an understandable gambit from their point of view. Repeating the whole process again, after the U.S. response, seemed strange. Even stranger was their vagueness about what had been negotiated on underground testing; on this, even Gromyko did not seem well informed. Perhaps they showed a better grasp of issues involved in strategic weapons discussions, but there is a lingering suspicion that they may have difficulty grasping the technicalities and they are therefore at the mercy of their predominantely military experts. In this context, educative attempts such as Arbatov’s Izvestiya article (Moscow septel) are particularly noteworthy. Let us hope that franker and more persuasive papers are being officially circulated and comprehended.
5. Soviet journalists, expanding on Brezhnev’s Spaso toast remark that more could have been achieved, have applied it specifically to the area of strategic arms and suggested that one reason is the President’s domestic situation, which made it necessary for him to protect his right flank. Possibly the Soviets believe this; Arbatov said that Brezhnev had been warned in advance by Soviet Americanologists that Nixon was locked into a conservative position on SALT. In any case, the implication that the Soviets had been ready to move on SALT serves the dual purpose of making them look reasonable on arms control and turning upside down the argument that they were prepared to take advantage of the President’s problems at home.
6. While taking care to do nothing to undercut President Nixon, the Soviets have used the summit to emphasize that bilateral relations go beyond the personal ties between the two leaders. Unlike 1973 (admittedly a different situation since Brezhnev visited the U.S. without Podgorny and Kosygin), recent commentaries have not particularly emphasized Brezhnev’s personal role in détente. There is no resonance in the Soviet press to the President’s references in his toasts to his [Page 209] personal relationship with Brezhnev, and TASS—possibly on purpose—even omitted one of those references from its Russian translation. In any case, Soviet propagandists have consistently cited support for the summit by Democratic luminaries such as Kennedy and Harriman to emphasize that Moscow’s view of détente is not limited to one party or one President.
7. In addition to the press play, there was some indication at the summit itself of a tendency to slip Brezhnev’s personal dominance of foreign policy back a notch or two. Perhaps this impression was deliberately cultivated in order to play down the personal aspect of summitry. In any case, these points are worth noting:
A. The Soviet side took a more collegial approach to plenaries. Brezhnev’s statements frequently were followed by contributions by Kosygin and Podgorny, which did not necessarily add anything but appeared to be for the record. Often President Nixon’s turn came after all three had spoken. This contrasts with 1972, when Brezhnev made nearly all the programmatic statements (except on trade), to which President Nixon then responded; on that occasion, Podgorny and Kosygin had to push in their remarks, if any, toward the end of the sessions.
B. Brezhnev did not appear as well briefed, or at least as able to make easy application of his briefings, as in 1973. Occasionally, especially in the afternoons, he showed symptoms—flushed face, overbright eyes—which might have, perhaps mistakenly, been taken for the results of over-imbibing. The airport return from the Black Sea on July 1 was such an occasion; he also stumbled on the stairway. But, nevertheless, he went immediately into an airport meeting with the Secretary and Gromyko and as usual dominated it from the Soviet side. On this and other occasions, he seemed quite fatigued.
C. The atmosphere of easy camaraderie between Brezhnev and his colleagues continued unchanged, and we saw no evidence of tension among them.
8. Some comments are also in order regarding other members of the Politburo.
A. Kosygin seemed vigorous and in good health. His contributions in negotiations tended to be relatively substantive and well-informed, while not breaking any new ground. He usually spoke after Brezhnev but before Podgorny, contrary to formal rank ordering. On social occasions he seemed relaxed and—for him—relatively convivial. He was the one who took charge in arranging for TTB negotiations to follow up on summit discussions.
B. Podgorny’s interventions were less frequent, briefer and less substantive. Appearances did not belie his reputedly good personal relationship with Brezhnev, but there was no evidence of Brezhnev leaning heavily on Podgorny for political support.
[Page 210]C. Gromyko wears his Politburo hat as if it had always been there, but continues to carry the burden of making detailed presentations; Brezhnev often turned the floor over to him for that purpose. His ranking in the list of suggested invitees for the Spaso dinner given to the Embassy by the MFA Protocol Division was an anomaly: after the top three, the order was Andropov, Gromyko and Grechko, followed by selected other Politburo members in alphabetical order. Thus Gromyko was put out of alphabetical order ahead of Grechko. This might have been justified on the basis of his participation in the talks, but in that case he should have gone ahead of Andropov as well. (As it turned out, Andropov declined, which made it possible to seat Gromyko at the head table.) Gromyko is said by Soviets to have an excellent personal relationship with Brezhnev.
D. Grechko, who with Podgorny and Shcherbitsky is reputed to be among the group of Brezhnev’s Ukrainian buddies, was the object of special attention from Brezhnev, including an occasional friendly arm around his shoulder and affectionate banter. On the whole, and contrary to his public reputation, Grechko comes through as a rather soft-spoken and even shy person. He displayed some knowledge of English.
E. Kulakov was much in evidence at social functions, which may support the belief that he is closely allied with Brezhnev politically. He makes a good appearance and moved easily, but did not seem particularly at ease in talking socially with Americans. He steered clear of substantive discussions.
F. Andropov was a last minute dropout—“called away on business”—from the Kremlin dinner, according to the Soviet protocol officer who had to find a nonentity (an interpreter) to fill Andropov’s seat. His attendance along with Suslov and others at a competing function—a Lithuanian cultural evening—instead of the Spaso dinner could have some political significance, but we are inclined to think that assignments for the evening would have been collectively decided.
G. Suslov attended the Kremlin dinner and the final reception but was noticeably aloof.
H. Shelepin attended both dinners and was noticeably convivial and congenial. On both occasions he plugged vigorously for relaxation of the U.S. policy of refusing to grant visas to Soviet trade unionists. He does not give the appearance of being a political heavyweight, but considering the decline in his fortunes compared to several years ago he showed a lot of bounce.
9. Soviet preoccupation with China, apparent in the sudden despatch of border negotiator Ilichev to Peking on the eve of the summit, also emerged in social conversation with Politburo members.
[Page 211]A. Talking with the DCM, Podgorny predicted that the results of the summit would be widely acclaimed. When Shelepin interjected “except by China,” Podgorny went off on a five minute tirade about China along familiar lines, accusing Peking of opposing improved U.S.-Soviet relations and engendering anti-Soviet feelings in the rest of the world, especially in Western Europe. But he said that in the final analysis, the Chinese will fail in this effort.
B. Grechko also alluded to China at the dinner table, noting that Soviet defense efforts must take account not only of the U.S. but also a third country which has a 7000-kilometer border with the USSR. Nobody could predict what that country might do; while there is no direct threat at present, Grechko thought there could be an attack within five years. He noted that by 1980 that country would have population of one billion.
10. Propaganda play of CSCE themes during and after the meetings included some expected puffery. A Pravda commentary by Uri Zhukov, for example, stretched the communiqué language to make it appear the U.S. had bought the Soviet position on a third-stage summit. Apart from this minor mischief-making, Zhukov virtually admitted that Soviet-Western differences over Basket Three make an autumn conclusion the best that can be hoped for.
11. On the Middle East, the Soviet press has been somewhat defensive since the summit. While the July 6 Politburo appraisal of the summit singled out the ME (along with CSCE) as an international issue of prime importance, the Soviets have not found the communiqué language particularly useful for playback. They emphasized that they have not softened their insistence on a full Israeli withdrawal nor their support for the rights of the Palestinians. We expect that they will continue to cast themselves as patrons of the Arab cause. They will probably focus more directly on the Palestinian problem as a useful lever; the Arafat visit may be important in this regard.
12. In sum, the third summit does not appear to have marked any major new departures in Soviet thinking about either bilateral or international issues, but may have laid the groundwork for further progress on some important questions.
13. Suggest Department disseminate this message to USNATO, EE posts, major European capitals, Peking and Hong Kong.
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Summary: The Embassy summarized and analyzed the Soviet leaders’ behavior during the recently concluded Moscow summit.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740189–0753. Confidential; Exdis. In telegram 161363 to multiple European posts, July 25, the Department repeated the text of telegram 10984. (Ibid., D740201–0466)
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