62. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
- Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the USA
- Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief of USA Division
- Oleg Sokolov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Mr. Zaitsev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (interpreter)
- Oleg Krokhalev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (interpreter)
- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR
- Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor to the Department of State
- Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
- William G. Hyland, Director, State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
- Harold H. Saunders, NSC Senior Staff
- Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
SUBJECTS
- Test Ban; Environmental Warfare; Communiqué
Test Ban
Gromyko: If there are no objections, let us go underground.
Kissinger: Fine. How is your toothache?
[Page 183]Gromyko: Thank you very much. I needed an hour and a half to put aside for that. But with all these documents to sign, I can’t. When we have finished, my war with the doctor will stop.
Let’s turn to a starting date. We thought first we would start on the 1st of January [1976].
Kissinger: Impossible.
Gromyko: Impossible.
Kissinger: How about May 27, my birthday?
Gromyko: Let’s try March 1 as a compromise.
Kissinger: Let us say April 15.
Gromyko: That is a bad month.
Dobrynin: It is not a good time.
Kissinger: At the beginning of March you will find underground water is so deep that you can’t do it. I was trying to help Morokhov.
No, April 15 is the realistic figure we gave you.
Gromyko: I will give you one figure, and please don’t try to persuade me. March 31. Try the peanuts there and agree.
Kissinger: Now that you are trying to bribe me.
Gromyko: 31st of March.
Korniyenko: Without the peanuts.
Kissinger: April 15 with peanuts.
Gromyko: Let’s take this time our compromise solution.
Kissinger: All right.
Gromyko: The 31st of March. Let’s go to the third article. [Draft text is at Tab A.]
You have any reservations?
Kissinger: No.
Gromyko: Then we accept. “Underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes shall be governed by an agreement . . .”
Kissinger: I want the record to be absolutely clear on this, on what position we will take with our Congress. We will strongly defend this treaty but we will also point out that we cannot deposit ratification until this is settled.
Gromyko: Each side will be responsible for its own actions. This is the responsibility of the Administration, how it defends. All right. Article Five. In that form as we already agreed, excluding the words “including consideration of reducing the levels,” that we accept.
Kissinger: Within the context of what we discussed yesterday.
Gromyko: Yes.
Kissinger: All right.
[Page 184]Gromyko: Now 3rd became 2nd. Is it recorded? The former 3rd becomes the 2nd paragraph.
Kissinger: The sixth article becomes paragraph three of the fifth article.
Gromyko: We are speaking about Article Five.
Kissinger: These texts have already been compared. It is accepted.
Gromyko: Tell me. Have you become [more] realistic than yesterday about joining of other countries to the agreement?
Kissinger: No.
Gromyko: It is a pity.
Kissinger: I am a slow student. I don’t think you want to exchange geological data with the Chinese. So we are doing it out of friendship.
Gromyko: The Chinese scared you.
Kissinger: Scared me? They have Senator Jackson there; they are happy. I wish they would keep him.
Gromyko: How many millions did they bring to meet him?
Kissinger: I don’t think they did.
Dobrynin: It was very quiet.
Gromyko: Thus, you are too sensitive as far as this good article is concerned.
Kissinger: We will put it in some other treaty. We will save it. How about the artificial heart machine?
Gromyko: We already signed it.
All right. We are sorry, and I say that frankly. Just because you stress too much importance to that, to turn it into a barrier.
So the Sixth Article goes away.
Kissinger: The third paragraph of the Sixth Article becomes the third paragraph of the fifth.
Gromyko: Right.
Kissinger: When do we sign it?
Gromyko: Tomorrow. It seems you have changed your view. Our thought would be today.
Kissinger: It is not a political decision. Our people thought it better for the press . . . We very rarely think about public relations in this Administration.
Gromyko: Now we are on the protocol. [Tab B]
Kissinger: Right.
Gromyko: We went a long way as far as concessions to the Americans on this.
Kissinger: We came a long way too. We gave up two paragraphs. But we need that paragraph (d).
[Page 185]Gromyko: Already, I turned.
Kissinger: You accept it?
Gromyko: I accept it. Right. Will the American side appreciate this gesture?
Kissinger: Yes. Quite seriously, we recognize you’ve made a big concession.
Gromyko: We think you will be more understanding when we discuss the natural factors. Environmental factors.
Kissinger: I have already made a proposal. Your Ambassador rejected your proposal of yesterday.
Dobrynin: I said it was too weak.
Kissinger: Just to finish on the protocol: There are a number of brackets that follow.
Gromyko: Yes.
Kissinger: We don’t have to review them all.
Gromyko: Tomorrow is the signing.
Kissinger: What time is it?
Gromyko: There is a reception at 1:00 p.m. and we shall arrange it so we sign it and the reception comes immediately afterward.
Kissinger: Good. We sign the treaty, the ABM agreement—we see where we are on environment—and the communiqué.
Gromyko: Right.
Kissinger: And the comprehensive SALT Agreement.
Korniyenko: And the two Geneva Protocols.
Kissinger: The SCC documents.
Gromyko: Yes.
Kissinger: We will announce that Kissinger and Gromyko will sign two secret agreements. With loopholes.
Gromyko: How many? Six?
Korniyenko: Six.
Gromyko: With environment, it will be six.
Kissinger: Including SALT?
Gromyko: You are in an extra good mood today. All right.
Environmental Warfare
Now, let’s pass to the subject of environment.
Kissinger: I made the mistake of discussing with your Ambassador who, as always, was not correctly briefed.
Yesterday when we discussed the question of dealing with the dangers of use, there was some dispute about it. We will accept any [Page 186] reasonable interpretation. So we could accept that language that yesterday I withdrew. We will reserve our position for the conference. “Both sides,”—this formula—“advocate the broadest possible measures to deal with the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes.”
[He hands the text of Tab C to Gromyko. They translate to themselves and discuss in Russian.]
Gromyko: The Russian text—“to deal with.” You are better experts in English, and we vice versa. In Russian we will say “with purpose of elimination.”
Dobrynin: Or “doing away with.”
Gromyko: This is the formulation. Does it give this, or does it give permission? Removal or permission.
Dobrynin: “Overcome the dangers.”
Sonnenfeldt: “Overcome the dangers.”
Kissinger: Then we will say the same thing.
Gromyko: It seems to us, though not very strong, “overcome” is a little bit more definite than “deal with.”
Kissinger: I agree, but with the Russians equivalent.
Gromyko: “Ustranyenie”
Stoessel: That means to eliminate. “Udalyenie.”
Dobrynin: “Ustranyenie” means removing the dangers.
Gromyko: We don’t want to mislead you; neither do we want to mislead ourselves. If it gives the impression of permission, it is not our intention.
Kissinger: If someone is deceived, it is better it be you than we.
Let’s be realistic. We understand your position; your position will be to eliminate. We can’t yet state this in a document. Our position is we do not exclude it; you are free to discuss it, but we want a more flexible phrase. “Overcome the dangers” is all right. But we do not want to be told at the first meeting of the Conference that we have already agreed to elimination of it.
This will be well received in America. Therefore unless we are forced into it, if you don’t give any explanation, we won’t give any explanation.
We may have to give an internal explanation to our government, but not publicly. I don’t think it will come up at a press conference, but if it does, I will say the meaning of “overcome” will be determined by negotiation.
Gromyko: I told you we won’t give any explanation. We will use the word “ustranyenie.” To make it stronger we would use the word “liquidate.”
[Page 187]Kissinger: Is there a weaker word?
Stoessel: “Preodolyenie.”
Dobrynin: That makes no sense.
Gromyko: We cannot just play games in Russian. We will take the most flexible expression which shows a tendency and direction. Our intention is liquidation of the danger.
Kissinger: What you desire we understand. But this is a joint document. We understand what position you will take in the negotiation.
Dobrynin: That is why we agree to a weaker word.
Gromyko: We won’t give any official interpretation. But our intention is to act for peaceful purposes.
Kissinger: I don’t know what the Russian will say. But the record could not be clearer. You are free to give your interpretation.
Dobrynin: The Foreign Minister said he won’t give any interpretation.
Kissinger: All right. We accept.
Gromyko: I suggest the following: “Joint Statement,” while we just delete the subtitle which follows.
Kissinger: I agree.
Gromyko: I will just read it through in Russian. [He reads it through aloud quickly in Russian.]
Kissinger: “Have agreed on the following: To advocate . . .”
Dobrynin: Infinitive.
Gromyko: “The United States of America and the USSR . . . to advocate.” It doesn’t make sense.
Hyland: “Have agreed on the following:”
Kissinger: You can say what you want in Russian.
Korniyenko: “Effective” instead of “broadest.”
Gromyko: Let us say “effective.”
Kissinger: “Most effective measures possible”? That is fine.
Gromyko: “To advocate the most effective possible measures,” I repeat “most effective possible measures to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes.”
Kissinger: I suggest one modification. “Most effective measures possible.” It reads better.
Dobrynin: We are for elegance.
Gromyko: All right. How about, instead of “experts” in the next paragraph, putting “representatives.”
Kissinger: All right. I shouldn’t agree so easily.
Gromyko: It is not too late to withdraw! Maybe scientists, diplomats.
[Page 188]Kissinger: It is more inclusive.
Dobrynin: Maybe one of his assistants will go.
Kissinger: I want to send my assistants to be observers of the nuclear tests.
The only thing is—it is purely stylistic—instead of saying “they decided,” “they agreed,” we will just say “to advocate,” “to hold,” and “to discuss.”
Gromyko: All right.
Kissinger: All right.
Gromyko: Mr. Secretary, our opinion—I don’t know what is your opinion—is maybe it is worthwhile to sign this document at the highest level.
Kissinger: I agree. That means all the documents tomorrow will be signed at the highest level, except the SCC.
Gromyko: Yes.
Kissinger: And SALT.
Gromyko: Maybe the angels will be invited too.
Kissinger: All right.
Gromyko: Now the technical verification.
Kissinger: Our Ambassador will consult with Korniyenko.
Gromyko: All right.
Kissinger: On the Consultative Commission, are the technical papers all done?
Dobrynin: All purified in Geneva.
[Omitted here is discussion related to the communiqué.]
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Summary: Kissinger and Gromyko discussed the remaining issues related to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, environmental warfare, and the Moscow Summit communiqué.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Memcons, Moscow Summit, June 27–July 3, 1974. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in St. Catherine’s Hall at the Grand Kremlin Palace. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. Tabs A–D are attached but not published. Printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, as Document 195.
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