37. Editorial Note
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Moscow March 24–28, 1974, where he met with Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoliy Dobrynin, and other Soviet officials in preparation for President Richard M. Nixon’s trip to the Soviet Union scheduled for July. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Walter Stoessel, Department of State Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Arthur Hartman, Department of State Legal Advisor Carlyle Maw, Assistant Secretary of State-designate for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Alfred Atherton, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research William Hyland, and National Security Council Staff members Jan Lodal and Peter Rodman also took part in these conversations. The text of Kissinger’s March 24 arrival statement, the exchange of toasts between Kissinger and Gromyko during luncheons held on March 25 and March 27, and statements concerning the conversations Kissinger had with Brezhnev, Gromyko, and Dobrynin are in the Department of State Bulletin, April 22, 1974, pages 413–417. The memoranda of conversation are printed in Foreign [Page 87] Relations, 1969–1976, volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, as Documents 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, and 170.
On March 28, at the conclusion of Kissinger’s visit, the United States and the Soviet Union released a joint communiqué. The communiqué stated that the officials had discussed a “broad range of questions of mutual interest” in advance of Nixon’s visit. In addition:
“The sides noted with satisfaction that the course taken by the two countries toward a relaxation of tension and a major improvement of relations between them continues to be implemented successfully and brings tangible results. The exceptional importance of the fundamental decisions adopted at the two previous Soviet-American summit meetings, first of all the basic principles of relations between the USSR and the United States, the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war, and the agreements on the limitation of strategic arms, has been convincingly demonstrated.
“The sides are determined to pursue, on the basis of strict observance of the obligations they have assumed, the established policy aimed at making the process of improving Soviet-American relations irreversible.
“In the course of the discussions, considerable attention was given to the problem of the future limitation of strategic arms. The sides agree that, despite the complexity of this problem, there are possibilities for reaching mutually acceptable solutions. They are determined to continue to make energetic efforts to find such solutions. Certain other questions relative to the area of arms limitation and disarmament were also considered.” (Department of State Bulletin, April 22, 1974, pages 417–418)
In telegram 1748 to the delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in Geneva, March 30, the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization reported that Sonnenfeldt and Hartman had briefed attendees of the North Atlantic Council’s March 29 session on the substance of Kissinger’s meetings. The Mission reported:
“10. The Soviets raised a number of other disarmament/arms control matters. They were interested particularly in the following: CW ban on production and use—U.S. side pointed out the difficulties with verification, particularly of production. Prospects for verifying CW use may be somewhat better. U.S. sees difficulties moving on this subject.
“11. Comprehensive Test Ban—U.S. again pointed out verification problems with comprehensive test ban. Soviets had idea of making agreement effective sometime ahead. Sonnenfeldt commented that there might be political reasons for the Soviet interest in a comprehensive test ban. The Soviets probably thought there were some who could not subscribe to such a ban. U.S. side said we could not engage in [Page 88] efforts to pressure others who were testing.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])