Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

33. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Iklé) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, March 12, 1974.

SUBJECT

• Your Moscow Trip: Peaceful Nuclear Explosives and a Nuclear Test Ban

During your visit to Moscow, the Soviets may raise the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB). If so, I recommend that you raise the closely interrelated issue of Peaceful Nuclear Explosives (PNEs), and propose informal talks to sort out the implications for nuclear proliferation. These informal talks should be on a “private” political level and low key (e.g., in Washington).

A continued PNE program would almost certainly be incompatible with a comprehensive test ban, and perhaps even with a low threshold ban. As you know, the new NSSM due May 1st will serve to update our position on alternative test bans. This NSSM will probably conclude that low yield tests cannot be verified and that a high threshold ban which we could verify with national means would have little significance.

In 1969, 1970 and 1971, our technical experts held several meetings with Soviet experts on PNEs. It is my impression that a technical view prevailed on both sides in these talks, mutually stimulating interest in PNEs. Soviet PNE advocates have even been asking us for some time to reinterpret the Limited Test Ban so as to permit nuclear excavation projects that would result in some radioactive venting. An Under Secretaries Committee Study on this subject is underway. We are unlikely to agree to such a reinterpretation.

However, we don’t know the importance attached by the Soviet leadership—as distinct from their technical advocates—to their PNE program. Some time ago Vorontsov suggested to us we should hold political talks to control the technocratic drives.

The time is ripe for us and the Russians to figure out how we might protect our common interest in limiting proliferation from the possible spread of nuclear explosives under the guise of PNEs. Next September an IAEA technical panel will meet on PNEs. Should the Soviet participants continue to stimulate international interest in PNEs, many countries will demand technical assistance from the USSR and U.S. in the 1975 NPT Review Conference.

The Soviets ought to recognize that (1) as long as PNEs are not economically viable, we should not stimulate third country demand for them; but (2) if and when they become viable, we will need strong international institutional arrangements to keep these de facto nuclear bombs under control. The current, easy U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the IAEA and in our preparations for the NPT Review Conference holds promise for a U.S.-Soviet understanding on the policy of both sides toward PNEs.

You should note that the above reflects ACDA views only.

Fred C. Iklé

1. Summary: Iklé, noting that the Soviets might raise the issue of a nuclear test ban during Kissinger’s upcoming trip to Moscow, recommended that Kissinger raise the “closely interrelated” issue of peaceful nuclear explosions. Iklé also recommended that Kissinger propose informal talks on a “‛private’ political level” to take place in Washington at a later date.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Program Analysis Staff Files, Convenience Files, Box 60, Iklé memo to HAK re: HAK’s Moscow Trip, 1974. Secret.