Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

216. Position Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• Proposed Chemical Weapons (CW) Arms Limitation (U)

(C) The principal obstacle to achieving an acceptable CW arms limitation is the inability to satisfactorily verify compliance with a prohibition whether it includes production, stockpiling or deployment, or any combination thereof. Regardless of the nature and scope of the prohibition, current verification techniques are limited in effectiveness and there is no method of detecting clandestine CW activities. Further, the dual civilian-military nature of chemical production is such that even if all production would be monitored, there would be no way to prevent technological developments which could be applied to CW in future conflicts. This means that any CW agreement will hold a degree of risk. The task then in drafting any agreement is to limit this risk as much as possible.

(C) The Biological Warfare Convention (BWC) is a good example of an agreement which incorporates a high degree of “risk” and, therefore, represents a model of what a CW agreement should not allow. The circumstances surrounding the ratification of the BWC were entirely different than those affecting CW,² but nevertheless our experiences regarding Soviet compliance with the provisions of this Convention must prompt caution in CW negotiations. It is clear that the verification provisions of any meaningful agreement must be carefully worked out and worded and clearly understood by all. Available intelligence reveals that even though the Soviets may be meeting the literal requirements of the BWC, they are probably exploiting fully the loopholes that exist and are violating the spirit of the agreement. This may in time require serious consideration of U.S. counteraction if we are to protect our forces against Soviet BW capabilities. In any case, an eventual CW agreement must insure that there are no compliance loopholes.

(C) In the political arena, any attempt to negotiate a prohibition which did not call ultimately for a comprehensive prohibition would be unacceptable and probably would result in a successful negotiation by other countries of an agreement which would be undesirable from our standpoint. Thus, any acceptable agreement text would require a U.S. (and USSR) commitment to ban CW totally at some point in time.

(C) Given the above, in order to minimize the risk, we should present a gradual phased approach which would proceed over several years. This would allow for the possible development of more effective verification techniques while, at the same time, providing an opportunity to build confidence that the major parties intend to comply with the treaty provisions. Two essential elements of any CW agreement, regardless of how it was phased, would be (1) a provision for withdrawal in the event a significant CW threat developed from lack of progress or compliance, and (2) procedures to allow the mandatory onsite inspection of suspected violations on a challenge basis.

(C) An outline of the essential elements of a CW arms limitation which could be acceptable to the DOD is provided below. Details will require an interagency study and agreement.

—Phasing. The agreement would encompass a gradual phased approach to the destruction of stocks and production facilities over a period of approximately 10 years (the specifics would depend on several factors, including the capability to demilitarize stocks taking environmental considerations into account). At the end of the agreed period, all parties would have zero CW stocks and no useful CW production facilities.

—Coverage. An agreement should cover, as a minimum, all lethal CW agents initially. It could eventually cover CW incapacitants, as well. DOD does not consider riot control agents and herbicides as CW agents and these would not be covered.

—Scope of Prohibition.

—Destruction of stocks. Stocks would be destroyed over a period of eight years, preferably in equal increments annually. All CW stocks would be declared at the time of ratification and the location and composition of stockpiles identified and verified.

—Production. All production would be prohibited unless a party withdrew from the agreement. Production facilities would be declared and placed in a stand-by status at time of ratification. Modernization and maintenance of facilities would be allowed subject to inspection. Facilities would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes during the ninth and tenth years of the treaty.

—Research and Development. There would be no constraints on R&D.

—Protective Equipment. There would be no constraints on protective equipment or training.

—Transfer. The transfer of offensive CW stocks, facilities, and technology to another country would be prohibited upon ratification.

—Verification.

—Destruction. The destruction of declared stockpiles and facilities would be accomplished under international auspices and the agreement should provide for such an organization. Confirmation of declared stockpiles would also be accomplished under international auspices.

—On-site Inspection. The agreement would include a provision for mandatory on-site inspection of suspected violations on a challenge basis. Challenges would be subject to screening by an international oversight group under agreed procedures in order to eliminate invalid complaints; however, challenges would not be subject to single veto limitations.

—Other confidence building measures, such as the exchange of technical data, would be included.

—Withdrawal. A state party would be allowed to withdraw from participation in the agreement whenever a serious threat to its national security arose because of the non-compliance of other major parties. Withdrawal would be subject to the presentation of reasonable evidence of non-compliance to the international oversight group or a consultative committee established for the purpose of reviewing complaints/evidence.

(S) The above outline is very broad and lacks substantial details necessary to a workable agreement. Nonetheless, it does indicate a reasonable approach and provides a basis for discussion and negotiation. It is applicable to a bilateral U.S.–USSR agreement or to a multilateral agreement; however, it is aimed primarily at constraining the Soviet Union since the Soviets pose the only major CW threat to our forces. It is recognized that other countries, such as the PRC, also possess offensive CW capabilities, but CW attack by these countries can be adequately deterred by threat of nuclear or other retaliation. Nuclear deterrence of Soviet CW use is less credible, however, because of their increasing tactical nuclear capability. For this reason, it would be in our overall best interests to enter into an acceptable agreement along the lines outlined with the Soviets even if there were no other states party thereto.

1. Summary: The position paper outlined the essential elements of an acceptable chemical weapons arms limitation agreement.

   Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 82M00587R, Box 5, NSSM 195. Secret. Attached to Document 215.

2. There were several factors involved in the U.S. decision to sign an unverifiable BW treaty. Principal among these were (1) the U.S. had renounced unilaterally the use of BW and (2) BW was not considered a particularly efficient weapon since it was difficult to control and presented significant logistical problems which generally outweighed its effectiveness. These factors do not apply to CW which are effective tactical weapons currently stocked by U.S. with a history of use. [Footnote is in the original.]