Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

188. Telegram 2926 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State and the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Geneva, April 15, 1976, 1150Z.

2926. Subject: CCD: Informal Meetings on New Mass Destruction Weapons (MDW) April 7–8, 1976. Ref: State 81986 (Notal).

Summary: CCD held three informal meetings on Soviet MDW proposal in which experts from USSR, Hungary and GDR participated. Western delegations including U.S. raised questions about scope and content of proposed MDW convention, some (especially Canada and Italy) expressing strong skepticism and raising Soviet hackles. Non-aligned delegations remained silent except India, which supported CCD making efforts on question. Although a number of possible “new” weapons applications based on various physical, chemical and biological principles were suggested, scope and content of MDW proposal remained pretty much undefined. Soviets contended repeatedly that other CCD members had obligation to help sponsors put content into MDW concept. They mooted, but did not formally propose, establishing experts group on definition. However, following meeting they seemed uncertain as to what they wanted to do next regarding the proposal. Soviets later inquired as to future U.S. initiatives. End summary.

1. At Soviet request, CCD held three informal meetings with experts April 7–8 on question of banning new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Soviets sent two experts, Hungary and GDR one each. No other country was represented outside of its regular CCD delegation.

2. After introduction by Soviet Rep Roshchin, primary USSR expert, Academician Fokin of Academy of Sciences, led off discussion in April 7 a.m. meeting. Turning first to question of specifying weapons to be covered in draft MDW treaty, Fokin cautioned that listing weapons ideas now in existence could omit even more threatening weapons that might emerge in future. Nevertheless, he conceded, some kind of definition must be arrived at.

3. Fokin focused on definitions of MDW in terms of their objectives (mass destruction of people, loss of self-defense capability, death), their methods of employment (physical, chemical, biological, genetic), and their effects (on men, environment, productivity). He asserted that certain R&D areas must be defined for prohibition, but did not state what these were. New weapons of mass destruction could be based on existing technology; on principles already developed (particle annihilation); or on entirely new principles. As specific examples Fokin cited transuranic fission weapons and laser fusion; the examples were drawn from presentations at an open symposium in U.S. in 1970, meeting without amplification or addition (Fokin made no direct attempt to include for prohibition new systems for the employment of existing (e.g., nuclear or chemical) weapons).

4. Fokin added that a basic definition of MDW would involve three aspects: (a) objects of use, e.g., human systems, environment, energy systems; (b) method of operation; (c) realization of the effect (i.e., losses suffered). Filling in this basic definition would give rise to all-encompassing definition.

5. Upon conclusion of Fokin’s statement, Martin (U.S.) put forward following questions pursuant to instructions contained reftel:

(A) What specific items would be included as examples of “new types” and “new systems” in Article I, Paragraph 1, of the draft convention?

(B) What “new types” of weapons of mass destruction do Soviet experts believe may emerge in the foreseeable future?

(C) What physical principles do Soviet experts believe could eventually provide the basis for a new type of mass destruction weapon?

(D) Article I, Paragraph 2, of the Soviet draft provides for further negotiations if new areas emerge in the development and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and systems of such weapons not covered by the agreement. What is the meaning of the phrase “new areas”? How would agreement be reached as to whether or not new areas or systems had emerged? (Questions had been handed to SoviDel in advance.)

6. Schlaich (FRG) could not see how Soviet proposal could achieve the praiseworthy aim of preventive arms control. He said that authoritative interpretation of certain concepts was still lacking, e.g., it was unclear whether “new weapons” are completely new or embody development of existing ABC weapons. Schlaich asked whether genetic engineering was not actually covered by the Biological Weapons Convention. Commenting that verification and proof in context of MDW draft treaty seemed insurmountable problem, he called the complaints procedure involving Security Council “entirely inadequate.”

7. Allen (UK) was especially concerned regarding the distinction between “new types” and “new systems” of MDW. He agreed with Schlaich’s suggestion that genetic engineering was already covered by BWC and added that in considering the MDW question one must be careful to analyze what is and what is not covered by existing international instruments.

8. Di Bernardo (Italy) said “real life” definition of MDW was needed, but doubted that such definition could be developed. It was necessary, he said, to put content into any MDW agreement which at same time must not impede the beneficial development of new scientific techniques. Di Bernardo concluded that more specificity regarding proposal was needed in any case.

9. Ericsson (Sweden) asked whether draft treaty referred to new weapons and new systems of such new weapons or alternatively new systems of already extant MDW. He proposed that if intention was former, Article I be rephrased as “new weapons of MDW and new systems of such new weapons.”

10. Concluding morning’s discussion, Roshchin protested that Soviets wanted other countries to go beyond “negative questions” that had been raised. MDW definition, he said, was not the sole responsibility of the USSR. This was why informal meeting with experts had been called. Roshchin quite impassionedly maintained that all other members of CCD had obligation to add content to Soviet proposal. Thus he called on others to provide answers to U.S. questions, as he assured Soviets would.

11. In April 7 afternoon meeting second Soviet expert, Col. Sourikov, said two courses could be pursued: experts could develop definition of MDW and then move on to identifying specific weapons, or, alternatively, they could follow a concept which had been put forward earlier and establish a list of MDW and develop general prohibition from that. Definition, Sourikov said, should take into account new physical, chemical, or biological principles that could be used for military purposes, and measure these in terms of what they could do to humans. Under term MDW, he continued, should be considered new types of conduct of warfare that are being or may be found in research or study stage, based on qualitatively new methods of action and meant for new objectives of discussion.

12. Hungarian maintained that banning MDW was important because most such weapons are strategic in nature and if one country develops them others will have to as well. He stated that Soviet experts alone could not answer all questions put to them; answers could be found only after lengthy consultations in committee.

13. Mishra (India), the only non-aligned representative to intervene, supported the idea of a MDW convention. He said the CCD should pursue its consideration of this subject, which process could lead to “significant developments.”

14. Opening April 8 informal meeting, GDR Rep Herder called it regrettable that other technologically advanced states had so far only asked questions. They should, he said, have volunteered “positive information.”

15. Herder then introduced GDR expert, Prof. Lohs, a chemical toxicologist. In quite thorough presentation, Lohs proposed examples of new chemical weapons. These included new families of binary weapons based on high-toxicity carbamates and nitrosamines, which are too unstable for use in other than binary form. Synthetic toxins and pain-producing agents were cited as another example of possible future binary technology. Synthetically produced toxic peptides could undermine existing agreements.

16. According to Lohs delayed toxic effects could become important, as could highly toxic by-products of herbicides that can be produced as main components, which compare with V-agents in toxicity but for which, in contrast to the V-agents, there is no technically possible means of detoxification. Contamination of a town with, e.g., dioxin, would render it uninhabitable permanently without other damage. Effects of dioxin are long-lasting and can exterminate large population groups through diseases of metabolism or cancer. An additional example involved so-called “ethnic weapons,” specific in their effects against certain ethnic groups due to the genetic disposition or enzymatic polymorphism of those groups. Such weapons, Lohs maintained, could selectively exterminate specific ethnic populations without damaging others.

17. Barton (Canada) said his delegation had found Soviet experts’ presentations “thought-provoking and illustrative of the vast dimensions of the problems coming within the scope of the Soviet initiative.” Nevertheless, Barton said, procedures set forth in Article I of draft MDW agreement seemed inadequate to provide necessary definitions of what weapons and weapons types would be covered. Barton said that as with EnMod treaty it was necessary to define what was being banned with enough specificity so there would be no ambiguity about intentions and obligations being undertaken by treaty parties.

18. Barton raised another question relating to implementation of an agreement on MDW prohibition. In view of the sweeping nature of such an agreement he supposed it could not be implemented without adherence of all technologically and militarily advanced nations. But, he said, he would appreciate hearing Soviet views on this point which was “of some relevance in the light of the approach of some governments to these matters.”

19. Soviets then essayed response to questions raised by Western delegations, especially U.S. According to Fokin, “new types of MDW” involved new means of waging war based on a new effect, chemical, physical or other. “New systems” involved the carrier and control mechanisms. Regarding specific “new types,” Fokin postulated, e.g., “ethnic war” based on biochemical characteristics of races, psychotropic chemicals, use of infrasound and subsonic frequencies, acoustic and optical principles (lasers?), and radiological weapons.

20. Regarding “new areas” question, Roshchin said Fokin had pointed to three categories of MDW “that seem achievable:” (a) those based on already discovered scientific principles; (b) types for which there is scientific basis in principle, but scientific-technical means to bring them into being are lacking; (c) types based on entirely novel principles about which we currently know nothing. Roshchin maintained that draft treaty text answered question regarding agreement whether or not new area or system had emerged. This was to be subject of negotiation, he said.

21. In reply to other Western questions, Roshchin (a) doubted that MDW agreement would inhibit peaceful uses; (b) said not all technologically advanced states would need to join agreement. On latter point, he noted that “big majority” in UNGA, including Canada, had voted to refer MDW question to CCD; therefore he hoped that large number of technologically advanced countries would in fact participate in eventual agreement.

22. Meeting concluded with expressions of appreciation to experts, and with repeated Roshchin appeal to all CCD members to participate fully in dealing with “vitally important question.”

23. Comment: General reaction among Western and non-aligned groups seemed to be that notwithstanding creditable efforts by Fokin and Lohs, MDW proposal still lacked essential definition and substance. Soviets seem somewhat uncertain where to go next with their proposal. A week after meetings they have failed to respond to widespread requests for English translations of Fokin’s presentations. (GDR, in contrast, provided Lohs’s statement overnight).

24. At April 9 co-chairmen’s luncheon Roshchin asked if Martin thought committee should carry on in summer with more informal meetings on MDW. Martin said that he thought the present meetings had been very general and that if future meetings were to be of the same nature he personally had difficulty in seeing how the U.S. would be able to make any substantive contribution which would justify sending experts. If, however, the Soviets were prepared to designate specific areas or topics as the subject for consideration, Washington would be better able to consider in connection with its evaluation of the present meetings whether it would be worthwhile to send experts to future meetings.

Abrams

1. Summary: The mission reported that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament had, at Soviet request, held three informal meetings of experts in Geneva, April 7–8, concerning the Soviet new weapons of mass destruction proposal. After summarizing the three meetings, the Mission commented that the sense of the Western and non-aligned groups was that the MDW proposal “still lacked essential definition and substance.”

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760143–0213. Limited Official Use; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, London, New Delhi, Ottawa, Rome, The Hague, Tokyo, ERDA, the Mission to the IAEA at Vienna, the Mission to NATO, the U.S. delegation to the SALT II talks in Geneva, and USUN. Telegram 81986 to Geneva, April 6, is ibid., D760128–0656.