Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

159. Memorandum From Jan Lodal of the National Security Council Staff and the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, September 4, 1975.

SUBJECT

• Instructions for the TTBT/PNE Delegation

The fourth round of PNE talks is scheduled to begin in Moscow on September 5. With the exception of an allowance for some PNEs above 150 KT, most of the remaining differences between the two sides appear amenable to resolution.

Background

In our May private note we had proposed that all individual PNE yields be limited to 150 KT with an aggregate yield limit on PNE groups of one megaton. We pointed out that this would enhance public acceptance of both the TTBT and PNE agreement, and would permit less complex verification provisions. Just prior to your Geneva meeting with Gromyko in July, the Soviets accepted this basic approach, but asked that a “limited number” of individual excavation PNEs be allowed to exceed the 150 KT threshold. They also proposed that observers be permitted between 100 and 150 KT only at the discretion of the host side and for all PNEs above 150 KT, observers would be allowed at the discretion of the verifying side. At our request, they tabled this position at the conclusion of the last round of PNE talks.

Outstanding Issue

The major outstanding issue is the Soviet proposal to allow a “limited number” of individual excavation PNEs with yields greater than 150 KT. Fred Iklé has written to you expressing his view that we should not permit explosions above the 150 KT threshold. Our comments are at Tab C. Whether to permit a small number of excavation shots with yields above 150 KT is a difficult question since PNEs above the threshold could cause serious verification problems and would undoubtedly lead to strong Senate and public criticism that such shots would violate the LTBT. On the other hand, the right to have PNEs above the threshold has been a key Soviet objective from the outset of the TTB talks, and was the reason that a separate PNE negotiation was necessary. It is unclear whether they would be willing to abandon that goal.

We do not believe that the exceptions issue needs to be resolved at this time. There is general bureaucratic agreement that, if only for tactical reasons, we should begin this round by opposing any exceptions, as we did in our May private note. We would also table ad referendum treaty language consistent with our May note although a small amount of editing by the Verification Panel Working Group remains to be done in the next few days. The NSDM authorizes the delegation to table the draft treaty which we will convey upon completion of this work. This would bring our Moscow position into agreement with our position in your channel. It would also be responsive to Soviet concerns that we should begin negotiating treaty language and would represent considerable U.S. movement, even without concessions on “exceptions.”

We plan to continue work on an analysis of the exceptions issue, taking into account the Soviet positions in the next few weeks, with the goal of a decision, probably requiring a VP meeting, later this month.

Draft Treaty

The working group has prepared an interagency discussion paper and a draft treaty with two associated Protocols (Tab B). These documents have the general concurrence of all agency representatives on the Working Group. The draft treaty is consistent with our May note and previous guidance and contains the following key elements:

—Individual Yield Limits. All PNEs would be restricted to an individual yield limit of 150 KT.

—Aggregate Yield Limit. All PNE group explosions would be restricted to an aggregate yield limit of one megaton. The Soviet proposal suggests an aggregate limit of two megatons; however, as this yield limit increases above one megaton, there is some risk that an individual “above-threshold” shot might be hidden in the overall ground shock caused by the group.

—Distinction between Excavation and Contained PNEs. The treaty does not distinguish between excavation and contained PNEs, since with the yield restrictions noted above, the 0.2 KT fission yield restriction on excavation PNEs and its attendant melt sample collection and analysis is not required. A third protocol which sets forth this provision and its related verification procedures has been prepared for use if we eventually decide to permit exceptions.

—Yield Limit Verification. For PNE events below 150 KT, verification would be by national technical means supplemented by information exchange. For PNE group yields above 150 KT, seismometers and electrical yield measurement devices (SLIFERs) would be emplaced on-site. The Soviets have proposed use of instruments that are similar to SLIFERs, but in ERDA’s view are considerably less accurate and subject to “spoofing”. They have also argued that the equipment to be used by the verifying side should be manufactured by the host side. We believe they will eventually accept the SLIFERs but we may have to compromise somewhat on the latter point by permitting the Soviets to manufacture some of the less critical components.

—Observers below 150 KT. In our view the verifying side must retain the right to decide whether observers are needed. The draft treaty states that observers should be permitted for any PNE event (including groups) with a total yield above 50 KT. This requirement is rather extreme and could result in excessive and unnecessary verification activities. In the working paper it is acknowledged that observers are really only needed for PNEs with yields in excess of 100 KT and the draft NSDM instructs the Delegation to take this position.

—Observers for PNE groups above 150 KT. The draft treaty provides for extensive observer activities including utilization of both seismic instruments and SLIFERs for all PNE groups with aggregate yields above 150 KT.

—Information Exchange. The draft treaty includes provisions for information exchange which are graduated on the basis of the PNE yield level. These include limited information in advance with actual results after the event for all PNEs, and for PNEs near 150 KT (above 75 KT), detailed geological information and emplacement hole geometry.

— LTBT Compliance. The draft treaty includes an article reaffirming compliance with the LTBT, which the Soviets indicated they would be willing to accept. Whether or not exceptions are permitted, however, we can expect strong criticism on the implications for the LTBT of permitting excavation PNEs. The NSDM would have the delegation continue to stress that we expect the Soviets to comply with the LTBT and to ensure that the negotiating record is clear on that point. This will enable us to state, during our ratification hearings, that we have put the Soviets on notice that we will expect adherence to the LTBT in all PNE activities.

—Cooperation. The draft treaty contains an article which provides for consultation between the Parties and for possible agreements on cooperation in PNEs. The Soviets have consistently insisted on a cooperation provision and at one point suggested the entire PNE agreement should be an agreement on cooperation. The draft treaty position is a minimal one and the Soviets may insist on a more explicit agreement on cooperation in certain aspects of PNE development.

Most of the provisions reflected in the draft treaty are fairly close to the Soviet positions as we know them and we anticipate only minor difficulties in resolving the remaining differences. However, we may be misreading the Soviets on some of these issues such as observer rights or cooperation. Furthermore, the Soviets may attempt to link resolution of some of these issues to U.S. acceptance of at least some exceptions over 150 KT. Consequently, it is too early to predict how much time will be required to reach an agreement.

Recommendation

The attached NSDM and draft treaty are fully consistent with our private note in May and effectively implement the withheld provisions of the last PNE NSDM. In addition, there is substantial bureaucratic concurrence on these issues. Accordingly, we believe that there is no need for further Presidential review at this time and we recommend that you sign the attached NSDM at Tab A. We will subsequently prepare a memorandum from you to the President informing him of the status of the negotiations and the contents of this NSDM.

1. Summary: Lodal and Sonnenfeldt presented an updated set of topics to be raised by the U.S. delegation at the fourth round of PNE talks in Moscow. Noting “substantial bureaucratic concurrence” on the issues, they wrote that there was no need for Ford to review the instructions and recommended that Kissinger sign the attached National Security Decision Memorandum containing the instructions to the delegation.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files—NSDMs, Box 61, NSDM 304—Instructions for the U.S. Delegation to the PNE Negotiations, Moscow, 9/5/75. Secret; Completely Outside the System. Marcum initialed for both Lodal and Sonnenfeldt. Attached at Tab A is the draft NSDM; NSDM 304 as approved is Document 161. Tab B, the draft treaty, and Tab C, an undated memorandum from Lodal and Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger commenting on Iklé’s memorandum (Document 141), are attached but not published; the interagency discussion paper noted at Tab B is not attached.