Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

154. Memorandum From Jan Lodal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, July 1, 1975.

SUBJECT

• VPWG Control of Non-Proliferation Process

As a result of concern over the Republic of Korea’s apparent intention to develop nuclear weapons, there is a growing interagency consensus at the staff level that the U.S. should attempt to persuade the Koreans to abandon their plans to purchase a reprocessing plant from France. In view of recent public controversy surrounding our attempts to head off a similar FRG sale of a reprocessing plant to Brazil and recognizing the particular concern in the Korean case of minimizing any adverse impact on our security relationship, it is clear that a policy level decision is required prior to implementation of any such approach. Consequently, at a VPWG meeting last week, we tasked the bureaucracy to prepare an options paper on these issues. State (S/P) initially accepted this task but is now attempting, with ACDA concurrence, to treat the issue as an internal State matter which they would forward to Secretary Kissinger through their channels.

The State/ACDA opposition to NSC review in this case is apparently based on a fear that if they yield on this point, then all other proliferation initiatives will be controlled by NSC. We believe there are two compelling reasons for asserting our control in this area:

—First, this issue has important implications for both DOD and ERDA interests and it is essential that these agencies be fully involved through the interagency process.

—Second, non-proliferation policy involves numerous and diverse actions which we have been trying to integrate under a comprehensive review process to ensure orderly and consistent decision making. Allowing our tasking to be ignored in this manner would seriously undermine the Verification Panel process in this area and could also weaken our control of other arms control issues as well.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to Ingersoll instructing him that such issues should be handled through NSC channels.

Bill Hyland feels particularly strongly that we should firmly assert NSC control of the non-proliferation policy process at this time. Hal Sonnenfeldt and Dick Smyser concur in this action.

1. Summary: Lodal wrote that as a result of concern over the Republic of Korea’s apparent intent to develop nuclear weapons, an interagency consensus had developed, at the staff level, that the United States should persuade the Republic of Korea to “abandon” plans to purchase a reprocessing plant from France.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Program Analysis Staff Files, Convenience Files, Box 47, TTB/PNE Memos, Round 2 (2). Secret. Sent for urgent action. Marcum initialed for Lodal. Neither recommendation was approved, but a handwritten notation by Marcum on the second page indicates that the issue was “Handled orally with Ingersoll” on July 3.