Office of the Historian

149. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford1

Washington, June 11, 1975.

SUBJECT

  • Instructions for the U.S. Delegation to the PNE Negotiations, Moscow, June 3, 1975

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) signed in Moscow on July 3, 1974, limited nuclear weapons tests to a maximum yield of 150 kilotons (KT). It also provided for follow-on negotiations regarding peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), which were not covered in the TTBT. Two rounds of negotiations have been held in Moscow during October-November, 1974 and February-March, 1975 and considerable progress has been made towards reaching an agreement.

The next phase of the PNE negotiations began in Moscow on June 3 with Ambassador Stoessel continuing in charge of the U.S. Delegation. Based on the status of the negotiations and the Verification Panel Working Group studies, I have drafted for your approval instructions to the Delegation (Tab 1) and a note to be passed to the Soviets in your channel (Tab 2). The main features of this approach would be to:

—Reiterate our proposed 100 KT limit on contained PNEs, with provision for observers. We could withdraw the observer provision if the Soviets accept the 100 KT limit. Alternatively, if the Soviets insist that larger contained PNEs are needed, we could accept a limit of 150 KT with observers.

—Reiterate our position that PNE events must be fully consistent with the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) and question the Soviets on how major PNE excavation projects could be carried out consistent with the LTBT. In our view, the LTBT would have to be amended to permit the large radioactivity releases which would result from major PNE excavation projects, and Congress is unlikely to agree to amendment of the LTBT.

—Privately propose to the Soviets a limit of 150 KT for individual excavation explosions, with provisions for observers. Such a limit [Page 497] would ensure that the Soviets were not using PNEs for weapons test purposes otherwise prohibited by the TTBT. The Soviets have indicated that they need individual explosive yields of several hundred kilotons—preferably 500 KT—for a large canal excavation project they have in mind to stabilize the water level in the Caspian Sea. If they strongly insist on yields above 150 KT, we could reluctantly accept a limit of 250 KT, but with considerably more restrictive verification measures, including collection of radioactive samples in the vicinity of the explosions.

—Continue to propose 500 KT as the aggregate limit on multiple-shot excavation PNE salvos, but privately offer a higher limit of one megaton in exchange for Soviet agreement to a yield limit of 150 KT on each individual explosive device contained in the salvo. We would propose similar ceilings for contained salvos, but with additional on-site instrumentation to ensure that the individual yield limit is not exceeded.

—Indicate to the Soviets that we would be willing to consider favorably their proposal for PNE cooperation in the context of adequate verification provisions. The Soviets have indicated that it would be easier for them to allow observers (or “representatives” as they prefer to call them) if the two sides have a PNE cooperation agreement.

The above approach is the same in substance as that recommended in the interagency paper on PNE’s prepared for the Verification Panel. It has the concurrence of all agencies.

A fuller analysis of the issues is provided in a Briefing Paper at Tab 3.

Recommendation

That you authorize me to sign the instructions at Tab 1 for the U.S. Delegation to the PNE negotiations and pass the note at Tab 2 to Ambassador Dobrynin.

  1. Summary: Kissinger requested that President Ford authorize instructions for the U.S. delegation to the PNE negotiations in Moscow that had been prepared based on the current status of the negotiations and the Verification Panel Working Group studies.

    Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files—NSDMs, Box 60, NSDM 297, Instructions for the U.S. Delegation to the PNE Negotiations, Moscow, 6/3/75. Secret. Kissinger approved the recommendation for Ford. Tab 1, instructions to the delegation (NSDM 297), is Document 150. Tab 2, a note for Dobrynin, and Tab 3, a briefing paper, are attached but not published.

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