120. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Iklé) to President Ford1
SUBJECT
- Nuclear Proliferation: Urgent Issues for Decision
Pursuant to our recent discussion, I am submitting this memorandum outlining certain high priority actions which, as I see them, should be pursued urgently to curb the further spread of nuclear weapons. I recommend that we give somewhat higher priority in our arms control and defense policies to the objective of curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; specifically, that we take certain steps in addition to our present effort to coordinate export controls among the key suppliers of nuclear technology.
Discussion
1. Our current intelligence assessment is that South Korea is attempting to develop nuclear weapons and can have an initial capability in ten years. Taiwan will probably have such a capability in five years. Argentina could have nuclear explosives in ten years. The Argentine program would in turn prompt the Brazilians to follow close behind. The Union of South Africa is moving towards a capability to build nuclear weapons. Pakistan has been making efforts to acquire the means to manufacture plutonium. And Iran—although a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty—is coming into possession of the nuclear materials and know-how as a result of its large purchase of reactors. Iraq would probably follow Iran’s example. There are indications Libya is strongly interested in acquiring nuclear weapons and indigenous technical know-how or becoming, through financial assistance, a partner with such countries as Pakistan. These developments, in turn, could impel some of the industrialized potential nuclear states to move into a weapons program.
[Page 404]If these trends cannot be checked, serious new threats to our security are likely to arise in the 1980s—threats for which our military forces would be ill-prepared. Also, should we fail to take more vigorous action now, we would appear to be co-responsible for further proliferation because of our close association with several countries now on the verge of going nuclear.
2. Our effort to organize a supplier’s conference for tightening export controls on nuclear materials and technology represents the most serious and realistic effort any government has yet made to slow proliferation. However, its success may depend to a large extent on the French attitude. And even if we manage to achieve our objectives for the conference on export controls, the situation would be improved but far from resolved. Without political backup, the export controls will be inadequate in the end. A determined government could circumvent these controls, especially the fragile safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
3. The Non-Proliferation Treaty is important because some states, such as the FRG and Japan, are restrained by essentially political considerations. The number of countries that cannot be restrained by export controls will grow because nuclear technology is inevitably becoming more accessible throughout the world. For them and some others, the NPT could be a useful barrier against domestic pressures to develop a nuclear weapons capacity. In addition, the Treaty helps maintain in many regions a network of commitments among neighboring countries not to start a nuclear competition against each other, and thus avoid precisely the kind of nuclear competition now threatening between India and Pakistan or between Argentina and Brazil.
Today, however, the Non-Proliferation Treaty is at an impasse because Japan and Italy might indefinitely delay their ratification. This could lead to an unravelling of the Treaty. Without Italy’s ratification the Federal Republic of Germany (and perhaps other Euratom countries) would probably not become parties. Other signatories would then fail to ratify, or perhaps even withdraw and embark on a nuclear weapons program.
To be sure, parties to the Treaty could withdraw from it in any event or violate it, much as they could circumvent our export controls. Indeed, Taiwan may now be in the process of doing both. Nor will the Treaty cover all the countries of concern to us.
4. In addition to export controls and the NPT, a third critical question is what action we take with certain specific countries where we have influence and that are now actively pursuing nuclear weapons. Export controls and the Non-Proliferation Treaty are only as strong as the political resolve that backs them up. If some of the smaller countries are seen to be pursuing nuclear weapons unchecked—particularly [Page 405] countries over whom our influence is presumed to be strong—larger countries may question their own decisions to renounce these powerful weapons, and perhaps even their decisions to impose controls on commercial exports of nuclear technology.
A first test case here is what we do about South Korea’s nuclear program, a program which will have adverse effects on stability in East Asia and on U.S. interests in that area, including the U.S. security commitment to South Korea. Our influence on that country, if we choose to exercise it, could enable us to change ROK nuclear policy, with attendant benefits in a broader nonproliferation context. While the costs of such action may be high, we should seriously weigh them against the dangers that a South Korean nuclear weapons program would present.
Recommendations
The specific actions I believe ought to be taken in the very near future are:
—Using our influence in South Korea to keep that country, for the time being, from moving towards a nuclear weapons capability. I would recommend that you request an interagency study, on an urgent basis, to provide you with an assessment of specific policy options (Tab A).
—Informing the Japanese Government that we want them to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty, so as to correct their mistaken impression that we are rather indifferent. I recommend we do the same for the Italian Government, should it fail to ratify soon (Tab B and C).
In light of the far-ranging implications for our overall arms control and defense policies and in view of Congressional attitudes on nuclear technology transfer, I would recommend the key issues regarding proliferation be taken up at an NSC meeting in the near future.
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Summary: In light of U.S. intelligence reports on the status of nuclear weapons development abroad, Iklé recommended that the United States consider several high priority actions to hinder the spread of nuclear weapons. He summarized the current situation and offered recommendations for specific actions, requesting that the National Security Council take up several of these issues in the near future.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Agency Files, Box 1, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, February 18, 1975–July 8, 1975. Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Kissinger and Schlesinger. Tab A, an undated assessment of South Korea’s nuclear intentions and U.S policy options, and Tabs B and C, undated recommendations to the Japanese and Italian Governments for NPT ratification, are attached but not published.
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